Jake Mandeville-Anthony, an individual v. the Walt Disney Company;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAKE MANDEVILLE-ANTHONY, an
individual,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 11-56441
D.C. No. 2:11-cv-02137-VBF-
JEM
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Valerie Baker Fairbank, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 17, 2012**
Before: SCHROEDER, THOMAS, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
Jake Mandeville-Anthony appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
on the pleadings in his action alleging claims for copyright infringement and
breach of implied contract. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
FILED
JUL 20 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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11-56441 2
review de novo, Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009), and we
affirm.
The district court properly granted judgment on Mandeville-Anthony’s
copyright infringement claims because there was no substantial similarity between
protected elements of his copyrighted works and comparable elements of the
defendants’ works as a matter of law, and any similarity in the general concepts of
car racing and anthropomorphic cars is unprotected. See Benay v. Warner Bros.
Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 624 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting forth extrinsic test to assess
substantial similarity between specific expressive elements of copyrighted works at
issue as a matter of law, such as plot, sequence of events, theme, dialogue, mood,
setting, pace, and characters); Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., L.P.,
462 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2006) (substantial similarity focuses on only
concrete, protectable elements of works standing alone, not non-protectable
elements such as generic concepts or ideas).
The district court properly granted judgment on Mandeville-Anthony’s state
law claim for breach of implied contract because it was barred by the applicable
two-year statute of limitations, and neither delayed discovery nor a continuing
violations theory applied to extend the limitations period. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
§ 339(1); Matsumoto v. Republic Ins. Co., 792 F.2d 869, 871-72 (9th Cir. 1986)

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11-56441 3
(per curiam) (under California law, a contract cause of action accrues at the date of
injury unless the facts giving rise to knowledge of the injury were concealed or
misrepresented); see also Kourtis v. Cameron, 419 F.3d 989, 1000-01 (9th Cir.
2005) (rejecting plaintiffs’ attempt to extend the limitations period on their implied
contract claim based on a continuing violation theory unsupported by precedent),
abrogated on other grounds, Taylor v. Sturgel, 553 U.S. 880 (2008).
We do not consider issues that Mandeville-Anthony raises for the first time
on appeal. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).
Mandeville-Anthony’s remaining contentions, including those based on
documents and materials not properly before the district court, are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

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