Richard Trihn; Amphouvanhna Chanthalamgsy v. Mohammed Jack Moghaddam;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
GT/Research
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RICHARD TRIHN; AMPHOUVANHNA
CHANTHALAMGSY,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
MOHAMMED JACK MOGHADDAM; et
al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 09-15039
D.C. No. 2:07-cv-00488-GEB-
EFB
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Garland E. Burrell, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 16, 2010 **
Before: FERNANDEZ, GOULD, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
FILED
MAR 08 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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GT/Research 09-15039 2
Richard Trihn and Amphouvanhna Chanthalamgsy appeal pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment for the City of Marysville and City officials in
their action alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause, Due Process Clause,
and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(3), and 1986. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1278 (9th
Cir. 1996), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on the Equal
Protection Clause claims and other racial discrimination claims arising under
federal statutes, because plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue as to whether
defendants were motivated by racial animus when they temporarily shut-down
plaintiffs’ night-club and subsequently revoked their conditional use permit. See
id. (providing that affidavit in opposition to summary judgment must be based on
personal knowledge); Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536-38 (9th
Cir. 1992) (affirming summary judgment for defendant on 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
claim, and explaining that racial animus is an element of a section 1985(3) claim).
Even if plaintiffs had a cognizable property interest in the continued
existence of the conditional use permit, the district court properly granted summary
judgment on the Due Process Clause claims because there was no triable issue as to
whether plaintiffs were afforded adequate due process at the revocation hearing.

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GT/Research 09-15039 3
See Ebel v. City of Corona, 698 F.2d 390, 392-93 (9th Cir. 1983) (affirming
summary judgment for City Planning Commission on claim that it violated Due
Process Clause by making a decision “without making adequate findings of fact to
justify” the decision, and explaining that “great latitude is given to legislative
bodies in the procedures they may use in factfinding”); see also Town of Castle
Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756, 760 (2005) (explaining that cognizable
property interests arise only when the relevant state law provisions “truly ma[k]e
[the conferral of the benefit] mandatory.”).
Plaintiff’ remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.

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