United States of America v. Terrance Lee Jones

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TERRANCE LEE JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 09-30161
D.C. No. 3:08-CR-00057-TMB-1
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Alaska
Timothy M. Burgess, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 5, 2010**
Seattle, Washington
Before: TASHIMA, FISHER and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Terrance Jones appeals the sentence imposed by the district court.
We affirm.
FILED
MAR 09 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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The district court correctly held that Jones’s 1989 Colorado conviction for
second-degree robbery is a predicate conviction for sentencing purposes under 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
Federal law forbids a person “who has been convicted in any court of, a
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to . . . possess
. . . any firearm.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). If convicted under this statute, an offender
who has three violent felony convictions faces an enhanced sentence of at least
fifteen years. § 924(e)(1). A violent felony is defined in relevant part as “any
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” § 924(e)(2)(B).
A conviction is not a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year” if “a person . . . has had civil rights restored . . . unless . . . restoration of civil
rights expressly provides that the person may not . . . possess . . . firearms.” §
921(a)(20).
Colorado restores civil rights automatically when a person has “served out
his full term of imprisonment.” Colo. Const. art. VII, § 10. Where restoration is
automatic, “[o]ne must ‘look to the whole of state law’” of the state of conviction
for any provisions limiting the right to possess firearms. United States v. Herron,
45 F.3d 340, 342 (9th Cir. 1995). Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-12-108 now provides that
“[a] person commits the crime of possession of a weapon by a previous offender if

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the person knowingly possesses . . . a firearm . . . subsequent to the person’s
conviction for a felony . . . under Colorado or any other state’s law or under federal
law.” The statute prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm after his civil rights
have otherwise been restored.
Section 18-12-108 was amended to its present form in 1994, after Jones’s
guilty plea to second-degree robbery in March 1989 but before his release and the
restoration of his civil rights in October 2001. The state law in effect “at the time
of the restoration [of civil rights]” controls. United States v. Huss, 7 F.3d 1444,
1446 (9th Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Sanchez-
Rodriguez, 161 F.3d 556 (9th Cir. 1998). Thus, the district court did not err in
counting the Colorado conviction as a predicate conviction for sentencing purposes
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
AFFIRMED.

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