United States of America v. Rene Oswald Cobar

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RENE OSWALD COBAR,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 09-10322
D.C. No. 2:07-CR-00014-JCM-
RJJ-1
MEMORANDUM*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RENE OSWALD COBAR,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 10-10545
D.C. No. 2:07-cr-00014-JCM-RJJ-
1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
No. 10-10551
D.C. No. 2:07-cr-00014-JCM-RJJ-
2
FILED
FEB 21 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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LUIS ANGEL GONZALEZ-LARGO,
AKA Lucho,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 13, 2012
San Francisco, California
Before: GRABER, BERZON, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Rene Oswald Cobar appeals the district court’s denial
of his claim of sentencing entrapment, as well as its denial of his motion for a new
trial. Defendant-Appellant Luis Angel Gonzalez-Largo joins in Cobar’s appeal of
the district court’s denial of the motion for a new trial. We affirm.
1. We review a district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines “for
abuse of discretion, and the district court’s factual findings for clear error.” United
States v. Garro, 517 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2008).
As a preliminary matter, Cobar argues that the district court failed to make
sufficient factual findings supporting its denial of his sentencing entrapment claim.
We disagree. Upon reviewing the record, we have no difficulty “ascertain[ing]
what facts [the district court] relied upon in finding that [Cobar] did not adequately

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prove sentencing entrapment.” United States v. Naranjo, 52 F.3d 245, 251 (9th Cir.
1995).
On the merits, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Cobar’s sentencing entrapment claim. To succeed on such a claim, a defendant
must show “by a preponderance of the evidence: 1) the lack of intent to produce
the quantity of drugs; and 2) the lack of capability to produce the quantity of
drugs.” United States v. Mejia, 559 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2009). Cobar failed
to do either.
The record reveals substantial evidence that Cobar had both the “intent” and
the “capability” to produce the quantity of drugs for which he was convicted. For
example, there were more than twenty phone calls between Cobar and those
involved in drug trafficking, demonstrating what the district court judge
characterized as a “remarkable affinity and connection to various people who were
involved in drug trafficking.” Over the course of his dealings with an undercover
police officer, Cobar revealed himself to be in contact with at least three drug
suppliers, with whom he tried to orchestrate drug transactions.
In addition, when the undercover officer suggested that he and Cobar
negotiate for 400 kilograms of cocaine, Cobar responded by stating that he had “up
to 1,000 kilos of cocaine available.” It was the officer who told Cobar to “slow

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down” and limited the deal to 400 kilograms. If anything, the record suggests not
that the Government induced Cobar to sell a larger quantity of drugs than he
otherwise would have but, to the contrary, that it reduced the scale of the
transaction from that which Cobar was prepared to undertake. That circumstance
does not make for a plausible claim of sentencing entrapment.
2. “A district court must adequately explain its decision-making process so an
appellate court can engage in meaningful review.” Am. Broad. Cos. v. Miller, 550
F.3d 786, 788 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). Cobar argues that the district court
failed to do so in denying his motion for a new trial based on the deactivation of
confidential informant Carlos Aguilar-Alvarez. We disagree.
Although the district court’s order denying Cobar’s motion was terse, the
judge’s extensive comments during the hearing make clear his reasons for the
denial. The judge, who was the finder of fact at Cobar’s bench trial, explained at
the hearing that Aguilar-Alvarez’s credibility was deeply suspect and that his role
in Cobar’s trial was minor. Furthermore, in his written order, the judge found “no
relationship and no parallels between the case for which the confidential informant
was deactivated and” Cobar’s case. Evidence of Aguilar-Alvarez’s deactivation
was thus not material to the trial, nor would it have affected the judge’s assessment
of Aguilar-Alvarez’s credibility. The denial of Cobar’s motion for a new trial was

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therefore not an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Harrington, 410 F.3d
598, 601 (9th Cir. 2005).
Aguilar-Alvarez played even less of a role in the prosecution of Gonzalez-
Largo than he did in Cobar’s trial. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Gonzalez-Largo’s motion for a new trial.
AFFIRMED.

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