United States of America v. Gerald T. Hill

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GERALD T. HILL,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 12-30053
D.C. No. 3:10-cr-00044-MO-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 11, 2012
Portland, Oregon
Before: SILVERMAN, CLIFTON, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Gerald T. Hill appeals the special conditions of supervised release imposed
by the district court, when Hill violated the terms and conditions of his prior
FILED
OCT 23 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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supervised release by being convicted of promoting the prostitution of his wife.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. While Hill was originally convicted of two drug crimes and was sentenced
to one hundred months in prison, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing special conditions 4, 5, and 6 relating to the use and search of his
computer, the internet, and his cell phone. The prostitution of Hill’s wife was
accomplished via the internet and with use of a cell phone. Whether or not it was
proven that Hill himself used those devices in connection with the criminal
conduct, the risk of such use in the future was evident and properly considered by
the district court as part of an individualized assessment of Hill’s circumstances.
Further, the record indicates that posting victims of human trafficking or
prostitution on various internet websites by using cell phones or laptops is the
current method being used to promote such conduct. Thus, we cannot say that the
district court abused its discretion in determining that these conditions are
“reasonably related to the goal of deterrence, protection of the public, [and]
rehabilitation of the offender . . . .” United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 618
(9th Cir. 2003).
2. The special conditions further do not involve a “greater deprivation of
liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes of supervised release.” Id.

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Hill argues generally that conditions 4, 5, and 6, relating to these devices, are not
narrowly tailored, because he did not personally use a computer-related device to
post his wife’s services on the internet. However, he does not point to any specific
provision in the special conditions that is overly broad. The district court imposed
conditions that relate to the purposes of supervised release, and conditions
monitoring such devices are not a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably
necessary. See United States v. Quinzon, 643 F.3d 1266, 1271-73 (9th Cir. 2011).
AFFIRMED.

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