Edward Jones; v. City of Los Angeles;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The Honorable Edward C. Reed, Jr., Senior District Judge for the U.S.***
District Court for Nevada, Reno, sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EDWARD JONES; et al.,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES; et al.,
Defendants - Appellants.
No. 09-55014
D.C. No. 2:03-cv-01142-R-RNB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 26, 2011**
Pasadena, California
Before: RYMER and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges, and REED, Senior District
Judge.***
FILED
JAN 28 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Each of the party’s motions for judicial notice is denied as moot.1
2
The City of Los Angeles appeals the district court’s order granting plaintiffs’
request for attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988, and California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5. The district court
concluded that plaintiffs are “the prevailing party” under both statutes, but failed to
set forth any reasons underlying its conclusion. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care
Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001).
Nor did the district court explain how the award was calculated, i.e., “what number
of hours were being compensated and what hourly rate was applied.” Chalmers v.
Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1213 (9th Cir. 1986). Moreover, the order is
internally inconsistent as to whether a multiplier was used, and it appears that some
noncompensable hours may have been included.
Because the district court failed to provide a reasoned basis for its decision,
we are unable to engage in a meaningful review of either the basis for the award or
the award itself. See Hensley v. Eckhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437–40 (1983) (where1
meaningful appellate review is not possible, remand for a fuller explanation of the
fee award is appropriate); Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. City of Hailey, 452 F.3d 1055,
1065 (9th Cir. 2006) (where there is no reasoning to support a fee award, “it is
simply not possible for this court to review [the] award in a meaningful manner”

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3
(citation omitted)); Chalmers, 796 F.2d at 1213 (finding an order granting
attorneys’ fees insufficient because it failed to provide “an adequate explanation of
the reasons for [the] award and the manner in which that award was determined”).
Therefore, we reverse the award of attorneys’ fees and remand for further
proceedings consistent herewith.
REVERSED and REMANDED.

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