United States of America v. Philip Stott

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
PHILIP STOTT,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 11-10521
D.C. No. 3:10-cr-00026-LRH
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Larry R. Hicks, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 15, 2012 **
Before: CANBY, GRABER, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Philip Stott appeals from the 12-month consecutive sentence imposed
following his guilty-plea conviction for theft and receipt of stolen mail, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1708. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Stott contends that the district court procedurally erred when it ordered his
FILED
MAY 18 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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sentence to run consecutive to his undischarged state sentence. Specifically, he
contends that the district court failed to consult U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 and its
application notes, failed to consider the sentencing disparity allegedly caused by
imposition of a consecutive sentence, and relied on a clearly erroneous finding that
the state offense was unrelated to the instant offense. The record does not support
his contentions. The court was aware of its discretion to impose a concurrent or
consecutive sentence, and considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors
before imposing a consecutive term. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584; U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c);
United States v. Treadwell, 593 F.3d 990, 1012 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[S]entencing
disparity is only one factor a court considers in crafting an individualized sentence
under § 3553(a).”). Moreover, the court’s finding that there is not a direct
relationship between the state conviction and the instant conviction is not clearly
erroneous. See Treadwell, 593 F.3d at 999.
Scott further contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. The
record reflects that Stott’s sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the
totality of the circumstances and the section 3553(a) sentencing factors. See Gall
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
AFFIRMED.

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