Arthur Rose v. RAY MABUS , Secretary, Department of Navy

Ray Mabus has been substituted for his predecessor, Donald Winter,*
as Secretary, Department of the Navy under Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent**
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision***
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ARTHUR ROSE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
RAY MABUS , Secretary, Department of*
Navy and acting in his individual capacity
acting within the course and scope of his
authority at NAS Miramar San Diego
(Marine Corps Air Station Miramar),
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 11-55125
D.C. No. 3:08-cv-01471-BTM-
BLM
MEMORANDUM**
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Barry T. Moskowitz, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 26, 2012***
Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.
FILED
JUL 11 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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11-55125 2
Arthur Rose appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his
employment action under Title VII. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment. White
v. City of Sparks, 500 F.3d 953, 955 (9th Cir. 2007). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Rose’s retaliation
claim based on his performance evaluation because Rose failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether there was a causal connection between his
alleged protected activity and the evaluation, and whether defendant’s legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for the evaluation comments and ratings were a pretext
for retaliation. See Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1065-66 (9th Cir.
2004) (setting forth the framework for analyzing a retaliation claim and explaining
that evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial); Villiarimo v. Aloha
Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (eighteen-month lapse
between protected activity and an adverse employment action is too long to give
rise to an inference of causation).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Rose’s retaliatory
harassment claim because Rose failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as
to whether the alleged conduct was because of his protected activity, or was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his employment. See Ray

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11-55125 3
v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing retaliatory
harassment).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, nor arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Rose’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

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