Anthony Wohllaib v. United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, Seattle

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANTHONY WOHLLAIB,
Plaintiff,
and
CHRISTOPHER DENIS KUEBLER,
Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
WASHINGTON, SEATTLE,
Appellee,
and
ICICLE SEAFOODS, INC.,
Defendant.
No. 09-35861
D.C. No. 2:07-cv-00080-RAJ
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding
FILED
SEP 16 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2
Submitted September 2, 2010**
Seattle, Washington
Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff’s counsel, Christopher Kuebler, appeals the district court’s sua sponte
imposition of a $5,000 sanction, claiming Rule 11 of Civil Procedure prohibits the
sanction because the parties had already settled the underlying case. By no means
countenancing the behavior occasioning the sanction, we agree with Kuebler’s reading
of Rule 11, and having determined the parties’ Mediation Agreement was a
“settlement” for Rule 11 purposes, we reverse and remand.
Rule 11 clearly prohibits a district court from sua sponte issuing an order to
show cause why the court should not impose a monetary sanction if the parties have
already settled a case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(5) (“The court must not impose a
monetary sanction . . . on its own, unless it issued the show-cause order under Rule
11(c)(3) before voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against the
party that is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.”); see also Charles Alan Wright
& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §1336.3 (3d ed. 2004).
Here, the signed Mediation Agreement was a settlement and was entered into
before the district court issued its Order to Show Cause. The Mediation Agreement’s

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requirement of removal of the offending language from the district court filings was
a part of performance rather than a condition of contract formation. See Tacoma
Northpark, LLC v. NW, LLC, 96 P.3d 454, 457 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Ross
v. Harding, 391 P.2d 526, 530 (Wash. 1964)); see also Camacho v. City of San Luis,
359 Fed. Appx. 794, 796–97 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying Arizona contract law to a
similarly situated appeal of the enforceability of a settlement agreement in Arizona).
Particularly given our statements emphasizing our “firm[] commit[ment] to the
rule that the law favors and encourages compromise settlements,” Ahern v. Cent. Pac.
Freight Lines, 846 F.2d 47, 48 (9th Cir. 1988), the district court erred in concluding
the Mediation Agreement was not a settlement for the purposes of Rule 11.
Of course, reversing the monetary sanction is not necessarily a loophole through
which Kuebler can escape sanction for behavior intended to harass opposing counsel’s
law firm. Although it is preferable that a district court impose sanctions before
issuing a final order, the text of Rule 11 does not place a time limit on a court’s ability
to sanction. See 2 James Wm. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice, §11.22[2][a] (3d.
ed. 2010). Thus, we remand for the district court to consider whether some alternative
sanction is appropriate to ensure Kuebler is deterred from similar litigation tactics in
the future. See Wright and Miller, supra, at § 1336.3 n.70.
REVERSED and REMANDED.

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