Janice M. Ohman v. County of Orange, a Municipal Corporation; ISRAEL CLAUSTRO, individually

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The Honorable Henry E. Hudson, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JANICE M. OHMAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
COUNTY OF ORANGE, a Municipal
Corporation; ISRAEL CLAUSTRO,
individually,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 10-55231
D.C. No. 8:09-cv-00653-CJC-
RNB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Cormac J. Carney, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 10, 2011
Pasadena, California
Before: SCHROEDER and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges, and HUDSON, District
Judge.**
Janice Ohman appeals the district court’s dismissal of her 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action against the County of Orange and Deputy District Attorney Israel Claustro
FILED
NOV 30 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2
in his individual capacity. She has not pursued an appeal from the district court’s
order dismissing Ohman’s claim against the County.
Ohman’s claim is based upon Claustro’s conduct in prosecuting a case
against her. Ohman alleges that the state charged her with forgery, and supported
its case using inadmissible evidence obtained illegally by the Tustin Police
Department. State courts suppressed that evidence in 2008, then dismissed the
charges. She further alleges that at some point after Claustro took over control of
the prosecution, he instructed the Tustin Police Department not to find additional
evidence to support forgery charges, reintroduced charges based on the original
inadmissible evidence, and produced it in response to discovery requests, knowing
it had been seized illegally. That second criminal action eventually was also
terminated in Ohman’s favor.
The district court dismissed the federal action on grounds of prosecutorial
immunity. Ohman argues that Claustro was performing administrative or
investigative functions by collecting and evaluating evidence, since prosecutors are
entitled to absolute immunity for their advocacy functions, but not for investigative
or administrative functions. Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 636–37 (9th
Cir. 2005). While a prosecutor who participates in obtaining evidence may be
acting in an investigative capacity, see id. at 641, the complaint reflects that

-- 2 of 3 --

3
Claustro was not involved in investigative work, such as participating in the illegal
search itself. Rather, the complaint reflects that Claustro was, at all relevant times,
engaged in conduct related to his role as an advocate for the state. This included
the filing of charges on the basis of evidence in the file, and responding to defense
discovery requests. The challenged conduct is therefore subject to absolute
prosecutorial immunity. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)
(absolute immunity for prosecuting charges maliciously); Ybarra v. Reno
Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 679 (9th Cir. 1984) (absolute
immunity for evaluating “whether the prosecutor needs [certain] evidence to
prosecute,” since that decision “goes to the heart of the advocate’s role”); Broam v.
Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (absolute immunity for prosecutor’s
exercise of discretion in regulating flow of information to defense, including for
“deliberate withholding of exculpatory information”) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at
431–32).
It therefore makes no difference that Claustro allegedly knew the evidence
had been suppressed previously and thus intended to prosecute on the basis of
illegally obtained evidence. See Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir.
1986) (en banc) (“Intent should play no role in the immunity analysis.”).
AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --