10-16488•Marlene Propps v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration
10-16488Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit1 de dez. de 2011
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARLENE PROPPS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 10-16488
D.C. No. 1:09-cv-01017-DLB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Dennis L. Beck, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 16, 2011**
San Francisco, California
Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Marlene Propps appeals the district court’s decision affirming the
Commissioner’s third denial of her application for Supplemental Security Income
disability benefits. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
FILED
DEC 01 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS
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Propps must overcome the presumption of continuing non-disability by
demonstrating “changed circumstances” since the Commissioner’s prior denials of
benefits. Taylor v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1985). In prior hearings,
the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that Propps had “slight to moderate”
deficiencies in concentration, persistence and pace, with a residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to perform limited light work. The ALJ adopted those findings
in this case. Propps’s argument that the ALJ erred rests on the medical opinions of
two treating physicians, Dr. Zhang and Dr. Hood. However, Dr. Zhang also listed
deficiencies in concentration, persistence and pace, and did not specify whether
these limitations would be slight or moderate. Dr. Hood noted some “moderate”
limitations, but ultimately found that Propps could “[c]arry out simple tasks for a
normal work week.” Substantial evidence existed to support the ALJ’s RFC
determination. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750-53 (9th Cir. 1989). Even
if the ALJ incorrectly characterized Propps’s limitations as slight to moderate
instead of moderate, the error was harmless, as the RFC finding remained
unchanged, and a claimant with “moderate” limitations may carry out simple work.
Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008).
The ALJ also properly relied on vocational testimony based on Propps’s
RFC. Although Propps argues that the ALJ did not give weight to a portion of the
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vocational expert’s testimony, it was proper for the ALJ to consider only the
hypothetical supported by substantial evidence in the record. Magallanes, 881
F.2d at 756-57. Based on the record, the ALJ found that Propps could perform
limited light work. He relied on the vocational expert testimony that a claimant
with the RFC to do limited light work was capable of making a successful
adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national
economy. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination of Propps’s RFC
and reliance on corresponding vocational expert testimony. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 416.945(a)(3), 416.946(c).
AFFIRMED.
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