WILLIE BELL, Jr. v. V. M. ALMAGER, Warden;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WILLIE BELL, Jr.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
V. M. ALMAGER, Warden; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 08-56636
D.C. No. 3:08-cv-00165-H-AJB
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Marilyn L. Huff, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 29, 2010**
Before: ALARCÓN, LEAVY, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
Willie Bell, Jr., a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due process
violations. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo,
Nelson v. Heiss, 271 F.3d 891, 893 (9th Cir. 2001), and may affirm on any basis
FILED
JUL 20 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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supported by the record, Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 329 F.3d 1089,
1097 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Bell’s claim concerning his failed
attempt to mail a package containing a watch before it was confiscated because
regulations requiring Bell to pay for postage from his trust account, rather than
supply his own stamps, do not implicate a constitutionally protected interest. See
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (only deprivations that impose
restraint exceeding an inmate’s sentence in an unexpected manner give rise to
protection “by the Due Process Clause of its own force” and only “atypical,
significant deprivation[s] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” give
rise to state-created liberty interests).
The district court properly dismissed Bell’s claim concerning the handling of
his grievances because inmates have no protected due process rights in grievance
procedures. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (order).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bell’s motion for a
preliminary class injunction and his motion for class certification because
non-attorney plaintiffs may not act in a representative capacity. See Simon v.
Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2008). Moreover, to the extent that
Bell sought an ex parte injunction on his own behalf, the district court did not

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abuse its discretion by denying it on the ground that Bell failed to meet, or justify
not meeting, applicable notice requirements. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
The district court also did not abuse its discretion by denying Bell’s motion
for appointment of counsel because he failed to establish exceptional
circumstances. See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986).
Bell’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

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