Ana Estela Estrada-Ochoa, a.k.a. Domitila Morales-Vasquez v. ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The Honorable Donald E. Walter, Senior United States District Judge**
for Western Louisiana, sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANA ESTELA ESTRADA-OCHOA,
a.k.a. Domitila Morales-Vasquez,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 06-71873
Agency No. A097-337-105
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted May 3, 2010
Pasadena, California
Before: B. FLETCHER and PAEZ, Circuit Judges, and WALTER, Senior United
States District Judge.**
Petitioner Ana Estela Estrada Ochoa (Estrada Ochoa), a native and citizen of
Guatemala, appeals the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) affirmance of the
Immigration Judge’s (IJ) order denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
FILED
JUN 23 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Although the BIA affirmed the IJ’s ruling, in so doing, it credited Estrada1
Ochoa’s testimony that Gerson Estrada is her father. Accordingly, we deem it
conclusively established that Gerson Estrada is Estrada Ochoa’s father and proceed
accordingly.
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under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Estrada Ochoa asserts a derivative
asylum claim based on the application of her father, Gerson Rocael Estrada-Lopez
(Gerson Estrada).
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Because we conclude that the
BIA erred when it failed to consider Estrada Ochoa’s father Gerson Estrada’s
asylum application for purposes of assessing Estrada Ochoa’s eligibility for
asylum, we grant the petition and remand.1
Estrada Ochoa applied for asylum in March 2004. The basis for her asylum
claim was her father’s I-589 application, which she attached to her application.
The child of an alien can file a derivative asylum claim, which is based entirely on
the parent’s application. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3); see also Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d
553, 561 n.10 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A . . . child . . . of an alien who is granted asylum
under this subsection may, if not otherwise eligible for asylum under this section,
be granted the same status as the alien if accompanying, or following to join, such
alien.” (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3))). Furthermore, “[a]n unmarried alien who
seeks to accompany . . . a parent granted asylum . . . shall continue to be classified

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as a child . . . if the alien attained 21 years of age after such application was filed
but while it was pending.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.21.
Gerson Estrada applied for asylum in September 1994. At that time, Estrada
Ochoa was under 21 years of age (she was 11 years old), and therefore, although
she is now 24 years old, she is still classified as a child for purposes of §
1159(b)(3) so long as Gerson Estrada’s application is pending. See 8 U.S.C. §
1158(b)(3). Gerson Estrada’s application was pending at the time Estrada Ochoa
filed her asylum application. Thus, for purposes of considering her derivative
asylum claim, Estrada Ochoa must be classified as a child.
Gerson Estrada, however, failed to list Estrada Ochoa on his asylum
application. His stated reasons for not including her were that he never thought she
would come to this country and that he received only hurried advice from the
immigration consultant who helped him prepare his application. The BIA
concluded that Gerson Estrada’s failure to include Estrada Ochoa on his
application cannot be excused on the basis of “notary” fraud. Because Gerson
Estrada concedes that he failed to list his daughter and does not allege any fraud on
the part of the immigration consultant, we agree.
We disagree, however, that Gerson Estrada’s omission in failing to list his
daughter on his application should result in Estrada Ochoa’s ineligibility for

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derivative asylum relief. As Estrada Ochoa was a minor at the time her father filed
for asylum, his omission should not be held against her. See El Himri v. Ashcroft,
378 F.3d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 2004) (considering time-barred asylum application of
parent to find child eligible for asylum). Therefore, due to Estrada Ochoa’s minor
status at the time Gerson Estrada filed his asylum application, she does not bear the
consequences of her father’s incomplete application. Id.
At this point, however, the government has informed us that Gerson Estrada
already has achieved permanent resident status under the Nicaraguan Adjustment
and Central American Relief Act (NACARA). To qualify for NACARA relief, an
alien must show that she falls under one of the five groups identified in 8 C.F.R. §
1240.61(a). Because Estrada Ochoa entered the country after October 1, 1990, she
is disqualified from claiming derivative NACARA relief. 8 C.F.R. §
1240.61(a)(5). Estrada Ochoa’s father’s change in status does not automatically
preclude Estrada Ochoa from relief. In fact, his status as a permanent resident
suggests that his asylum claim had merit. After obtaining permanent resident
status, however, Gerson Estrada withdrew his petition for asylum. Because neither
the BIA nor this court has determined whether a derivative asylum applicant still
may receive derivative asylee status when the principal application has been

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withdrawn, we remand to the BIA to determine in the first instance the status of
Estrada Ochoa’s asylum petition.
Estrada Ochoa abandoned her withholding of removal and CAT claims on
appeal. Therefore, we do not address those claims.
Petition GRANTED and REMANDED.

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