Lawrence E. Lupien v. Harold W. Clarke

1The Honorable Ralph R. Erickson, United States District Judge for the District
of North Dakota.
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
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No. 04-1578
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Douglas F. Longie, *
*
Appellant, *
* Appeal from the United States
v. * District Court for the
* District of North Dakota.
Spirit Lake Tribe; Spirit Lake Health *
Administration; Spirit Lake Tribe *
Refuse Control Services, *
*
Appellees. *
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Submitted: December 13, 2004
Filed: March 7, 2005
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Before WOLLMAN, LAY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.
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WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
Douglas L. Longie appeals the district court’s 1 dismissal of his case for lack of
federal jurisdiction and, alternatively, for his failure to exhaust tribal court remedies.
We affirm.

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I.
This appeal involves a dispute between the Spirit Lake Tribe and one of its
members over two tracts of land within the Spirit Lake Nation Indian Reservation.
Longie, an enrolled tribal member, submitted a request for a land exchange to the
tribe in 1976, seeking to trade his family’s 40-acre allotment (No. DLS-888) for the
80-acre Devils Lake Sioux Allotment No. SL-0878. Congress originally allotted the
40-acre plot to Longie’s family members; the 80 acres are tribal lands. The United
States holds both land parcels in trust. In negotiating the transfer, both parties
acknowledged that they would transfer only their existing interests in the land and
that the land would retain its associated restrictions and conditions. The transfer,
once complete, would be subject to the approval of the Bureau of Indian Affairs of
the Department of the Interior, as is required for all exchanges of Indian trust land.
See 25 U.S.C. § 464.
Believing that the agreement would soon be finalized, Longie made
improvements on the 80-acre parcel, including a road and a well. The tribal council
passed Resolution No. A05-86-069, authorizing the transfer, and Longie signed the
deed to transfer title to his land. The transfer remained incomplete, however, because
the tribal council members did not sign the deed authorizing the formal transfer of
title. Longie began living on the land and made additional improvements over the
years. He continues to receive rent income from his family’s 40-acre allotment,
which was never formally transferred to the tribe.
Longie received a letter in May 2001 from the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(charged with management of the leasing of Indian lands), stating that the land
transfer had never occurred, that Longie owed $12,075 for unauthorized use of the
land, and that Longie needed to obtain leases from the tribe in order to continue to use
the property. In December 2002, the Spirit Lake Tribe began to build a mini satellite
solid waste transfer station on a portion of the 80-acre plot where Longie resides.

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2Longie had been elected in 1997 by the members of the tribe as Chief Judge
for the Spirit Lake Nation. The tribal council adopted resolutions in 1999 allowing
its members to remove and appoint judges and promptly acted to remove Longie from
his position as Chief Judge. Longie filed suit in the Northern Plains Intertribal Court
of Appeals and in federal court, both of which suits were dismissed for failure to
exhaust tribal remedies. We affirmed the dismissal of the federal court action.
Longie v. Pearson, No. 99-4142, 2000 WL 427630 (8th Cir. Apr. 21, 2000)
(unpublished per curiam). Longie’s subsequently filed tribal court action was
unsuccessful, as was his appeal to the Intertribal Court of Appeals.
3As a preliminary matter, Longie argues that the district court abused its
discretion in not granting his request to amend his complaint. His argument is
immaterial if the urged bases for subject matter jurisdiction in the amended complaint
would nevertheless result in dismissal. We have held that amended complaints,
although liberally permitted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), may be denied if there has
been undue delay, there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, the
amendment would be futile, or unfair prejudice would result. See Roberson v. Hayti
Police Dep’t, 241 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 2001). Here, the district court evaluated the
amended complaint and, concluding that it would be futile, dismissed the case
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Longie filed this action in federal district court in August 2003 seeking quiet
title, an injunction against the waste transfer station, and other equitable relief. He
believed that he would face prejudice and unfair treatment if he tried to proceed in
tribal court because of a prior dispute with tribal council members. 2 Longie sought
to amend his complaint to add bases for federal jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1361
and 1362) and to add the United States as a party (based on its belief that it is an
indispensable party), along with other government agencies. The tribe moved to
dismiss on numerous grounds. The district court dismissed the case, finding that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the case did not raise a federal question and
the other jurisdictional provisions were inapplicable.
II.
Longie argues on appeal that this court has subject matter jurisdiction over his
case under both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1361. 3 We review questions of subject matter

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without formally accepting the amended complaint. Its decision to do so was
appropriate and did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
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jurisdiction de novo. Prince v. Ark. Bd. of Examiners in Psychology, 380 F.3d 337,
340 (8th Cir. 2004). We conclude that the district court properly held that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to resolve this dispute.
Federal courts have consistently affirmed the principle that it is important to
guard “the authority of Indian governments over their reservations.” Williams v. Lee,
358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959); see also Fisher v. Dist. Ct., 424 U.S. 382, 387-88 (1976)
(per curiam) (finding no state court jurisdiction over adoption of child member of the
tribe because such jurisdiction “would interfere with the powers of [tribal] self-
government” and “would cause a corresponding decline in the authority of the Tribal
Court”). In light of the fact that “Indian tribes retain attributes of sovereignty over
both their members and their territory,” and out of our obligation to avoid impairing
“the authority of the tribal courts,” United States ex rel. Kishell v. Turtle Mountain
Housing Auth., 816 F.2d 1273, 1276 (8th Cir. 1987), we will exercise our section
1331 jurisdiction in cases involving reservation affairs only in those cases in which
federal law is determinative of the issues involved. See Smith v. McCullough, 270
U.S. 456, 459 (1926) (stating that either the suit “was one arising under the [federal]
legislation relating to Quapaw allotments, or was one where there was an absence of
federal jurisdiction”). This is particularly true when, as here, the case involves an
intra-tribal dispute.
This case is not one “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Longie argues that his claim
raises a federal question because it implicates the tribe’s possessory interest in the
land, protected by the United States in trust. Section 1331 jurisdiction, however, does
not broadly incorporate every case that indirectly implicates an interest that is
grounded in the laws of the United States. See Schulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561,
569-70 (1912). A case does not “arise under” the laws of the United States “unless

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it really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy respecting the validity,
construction or effect of such a law, upon the determination of which the result
depends.” Id. (finding no jurisdiction even though the title to the land at issue had
originally been granted under an act of Congress creating allotments for individual
Indians); see also Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 114 (1936) (finding
that “[t]here is no necessary connection between the enforcement of [ ] a contract
according to its terms and the existence of a controversy arising under federal law”
just because the contract implicated federal statutory obligations).
We therefore ask whether federal law or local/tribal law controls the existence
and enforceability of Longie’s asserted right. See Weeks Constr., Inc. v. Oglala
Sioux Housing Auth., 797 F.2d 668, 672 (8th Cir. 1986). We agree with our sister
circuits that a federal question exists if the outcome is “controlled or conditioned by
Federal law,” Prairie Band of the Pottawatomie Tribe of Indians v. Puckkee, 321 F.2d
767, 770 (10th Cir. 1963), but does not exist if “the ‘real substance of the
controversy’ centers upon” something other than the construction of federal law.
Littel v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486, 488 (9th Cir. 1965) (citation omitted) (noting that a
retainer contract dispute “center[ed] upon the contract and its construction,” not the
fact that federal law required approval of the contract by federal officials before it
was enforceable). If an interpretation of tribal or local law is necessary to establish
or clarify a right sought to be enforced based on a contract, then jurisdiction under
section 1331 does not exist, even if the subject of the contract is Indian trust property.
Weeks Constr., 797 F.2d at 672. Similarly, if the dispute centers on discretionary
tribal action that affects tribal members, it is not a federal question, even if the
discretionary act was taken pursuant to a federal statute and with the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior. See Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 273 F.2d 731, 732-34
(10th Cir. 1959) (finding that the district court did not have jurisdiction to issue a
declaration that Martinez was a member of the tribe and should have received per
capita payments designated by the tribe to its members because the dispute centered

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4 Even when an Indian law case involves a federal question, other
jurisprudential considerations may nevertheless prevent it from proceeding in federal
district court. See National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 855-56. For example, with very few
exceptions we require that the parties exhaust tribal court remedies so that the tribal
court may first consider the limits of its own sovereignty and may develop a full
record. Id. at 856; see also Reservation Tel. Coop. v. Three Affiliated Tribes, 76 F.3d
181, 184 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding exhaustion necessary in case involving tribal
authority to tax telephone lines and rights of way on reservation land).
5We agree with Judge Hazel’s conclusion in United States v. Seneca Nation of
New York Indians, 274 F. 946, 951 (W.D.N.Y. 1921):
[I]n the absence of congressional action bestowing upon the individual
Indians the right to litigate internal questions relating to their property
rights in the federal courts, and conferring jurisdiction upon this court
to determine such controversies, this court should not assume
jurisdiction.
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on the tribe’s exercise of discretionary authority, not the federal statute authorizing
the tribe to make such designations).
The interpretation of federal law is central, however, to the resolution of cases
that involve the question whether a tribal court has exceeded its jurisdiction. National
Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851 (1985) (finding
jurisdiction under section 1331 because federal common law establishes the limits of
tribal sovereignty).4 It is also central to cases that involve whether a federal agency
action is unlawful. See Goodface v. Grassrope, 708 F.2d 335, 338 (8th Cir. 1983)
(finding jurisdiction to review a Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) officer’s refusal to
recognize a newly elected tribal council due to a tribal election dispute). Yet agency
action is reviewable only after it has occurred. The fact that the Secretary of the
Interior must approve every land transfer within a reservation does not establish that
every dispute related to a transfer of land involves a federal question.5 See Id.; see
also Conroy v. Conroy, 369 F. Supp. 179, 180 (D. S.D. 1973) (stating that “[i]t is well

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settled that merely because there is some federal involvement—because the land is
trust property—does not create a federal question”).
Longie’s right to ownership of the 80-acre plot is contingent upon whether the
tribe legally consented to and effectuated the transfer, i.e., whether there was an
express or implied contract or other legal basis to force the tribe to honor its
resolution consenting to the transfer. This intra-tribal matter is contingent upon tribal
law, not federal law. Longie contends that the federal courts may order the land
transfer as part of the remedy he seeks. We disagree. Neither the federal courts nor
the Secretary of the Interior has authority to determine in the first instance that a land
transfer should occur between a tribe and a member of that tribe. The Secretary’s
authority is limited to the choice of whether to approve or deny a completed and
voluntary land transfer agreement by the parties involved. 25 U.S.C. § 464. That
limited statutory authority, grounded in the trust responsibility of the United States
and its fee interest in Indian lands, is the only federal law concept implicated in this
case, and it is insufficient to provide jurisdiction under section 1331.
Longie also argues that the federal district court has jurisdiction over his case
under 28 U.S.C. § 1361. He claims to be seeking a writ of mandamus against the
United States and contends that the United States has a duty to honor the previously
agreed-upon land exchange. His claim fails, however, because he has not named a
federal officer as a defendant and because he has not identified a legal basis for the
duty he claims exists. For section 1361 to apply, the plaintiff must seek “to compel
an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty
owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Mandamus may issue under section 1361
against an officer of the United States “only when the plaintiff has a clear right to
relief, the defendant has a clear duty to perform the act in question, and the plaintiff
has no adequate alternative remedy.” Borntrager v. Stevas, 772 F.2d 419, 420 (8th
Cir. 1985).

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Even if Longie had identified the federal officer who is responsible for
approving land transfers within the reservation, that officer would not have a duty to
act—and in fact, as detailed above, would lack authority to act—on a land transfer
until it has been established that the transfer was voluntary and complete in every
other respect. Longie cannot claim that the Secretary of the Interior refused to
approve a land transfer that was never presented to him for approval because the
predicate steps never took place. See, e.g., Martinez, 273 F.2d at 734.
Our holding does not preclude Longie from seeking relief in tribal court. The
tribal court is well suited to determine whether a binding agreement existed between
Longie and the tribe regarding the land exchange and whether any obligations still
exist under that agreement.
The order of dismissal is affirmed.
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