Daniel C. Edington; v. Yavapai County;

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without**
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
GT/Research
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DANIEL C. EDINGTON; et al.,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
YAVAPAI COUNTY; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
No. 08-15318
D.C. No. CV-05-04227-FJM
MEMORANDUM *
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Frederick J. Martone, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 17, 2009**
Before: ALARCÓN, TROTT, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.
Daniel C. Edington and his wife Noreen Edington appeal pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment for defendants in their action alleging violations
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, the Equal
FILED
DEC 14 2009
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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Protection Clause, and various federal criminal statutes. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Gibson v. County of Washoe,
290 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2002), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiffs’ ADA
and Rehabilitation Act claims because plaintiffs did not raise a triable issue as to
whether Yavapai County employees discriminated against Daniel Edington due to
a perception that Mr. Edington was disabled. See Weinreich v. Los Angeles County
Metropolitan Transp. Authority, 114 F.3d 976, 978-79 (9th Cir. 1997) (“To prove a
public program or service violates Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show (1) he
is a ‘qualified individual with a disability’; (2) he was either excluded from
participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs or
activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such
exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability.”);
Douglas v. Cal. Dept. of Youth Auth., 285 F.3d 1226, 1229-30 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002)
(explaining that cases interpreting the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA are
“interchangeable”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on the selective
enforcement claims because, other than their subjective beliefs, the Edingtons
failed to produce evidence raising a triable issue as to whether County law

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enforcement officials failed to arrest other similarly situated citizens for disorderly
conduct and harassment. See Rosenbaum v. City and County of San Francisco,
484 F.3d 1142, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining elements of a selective
enforcement claim); Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028-
29 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that a plaintiff may not defeat a defendant’s
motion for summary judgment “by relying solely on the plaintiff’s subjective belief
that the challenged [ ] action was [wrong]”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on the malicious
prosecution claim because there was no evidence suggesting that Daniel Edington
was prosecuted without probable cause. See Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68
F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995) (disposing of plaintiff’s malicious prosecution
claims because she was “unable to show that she was prosecuted without probable
cause[,]” and stating that “the mere fact a prosecution was unsuccessful does not
mean it was not supported by probable cause.”).
The Edingtons’ remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
We deny all pending motions.
AFFIRMED.

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