Bachitar Singh; v. ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BACHITAR SINGH; et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 08-70594
Agency Nos. A098-846-956
A098-846-957
A098-846-958
A098-846-959
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted July 20, 2012 **
San Francisco, California
Before: TASHIMA, CLIFTON, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Bachitar Singh (along with his wife and two children, whose applications are
derivative to his) petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeal’s
FILED
AUG 06 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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decision affirming an Immigration Judge’s denial of his application from asylum.
We conclude that the Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. We
therefore deny the petition. See Go v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir.
2011).
The Board found Singh’s account of past persecution credible but reasoned
that the presumption of a reasonable and well-founded fear of future persecution
was rebutted by evidence that Singh escaped persecution in the past by relocating
to Mumbai and, later, Ludhiana. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b). Petitioners argue that
Singh avoided persecution elsewhere only by hiding from police. He testified,
however, that he was able to marry, travel, raise children, and supervise his farm
while he lived in those cities. This testimony is substantial evidence in favor of the
Board’s conclusion that relocation within India is a feasible alternative to asylum.
Petitioners also point out that we held in Singh v. Moschorak, 53 F.3d 1031,
1034 (9th Cir. 1995), that “[i]t has never been thought that there are safe places
within a nation when it is the nation's government that has engaged in the acts of
punishing opinion that have driven the victim to leave the country.” The petitioner
in that case, however, was persecuted in several different locations, and there was
no evidence that he had ever managed to avoid persecution by relocating. Id. at
1032-33. By contrast, the current lead Petitioner was persecuted only in his home

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village by the local police and lived without persecution in both Mumbai and
Ludhiana. The evidence does not compel a conclusion that the reach of Singh’s
persecutors is nationwide, but even if it did, the record in this case contains
substantial evidence that Petitioners can relocate to a place where Singh will not in
fact suffer persecution.
Finally, Petitioners argue that the Board only analyzed whether it was
possible for Singh to relocate, not whether it was reasonable to expect him to do
so. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3); Knezevic v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1206, 1214-15
(9th Cir. 2004). As described above, however, the Board took into account the fact
that Singh successfully relocated in the past. This evidence suggests that it is
reasonable to expect Petitioners to relocate again in the future.
PETITION DENIED.

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