Tadaryl Williams v. H. Skolnick;

09-16982Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit4 de out. de 2010

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This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TADARYL WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
H. SKOLNICK; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 09-16982
D.C. No. 3:08-cv-00112-ECR-
VPC
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Edward C. Reed, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 22, 2010**
Before: WALLACE, HAWKINS and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
The district court properly dismissed Tadaryl Williams’s (“Williams”)
claims stemming from a disciplinary proceeding that resulted in the loss of 103
days of good-time credit because Williams did not allege that the punishment had
been invalidated. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646-48 (1997) (barring
FILED
OCT 04 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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09-16982 2
section 1983 claim for damages that implicated the invalidity of the revocation of
good-time credits). Contrary to Williams’s contentions, the expiration of his
applicable sentence does not provide him with an exception to the favorable
termination rule. See Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 704-05 (9th Cir. 2006).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Williams’s motion
to compel discovery where his motion was filed prematurely. See Hallett v.
Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review and
noting that the trial court’s broad decision to deny discovery “will not be disturbed
except upon the clearest showing that [the] denial of discovery result[ed] in actual
and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant”) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Williams’s requests
for appointment of counsel because Williams did not demonstrate that exceptional
circumstances existed. See Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991)
(setting forth standard of review and “exceptional circumstances” requirement).
We deny Williams’s request for an en banc hearing. See Fed. R. App. P. 35.
AFFIRMED.

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