Vilma Esperanza Cordova Garcia; Donis Cardona v. ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VILMA ESPERANZA CORDOVA
GARCIA; DONIS CARDONA,
Petitioners,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 08-74134
Agency Nos. A098-391-747
A098-177-773
MEMORANDUM *
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted December 11, 2009
Seattle, Washington
Before: BEEZER, GOULD, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
The parties are familiar with the facts of the case so we do not repeat them
here. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) and we deny the
petitions for review.
FILED
DEC 22 2009
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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The petitions must be denied if the IJ and BIA determinations are “supported
by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a
whole.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). In order to qualify for asylum or withholding of
removal, a petitioner must demonstrate that a protected ground was, or will be, “at
least one central reason” for his or her persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).
In Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cir. 2009), we interpreted the
recently enacted REAL-ID Act of 2005 and held that in order to “demonstrate that
a protected ground was ‘at least one central reason’ for persecution, an applicant
must prove that such ground was a cause of the persecutors’ acts.”
Here, as in Parussimova, “it is simply not clear whether [a protected
ground], as opposed to one of the other possible motives evinced by the record,
caused the assailant[] to initiate [the] attack or increase its severity once it had
begun.” Id. at 742. First, it is unclear who attacked Cordova. She referred to her
attacker interchangeably as “a police officer” and “a delinquent gang member.”
Second, it is unclear from the record whether Cordova’s purported whistleblowing
led to the attack or whether, as the BIA concluded, the attack was motivated by a
desire to obtain retribution for Cordova’s husband’s actions in foiling a bank
robbery by shooting one of the robbers. As a result, substantial evidence supports

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the BIA’s determination that Cordova did not meet her burden to establish that a
protected ground was, or will be, at least one central reason for her persecution.
Likewise, Cordova’s United Nations Convention Against Torture claim fails
because she has not sufficiently demonstrated that “prior to the activity constituting
torture, [a public official] ha[d] awareness of such activity and thereafter
breach[ed] his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.” 8
C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7). Furthermore, the fact that Cordova lived safely in another
part of Guatemala for a period of time after her attack provides “[e]vidence that the
applicant could relocate to a part of the country of removal where . . . she is not
likely to be tortured.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3)(ii).
Finally, as Cordova’s husband’s petition is derivative of Cordova’s, it fails
as well.
Accordingly, the petitions for review are DENIED.

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