Patricia Ann Sexton v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Edward R. Korman, Senior United states District
Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PATRICIA ANN SEXTON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 10-56464
D.C. No. 5:09-cv-01951-E
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Charles F. Eick, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 13, 2012 **
Pasadena, California
Before: FARRIS and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN,
Senior District Judge. ***
FILED
FEB 23 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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Plaintiff-Appellant Patricia Ann Sexton (“Sexton”) appeals the denial of her
request for attorney’s fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”).
She contends that the government’s “position” was not “substantially justified.”
See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). There is no dispute that Sexton is a “prevailing
party” for purposes of the EAJA.
“Substantially justified means justified in substance or in the main — that is,
justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood,
487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing a
district court’s denial of EAJA fees in a case where, as here, the district court
reversed the decision of an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on account of
procedural errors, the relevant question is not whether the government’s position
on the merits of the plaintiff’s claim was substantially justified but, rather,
“whether the government’s decision to defend on appeal the procedural errors
committed by the ALJ was substantially justified.” Shafer v. Astrue, 518 F.3d
1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2008).
“To reject the opinion of a treating physician which conflicts with that of an
examining physician, the ALJ must make findings setting forth specific, legitimate
reasons for doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the record.”
Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks

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and citations omitted). In evaluating Sexton’s application for disability benefits,
the ALJ rejected the opinion of a treating physician, Dr. Raval, because the opinion
was “based solely on the claimant’s subjective complaints” and was “not supported
by the objective evidence.” The district court reversed and remanded, concluding
that the ALJ’s stated reasons for rejecting the opinion were insufficiently specific
and that the ALJ should have tried to clarify the basis for Dr. Raval’s opinion.
Nevertheless, the district court concluded that the government was substantially
justified in its decision to defend the ALJ’s action.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the
government’s position in this case was substantially justified. In Embrey v. Bowen,
849 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1988), we noted: “[t]o say that medical opinions are
not supported by sufficient objective findings or are contrary to the preponderant
conclusions mandated by the objective findings does not achieve the level of
specificity our prior cases have required.” However, the government could
reasonably have found Embrey distinguishable. Sexton’s other objections to the
district court’s decision are unavailing.
AFFIRMED.

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