James F. George, Iii; v. City of Morro Bay;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without**
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
LS/Research
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAMES F. GEORGE, III; et al.,
Plaintiffs,
and
MARGIE R. GEORGE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CITY OF MORRO BAY; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 08-55961
D.C. No. 2:07-cv-06302-R-JC
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 17, 2009**
FILED
DEC 14 2009
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Before: ALARCÓN, TROTT, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.
Margie R. George appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing
her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action as barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.
Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002) (res judicata);
McQuillion v. Schwarzenegger, 369 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2004) (collateral
estoppel). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed George’s claims as barred by the
doctrine of res judicata because George could have raised them in her prior
bankruptcy proceedings. See Stewart, 297 F.3d at 956 (“Res judicata, or claim
preclusion, prohibits lawsuits on any claims that were raised or could have been
raised in a prior action.”) (internal citation, quotation marks, and italics omitted).
The district court also properly dismissed George’s takings claims as barred by the
doctrine of collateral estoppel because they are foreclosed by issues George
litigated in her prior bankruptcy proceedings. See McQuillion, 369 F.3d at 1096
(applying collateral estoppel where issues at stake were actually litigated by the
party against whom preclusion is asserted and were necessary to the earlier
judgment).
George’s remaining contentions are unavailing.

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Because appellees’ request for sanctions for a frivolous appeal was not
separately filed, we deny the request without prejudice to refiling a timely separate
motion. See Fed. R. App. P. 38; 9th Cir. R. 39-1.6; Higgins v. Vortex Fishing Sys.,
Inc., 379 F.3d 701, 709 (9th Cir. 2004) (denying without prejudice a Rule 38
request made in an appellate brief rather than in a separately filed motion).
AFFIRMED.

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