Sukhchain Singh Parmar v. ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The Honorable Robert W. Gettleman, Senior District Judge for the**
U.S. District Court for Northern Illinois, sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SUKHCHAIN SINGH PARMAR,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 08-70109
Agency No. A098-822-312
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted November 15, 2011
San Francisco, California
Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, BEA, Circuit Judge, and GETTLEMAN, Senior
District Judge.**
FILED
NOV 23 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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2
Sukhchain Singh Parmar (“Parmar”) petitions for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) affirmance of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial
of relief based on an adverse credibility finding against Parmar.
Parmar filed his claim for asylum after the effective date of the REAL ID
Act, so our review is governed by the Act’s standards for adverse credibility
determinations. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Inconsistencies in an applicant’s
testimony need not go to the heart of his claim, and the IJ may consider many
factors in making an adverse credibility determination, including
unresponsiveness, inconsistency and demeanor. Id. Here, the IJ and BIA noted
that Parmar was unresponsive, especially regarding questions about the arrest and
detention that Parmar claimed precipitated his flight from India. There were also
inconsistencies in Parmar’s testimony, notably regarding the timing of his third
arrest. The IJ’s adverse credibility determination under the REAL ID Act requires
a “healthy measure of deference.” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th
Cir. 2010). The IJ and BIA in this case pointed to specific factors supporting the
adverse credibility determination and considered all of Parmar’s testimony. While
the government rightly concedes that the IJ erred in some of her characterizations
of Parmar’s testimony, the determination made by the IJ and BIA nonetheless was
supported by substantial evidence.

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3
Because Parmar failed to meet his burden of proof for asylum, he necessarily
failed to meet the higher burden of proof for withholding of removal. Ren v.
Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1094 n.17 (9th Cir. 2011). He also failed to meet his
burden for relief under the CAT. The reports on country conditions from the State
Department do not support Parmar’s claim that he is likely to be tortured upon his
return to India. Since the remainder of Parmar’s claim under the CAT was no
different from his discredited claim for asylum, his lack of credibility is also
sufficient to undermine his claim under the CAT. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d
1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 2003).
PETITION DENIED.

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