WIRELESS WAREHOUSE, INC., a Georgia Corporation v. BOOST MOBILE, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company doing business in Irvine,…

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WIRELESS WAREHOUSE, INC., a
Georgia Corporation,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
BOOST MOBILE, LLC, a Delaware
Limited Liability Company doing business
in Irvine, California,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 11-55217
D.C. No. 8:09-cv-01436-MLG
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Marc L. Goldman, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 8, 2012
Pasadena, California
Before: WARDLAW, PAEZ, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Wireless Warehouse, Inc. (WWI) appeals the district court’s order granting
summary judgment to Boost Mobile, LLC (Boost) in WWI’s diversity action
alleging false promise, intentional interference with prospective economic
FILED
JUN 12 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Boost’s motion for leave to supplement the excerpts of record is1
denied as moot.
2
relations, promissory estoppel, and unfair competition in violation of Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code. § 17200, et seq. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.1
1. The district court did not abuse its discretion by overruling WWI’s
evidentiary objections to the amended Attachment J to the Prepaid Wireless
Product Agreement (PPA). The record supports the district court’s determination
that the amended Attachment J was authentic because its contents “appear[ed] to
be sufficiently genuine.” Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 778 n.24
(9th Cir. 2002); see also FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4). The record likewise supports the
admissibility of the amended Attachment J under the residual hearsay exception.
FED. R. EVID. 807(a).
2. The district court properly concluded that WWI’s claims are governed by
Virginia law. Because Boost was a third party beneficiary of the PPA, Bugna v.
Fike, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 161, 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000), it is entitled to enforce the
PPA’s choice of law clause. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1559. The choice of law clause, in
turn, provided that the PPA was “governed by” Virginia law. In light of this broad
provision, Virginia law applied to all causes of action related to the PPA, including

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3
the contract and tort claims alleged in this action. Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior
Court, 834 P.2d 1148, 1155 (Cal. 1992).
3. The district court also correctly concluded that Boost was entitled to
summary judgment on the only two claims alleged by WWI that are cognizable
under Virginia law. Boost was entitled to summary judgment on WWI’s false
promise claim because WWI failed to show that it reasonably and justifiably relied
on the alleged oral promise made by Boost, that Boost intended to mislead WWI
with that representation, and that WWI suffered resulting damages. See State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Remley, 618 S.E.2d 316, 321 (Va. 2005). We likewise
agree with the district court that WWI failed to establish a genuine factual dispute
as to whether Boost improperly interfered with WWI’s relationship with sub-
dealers and that WWI suffered resulting damages, both of which are required in a
cause of action for interference with prospective economic advantage. See
Commercial Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Halifax Corp., 484 S.E.2d 892, 896 (Va. 1997).
Consequently, WWI is not entitled to any damages, let alone punitive damages.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294.
4. Finally, the record is devoid of any evidence that the district court abused its
discretion in denying WWI’s motion to compel additional discovery.
AFFIRMED.

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