United States of America v. Sharon Hatcher

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The Honorable Myron H. Bright, Senior Circuit Judge for the U.S.**
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHARON HATCHER,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 11-50409
D.C. No. 2:10-cr-00409-GW-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 9, 2012
Pasadena, California
Before: BRIGHT , GRABER, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.**
Sharon Hatcher appeals her conviction for being a felon in possession of
ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We affirm.
FILED
NOV 20 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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The first search warrant was supported by probable cause because Detective
Thompson’s affidavit disclosed evidence connecting Davonte to the January 2009
homicide, to the murder weapon, and to Hatcher’s home, and therefore raised a fair
probability that evidence of the homicide would be recovered at Hatcher’s home.
United States v. Grant is not to the contrary, because in that case no evidence
connected Davonte to the defendant’s home, 682 F.3d 827, 832–33 (9th Cir. 2012),
while here Davonte listed Hatcher’s home as his residence when he was arrested in
April 2009. Further, the issuing judge did not err in authorizing a nighttime search,
because the affidavit set forth sufficient reason to conclude that a daytime search
could compromise officer safety or lead to the destruction of evidence. See Bravo
v. City of Santa Maria, 665 F.3d 1076, 1085–86 (9th Cir. 2011).
The second search warrant was also supported by probable cause, because it
was based on a jailhouse conversation that could reasonably be interpreted to mean
that the first search was not thorough enough and, therefore, failed to find one of
Davonte’s guns.
An expert witness may testify as to the locations of ammunition
manufacturers “as part of an expert’s testimony on the ultimate issue—whether the
gun traveled in interstate commerce,” United States v. Dunn, 946 F.2d 615, 618
(9th Cir. 1991), and therefore the district court did not abuse its discretion in

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allowing such testimony. Dunn’s reasoning is not irreconcilable with the
reasoning of the Supreme Court’s subsequent expert-testimony opinions, see
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), or Confrontation Clause opinions, see
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36 (2004), so it has not been effectively overruled. See Miller v.
Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
Because there was evidence that Hatcher’s ammunition had previously
traveled in interstate commerce, and such evidence satisfies the jurisdictional
element of § 922(g)(1), see Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 570
(1977); United States v. Davis, 242 F.3d 1162, 1162–63 (9th Cir. 2001) (per
curiam), there was sufficient evidence to support Hatcher’s conviction under
§ 922(g)(1).
AFFIRMED.

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