Robert Titus, an individual v. Stanley Horrell, an individual

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT TITUS, an individual,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
STANLEY HORRELL, an individual; JIM
MUNYON, an individual; FRANK
PRIMOZIC, an individual; PAM
WOODWORTH, an individual; TIM
COE, an individual; ROGER
MCKINLEY, an individual; BILL
HARRINGTON, an individual,
Defendants - Appellants,
and
CITY OF PRAIRIE CITY, a municipal
corporation; DIANE CLINGMAN, an
individual; ANNA BASS, an individual,
Defendants.
No. 11-35664
D.C. No. 2:08-cv-01330-SU
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Patricia Sullivan, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
FILED
OCT 22 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Argued and Submitted October 10, 2012
Portland, Oregon
Before: SILVERMAN, CLIFTON, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Stanley Horrell and other members of the Prairie City Council appeal from
the district court’s denial of summary judgment in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
brought by Robert Titus. Because Titus had no protected property interest in his
continued employment, he suffered no due process violation, and appellants are
entitled to qualified immunity. We reverse.
Titus was an at will employee under the terms of the City Charter. The
Charter states that the City Council may appoint “such other officers and
employees of the city as the Council deems necessary or advisable and may
remove any of them at any time within their discretion.” Titus offers no evidence
to prove that he was not appointed by the City Council, and he does not dispute
that he was employed by the city. Though Titus argued that the Charter does not
apply to his position because it is not a specifically listed “officer” position, Titus
was at least an “other . . . employee[]” whom the City Council could remove
without limitation. Since Titus had no entitlement to his continued employment,
he had no protected property interest, and his due process rights were not violated.
See Lawson v. Umatilla Cnty., 139 F.3d 690, 691-92 (9th Cir. 1998). Appellants

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are entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity because they
did not violate Titus’s due process rights. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
232, 236 (2009).
REVERSED and REMANDED.

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