Armando Antonio Marroquin v. MACDONALD, Warden

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ARMANDO ANTONIO MARROQUIN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MACDONALD, Warden,
Defendant,
and
JACK R. HUDSON; JENNIFER WARD,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 10-17524
D.C. No. 2:10-cv-00596-DGC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
David G. Campbell, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 19, 2011**
Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
FILED
JAN 12 2012
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Armando Antonio Marroquin, a California state prisoner housed in Arizona,
appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust, and for
clear error its factual determinations. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th
Cir. 2003). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed the action without prejudice because
Marroquin failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit. See
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-95 (2006) (holding that “proper exhaustion” is
mandatory and requires adherence to administrative procedural rules).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Marroquin’s post-
judgment motion because Marroquin failed to show any grounds justifying
reconsideration. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5
F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and elements
for reconsideration under Rules 59(e) and 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying as premature
Marroquin’s motion to compel. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir.

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2002) (setting forth standard of review and describing trial court’s broad discretion
to deny discovery).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, nor arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Marroquin’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

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