Galen Lloyd Houser v. Caron Grant-Ellis;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GALEN LLOYD HOUSER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CARON GRANT-ELLIS; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-16492
D.C. No. 2:09-cv-00937-GMS
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 10, 2012**
Before: WARDLAW, CLIFTON, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Arizona state prisoner Galen Lloyd Houser appeals pro se from the district
court’s dismissal order and summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
FILED
SEP 19 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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for failure to state a claim, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000),
and the entry of summary judgment, Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th
Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed defendant Baird because Houser’s
allegations predicate liability solely upon Baird’s supervisory status. See Barren v.
Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (“Liability under § 1983
must be based on the personal involvement of the defendant.”).
The district court properly dismissed defendant McMorran because Houser
failed to allege facts showing that McMorran knew of and disregarded an excessive
risk to his health or that McMorran’s alleged failure to act was anything more than
negligence. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058-59 (a prison official acts with
deliberate indifference only if he or she knows of and disregards an excessive risk
to the prisoner’s health and safety; negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate
indifference).
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Houser failed
to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants Grant-Ellis and
Salyer were deliberately indifferent to Houser’s medical condition of severe
psoriasis. See id.; Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744-46 (9th Cir. 2002) (delay

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of medical treatment does not constitute deliberate indifference unless the delay led
to further injury).
We do not consider issues not specifically raised and argued in the opening
brief and the addendum to the opening brief, nor arguments and allegations raised
for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir.
2009) (per curiam).
Houser’s contention that the district court erred in denying his request for
appointed counsel is unpersuasive.
Houser’s petition for the redress of grievances, received on June 22, 2012, is
order filed and denied.
AFFIRMED.

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