United States of America v. Luis Alberto Castro

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The Honorable Frederic Block, Senior United States District Judge for**
the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LUIS ALBERTO CASTRO,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 09-50414
D.C. No. 2:09-cr-00328-R-1
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and submitted May 6, 2010
Pasadena, California
Before: O’SCANNLAIN and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges, and BLOCK, District**
Judge.
Luis Alberto Castro (“Castro”) appeals his conviction on one count of being
a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Castro
FILED
MAY 14 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

-- 1 of 3 --

2
contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence
seized during an investigatory stop of a vehicle in which he was a passenger. He
also contends that the district court erred in excluding evidence of another
passenger’s juvenile adjudication for possessing the same firearm. The facts are
known to the parties and will not be repeated here except as necessary.
I
The officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of the
vehicle based on the license plate check revealing an outstanding arrest warrant for
Jose Raz. See Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 784 (2009). Because Raz had
previously driven that vehicle, and because Castro matched Raz’s physical
description, “it was permissible to detain [Castro] in order to resolve questions
about his identity.” United States v. Crapser, 472 F.3d 1141, 1147 (9th Cir.
2007). Therefore, the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress
the gun.
II
Even assuming, arguendo, that the district court erred in excluding the
juvenile adjudication, we are fairly assured that any error was harmless given “the
evidence’s limited probative value.” United States v. 87.98 Acres, 530 F.3d 899,
907 (9th Cir. 2008). That “possession by one person does not necessarily preclude

-- 2 of 3 --

3
possession by another,” United States v. Carrasco, 257 F.3d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir.
2001), distinguishes this case from United States v. Crosby, 75 F.3d 1343 (9th Cir.
1996), upon which Castro relies. In Crosby, the prosecution’s theory was that the
defendant had acted alone in committing an assault; therefore, we held that the
exclusion of evidence tending to inculpate another person, which “would have
tended to exculpate Crosby,” required reversal. Id. at 1349. Here, by contrast,
evidence inculpating the other passenger would not have tended to exculpate
Castro. See, e.g., United States v. Spencer, 1 F.3d 742, 745 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Stewart, 770 F.2d 825, 830 (9th Cir. 1985).
AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --