Patrick Pinegar v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK PINEGAR,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 11-15955
D.C. No. 2:09-cv-01767-KJN
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Kendall J. Newman, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 9, 2012**
San Francisco, California
Before: FARRIS, NOONAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Patrick Pinegar appeals the district court’s order affirming the
Commissioner’s decision denying his application for Supplemental Security
FILED
NOV 23 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Income. We review de novo the district court’s order affirming the denial of
benefits. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). We may
reverse the Commissioner’s decision only if it is not supported by substantial
evidence or is based on legal error. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882
(9th Cir. 2006). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Pinegar claims that the ALJ did not properly characterize and weigh the
opinions of his treating physicians and his Global Assessment of Functioning
scores. Under the “treating physician rule,” a treating physician’s opinions are
entitled to great weight, and may only be rejected if the ALJ provides “specific and
legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Lester v.
Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d
499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). But most of the
“opinions” Pinegar claims the ALJ did not properly credit are nothing more than
notes summarizing Pinegar’s complaints. They are therefore not physicians’
opinions and do not fall under the “treating physician rule.” See id. Where
Pinegar does identify what is arguably a treating physician’s opinion, it is
contradicted by “substantial evidence in the record” that the ALJ took note of. Id.
Regarding Pinegar’s Global Assessment of Functioning scores, the
Commissioner has stated that such scores do not directly correlate with the

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requirements of Listing 12.04 for a finding of disability, and this Court has not
found error when an ALJ does not consider them. Revised Medical Criteria for
Evaluating Mental Disorders and Traumatic Brain Injury, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,764,
50,764-65 (Aug. 21, 2000); see also Chavez v. Astrue, 699 F. Supp. 2. 1125, 1135
(C.D. Cal. 2009). Therefore, the ALJ did not err by not considering Pinegar’s
Global Assessment of Functioning scores.
We reject Pinegar’s claim that the ALJ erred in finding his testimony not
fully credible. The ALJ offered “specific, clear and convincing reasons” supported
by substantial evidence to find that Pinegar was exaggerating the severity of his
claimed mental and physical symptoms. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281
(9th Cir. 1996).
Pinegar is correct that the ALJ committed error by ignoring the testimony of
his girlfriend, Crystal Broome. Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918-19 (9th Cir.
1993). However, Ms. Broome’s testimony was either consistent with the
determination reached by the ALJ, or merely repeated evidence already considered
and rejected. Thus, Pinegar has not met his burden to show that the error was not
harmless, i.e., that a reasonable ALJ fully crediting the testimony could have
reached a different determination. Stout v. Comm’r, 454 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir.
2006); see also Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009).

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Since the ALJ properly considered the above evidence, there is no basis to
find that the conclusion that Pinegar did not satisfy the listing requirements of 20
C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.04B was not supported by substantial
evidence. Robbins, 466 F.3d at 882.
Pinegar’s final claim is that the ALJ did not properly assess his Residual
Functional Capacity, specifically that the ALJ improperly ignored the final
hypothesis considered by the vocational expert. However, the hypothetical relied
on by the ALJ is supported by substantial evidence, whereas the one Pinegar
endorses is not. The ALJ properly assessed Pinegar’s Residual Functional
Capacity. See Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422-23 (9th Cir. 1988).
AFFIRMED.

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