Shawn Lawrence Desautel; v. Anita B. Dupris;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SHAWN LAWRENCE DESAUTEL; et
al.,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
ANITA B. DUPRIS; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-35926
D.C. No. 2:11-cv-00301-EFS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Edward F. Shea, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 13, 2012**
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Shawn Lawrence DesAutel, Tamara Desautel Davis and Tonia Rene
Desautel, adopted members of the Colville Confederated Tribes, appeal pro se
from the district court’s judgment dismissing their action alleging that defendants
FILED
NOV 26 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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11-35926 2
violated their First, Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights during
proceedings in which plaintiffs challenged their enrollment status before the
Colville Tribal Courts. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
de novo, Rhoades v. Avon Prods., 504 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2007), and we
affirm.
The district court properly dismissed the plaintiffs’ action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction because the allegations that defendants failed to follow the
provisions of the Colville Tribal Code in addressing the plaintiffs’ challenge to
their enrollment status would impermissibly require the court to evaluate the merits
of the tribe’s membership determinations. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
436 U.S. 49, 72 n.32 (1978) (the right to define membership “for tribal purposes
has long been recognized as central to [a tribe’s] existence as an independent
political community” and federal courts should avoid “intrud[ing] on these delicate
matters”); Lewis v. Norton, 424 F.3d 959, 961 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]ribal immunity
bars suits to force tribes to comply with their membership provisions, as well as
suits to force tribes to change their membership provisions.”).
The district court properly concluded that, in the alternative, the action was
subject to dismissal because the causes of action failed to state a claim as a matter
of law. See Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006)

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(“18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 . . . are criminal statutes that do not give rise to civil
liability.”); Evans v. McKay, 869 F.2d 1341, 1347 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]ctions
under section 1983 cannot be maintained in federal court for persons alleging a
deprivation of constitutional rights under color of tribal law.”); Caldeira v. County
of Kauai, 866 F.2d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he absence of a section 1983
deprivation of rights precludes a section 1985 conspiracy claim predicated on the
same allegations.”).
AFFIRMED.

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