Jerome Leslie Clemmons, an individual, on behalf and as class representative v. City of Long Beach, a municipal corporation

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JEROME LESLIE CLEMMONS, an
individual, on behalf and as class
representative
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CITY OF LONG BEACH, a municipal
corporation; Anthony Batts, an individual;
SKEEN #6060 Long Beach Officer;
MARTIN, #7123 Long Beach Officer;
VANDEN BOSCH, #006064 Long Beach
Officer;
Defendants, and
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; LOS
ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT, a local public entity,
Defendants - Appellees
No. 08-56686
D.C. No. 2:05-cv-05525-AHM-SH
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
A. Howard Matz, District Judge, Presiding
FILED
MAY 18 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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The City of Long Beach defendants entered into a settlement agreement1
with Clemmons and are no longer a party to this action.
2
Argued and Submitted February 2, 2010
Pasadena, California
Before: KLEINFELD, WARDLAW and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Jerome Clemmons (“Jerome”) appeals the grant of summary judgment in
favor of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department and the County of Los
Angeles (the “County”) on his § 1983 Monell claim of wrongful incarceration in
derogation of his due process rights. We affirm.
The district court correctly concluded that the County violated Jerome’s
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights when it detained him for twenty-two
days under a warrant that named a different person—James Clemmons. See
Fairley v. Luman, 281 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). Jerome was
arrested by City of Long Beach police officers on a warrant for the arrest of one
“James Clemmons.” Jerome was then taken to court, where a judge ordered him1
remanded to the custody of the County jail. Pursuant to the judge’s remand order,
the County then detained Jerome for twenty-two days, when it finally learned of
the mistaken identification underlying the arrest. Viewing the facts in a light most
favorable to Jerome, and based on his deposition testimony, Jerome repeatedly
protested his mistaken identity during his incarceration. Despite this, the County

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failed to verify that Jerome was not the “James Clemmons” named in the warrant
until July 19, 2004. The County’s failure to do so deprived Jerome of the due
process to which he was entitled. Id.
Although Jerome’s constitutional rights were violated, the County may be
liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if it its employees acted pursuant to an
unconstitutional policy. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91
(1978). The County in fact had a policy in place to avoid incidents of mistaken
arrest and detention, which the district court correctly concluded is constitutional.
The County’s “Disputed Warrant Verification” process requires County employees
to promptly investigate complaints of mistaken identity, record such complaints in
a log book, and release detainees upon confirmation that the detention is based on
mistaken identification. Thus, the County is not deliberately indifferent to such
claims of deprivation of constitutional rights. See Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470,
1474 (9th Cir. 1992).
Jerome failed to establish that the County had an informal policy of
disregarding the Disputed Warrant Verification process. The evidence showed to
the contrary: that County employees regularly investigate mistaken identity claims
and release detainees upon verification that they are not the person named in the
warrant. Jerome’s showing that the County detained the wrong person on two

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prior occasions is insufficient to withstand summary judgment. See Trevino v.
Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Liability for improper custom may not
be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices
of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a
traditional method of carrying out policy.”). Because the County cannot be held
liable under § 1983 for its employees’ isolated failure to abide by a constitutional
policy, the district court correctly entered summary judgment in its favor. Monell,
436 U.S. at 690-91.
Assuming that Jerome’s allegations about repeated protests of mistaken
identity are true, then if the County employees had followed County policy
Jerome’s twenty-two day wrongful detention could have been prevented. The
County should take the necessary steps to ensure that its constitutional policy is
being followed. If sufficient evidence should demonstrate that the policy is only
honored in the breach, the conclusion that the County acts in accordance with a
constitutional policy would be undercut.
AFFIRMED.

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