Fidlar Technologies v. Lps Real Estate Data Solutions, Inc .

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 15-1830
F IDLAR TECHNOLOGIES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LPS R EAL ESTATE DATA S OLUTIONS, I NC .,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois.
No. 4:13-CV-4021 — Sara Darrow, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED NOVEMBER 5, 2015 — DECIDED J ANUARY 21, 2016
____________________
Before F LAUM , M ANION , and R OVNER , Circuit Judges.
F LAUM , Circuit Judge. Fidlar Technologies (“Fidlar”)
brings this action against LPS Real Estate Data Solutions, Inc.
(“LPS”) for violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(“CFAA”) and the Illinois Computer Crime Prevention Law
(“CCPL”). Fidlar claims that LPS improperly downloaded
county land records provided through Fidlar’s services. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of LPS. It

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2 No. 15-1830
held that Fidlar failed to show that LPS acted with intent to
defraud under CFAA § 1030(a)(4) or that LPS caused “dam-
age” under § 1030(a)(5)(A). The court also rejected Fidlar’s
argument that LPS knew or had reason to know that it might
cause loss as required by the CCPL. For the following rea-
sons, we affirm.
I. Background
Fidlar is a technology company that develops software
for county offices to manage public land records. Fidlar’s
software allows counties to digitize and index land records.
Fidlar licenses its software to the counties, and the individu-
al counties contract with users who want access to these land
records.
One of Fidlar’s software products, Laredo, provides users
with remote internet access to county records. The “Laredo
system,” as Fidlar describes it, consists of three components:
the county databases, the “Laredo client” (or just “the cli-
ent”), and the “middle tier.” The county databases store
county land records and index data. The “Laredo client” is a
user-interface that allows users to remotely access these land
records and related data. Finally, the “middle tier” facilitates
the communication between the Laredo client and a specific
county database. Fidlar offers its county customers the op-
tion of whether to host the county database and middle tier
components on the county’s own servers or on Fidlar’s serv-
ers. The client is stored on the user’s own computer.
In order to use the client, a user must accept Fidlar’s End-
User License Agreement (“EULA”). In relevant part, the
EULA provides that a user may “use … any portion of the
software for any purpose,” but it also provides that a user

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No. 15-1830 3
may “not … copy the software covered by this Agreement in
any manner.” Importantly, the EULA specifies that it does
not grant access to any county information. The authority to
grant access to records remains with the relevant county.
When a user inputs a record search into the Laredo cli-
ent, the client sends a request to the middle tier via the in-
ternet. The middle tier then retrieves the appropriate record
from the county database and “streams” this record to the
user through the Laredo client. In other words, the user can
view an image of the record in the client, but cannot down-
load or save it for later viewing. However, the client gives
the user an option to “print” an image of the record, either
on paper or to a PDF file.
The client communicates with the middle tier through a
technology called Simple Object Access Protocol (“SOAP
calls”). The Laredo client sends SOAP calls unencrypted
over the internet. In order to access a particular record, the
client generates the appropriate SOAP call and sends it to
the middle tier. After analyzing the SOAP call, the middle
tier retrieves the matching record and sends it back to the
client for viewing. Each Laredo user has a unique username
and password for each county with which it has an agree-
ment. Accordingly, each SOAP call is coded with a corre-
sponding unique identifier.
Fidlar tracks access to county records in order to facilitate
billing by the individual counties. Each county develops its
own subscription plan for access to its records. All the sub-
scription plans charge a monthly fee set by the county based
on time spent accessing records. Some—but not all—
counties also charge a separate “print fee” (or “copy fee”) for
each record a user prints using the client. Fidlar also uses

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4 No. 15-1830
SOAP calls to track access and printing. For example, if a us-
er prints a record from the client, the client generates and
sends a SOAP call of the print request to the middle tier
where it is logged for billing purposes.
LPS is a real estate data analytics company that used La-
redo to gather real property data. LPS’s business requires a
continuous acquisition of land records and data. It currently
has agreements for access to public land records with ap-
proximately 2,600 counties nationwide. However, LPS is not
interested in the land records themselves, but rather the data
in these records.
To further its data collection efforts, in 2010, LPS con-
tracted with 82 of Fidlar’s county customers to gain access to
their land records. For each of these 82 counties, LPS agreed
to pay the monthly fee for unlimited access to the county’s
records. For those counties that charged separate print fees,
LPS’s unlimited subscription did not include printing—if
LPS printed a record from the client, it was still charged the
applicable print fee. Fidlar was not a party to any of the con-
tracts between LPS and the individual counties.
In 2011, LPS designed a “web-harvester,” a computer
program to download county records en masse. To create the
web-harvester, LPS ran a number of standard record search-
es and used a “traffic analyzer” to view the SOAP calls sent
from the client to the middle tier. LPS then identified the
SOAP calls necessary to retrieve records and developed its
own client, the web-harvester, to emulate those SOAP calls
and send them to the middle tier. 1 LPS’s web-harvester only
1 “Web-harvester” is in fact a misnomer since LPS’s client retrieved
records from the county databases, not the World Wide Web.

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No. 15-1830 5
sent the SOAP calls necessary to retrieve records; it did not
send other SOAP calls, such as those that track a user’s activ-
ity. But every SOAP call did include LPS’s unique identifier
assigned by each county.
Like the Laredo client, the web-harvester allowed LPS to
search for and retrieve any record from the county databases
it subscribed to. However, LPS’s web-harvester had three
major differences from Fidlar’s Laredo client. First, the web-
harvester allowed LPS to acquire records en masse rather
than viewing or printing them one at a time. Second, the
web-harvester allowed LPS to download or save records, an
option not available in the Laredo client. Third, LPS’s web-
harvester did not send any tracking data at all and did not
register any print fees, even if LPS downloaded or saved a
record.
LPS used its web-harvester to obtain a large number of
records from the 82 county databases it subscribed to over
approximately two years. It downloaded the records in bulk
onto its computers and then sent the records to India. There,
select data from the records were “keyed,” or entered, into
LPS’s database. Throughout this period, LPS continued to
pay for unlimited subscriptions in all 82 counties but did not
incur (or pay) print fees for all of the records it acquired
through its web-harvester. Indeed, essentially none of LPS’s
activities were tracked during this period. Nonetheless,
LPS’s web-harvester did not disrupt Fidlar’s services to other
users or alter any content in the middle tier or county data-
bases.
In 2012, Fidlar received a message from one of its county
customers noting that LPS was paying subscription fees but
was not logging any time used. In early 2013, Fidlar decided

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6 No. 15-1830
to investigate LPS. Based on server logs, Fidlar concluded
that LPS was using a web-harvester instead of the Laredo
client to obtain records.
On March 11, 2013, Fidlar filed this action in the Central
District of Illinois alleging violations of the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act and the Illinois Computer Crime Prevention
Law, as well as trespass to chattels. LPS moved to dismiss,
filed a counterclaim, and requested a TRO and preliminary
injunction to prevent Fidlar from reporting LPS’s activities to
the counties and from upgrading Laredo to prevent web-
harvesting. The district court denied LPS’s motion to dismiss
and its requests for injunctive relief. On December 1, 2014,
LPS moved for summary judgment on all of Fidlar’s claims.
On March 5, 2015, the district court granted LPS’s motion for
summary judgment and dismissed LPS’s counterclaim as
moot. Fidlar appeals.
II. Discussion
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo. Bunn v. Khoury Enters., Inc., 753 F.3d 676, 681 (7th
Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no
genuine dispute of material fact and the nonmoving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. A “material fact”
is one that affects the outcome of the suit. Id. A “genuine is-
sue” exists as to any material fact when “the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmov-
ing party.” Id. at 681–82. In determining whether a genuine
dispute of material fact exists, we view the record in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing reasonable
inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at 682.

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No. 15-1830 7
A. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Claim
The CFAA, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, is primarily a criminal anti-
hacking statute. However, § 1030(g) provides a civil remedy
for any person who suffers damage or loss due to a violation
of § 1030. § 1030(g). The district court held that Fidlar failed
to demonstrate a violation of § 1030. On appeal, Fidlar ar-
gues that LPS violated § 1030(a)(4) and § 1030(a)(5)(A). We
review each of these arguments in turn.
1. Intent to Defraud Under § 1030(a)(4)
Section 1030(a)(4) punishes anyone who:
[K]nowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses
a protected computer without authorization, or
exceeds authorized access, and by means of
such conduct furthers the intended fraud and
obtains anything of value ….
The district court held that no reasonable jury could find
that LPS acted with intent to defraud. Fidlar maintains that
LPS’s use of its web-harvester constituted an intentional
scheme to avoid paying print fees, thus defrauding the coun-
ties.
Although this Court has not previously examined this el-
ement of § 1030, we have explained that in similar statutes
“intent to defraud means that the defendant acted willfully
and with specific intent to deceive or cheat, usually for the
purpose of getting financial gain for himself or causing fi-
nancial loss to another.” United States v. Pust, 798 F.3d 597,
600 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Paneras, 222 F.3d
406, 410 (7th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because direct evidence of intent is often unavailable, intent
to defraud “may be established by circumstantial evidence

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8 No. 15-1830
and by inferences drawn from examining the scheme itself
which demonstrate that the scheme was reasonably calculat-
ed to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehen-
sion.” Id. at 600–01.
Additionally, the legislative history of § 1030(a)(4) indi-
cates that Congress intended for this provision to reach cases
of computer theft. S. Rep. No. 99-432, at 9, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2486–87 (“The new subsection 1030(a)(4)
to be created by this bill is designed to penalize thefts of
property via computer that occur as part of a scheme to de-
fraud.”). The intent to defraud element is meant to distin-
guish computer theft from mere trespass. Id. at 10 (“[T]here
must be a clear distinction between computer theft, punish-
able as a felony, and computer trespass, punishable in the
first instance as a misdemeanor. The element in the new par-
agraph (a)(4), requiring a showing of an intent to defraud, is
meant to preserve that distinction ….”).
We note at the outset that this is not a case of theft. It is
undisputed that LPS had authority to access the county rec-
ords as a general matter, the question is whether the way in
which it did so violated the statute.
Nonetheless, appealing to the broad nature of
§ 1030(a)(4)’s language, Fidlar argues that LPS’s conduct
supports an inference of an intent to defraud. By using its
web-harvester, LPS obtained county records at no additional
cost. Moreover, LPS knew that printing records through the
client resulted in an additional fee in some counties. And
LPS received invoices that did not reflect any downloads it
made using its web-harvester, suggesting that LPS was
aware that Fidlar and the counties were not tracking its ac-
tivities. Assuming that LPS otherwise would have paid a

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No. 15-1830 9
print fee for the records it downloaded, LPS’s web-harvester
allowed it to avoid paying these fees. Therefore, Fidlar con-
tends that LPS’s “scheme” appears consistent with an intent
to defraud.
By contrast, LPS argues that its conduct is consistent with
a legitimate, non-fraudulent intent. By using its web-
harvester, LPS rapidly acquired records en masse, something
it could not do with the Laredo client, even if it paid print
fees. In other words, LPS could have been driven by a need
to access documents more quickly, and not by an intent to
defraud the counties by avoiding print fees. Indeed, if LPS
just wanted to avoid print fees, it could have done so
through simpler means such as copying the salient data by
hand, taking pictures of the records on its computer screens
with a digital camera, or simply keying the data directly
from the Laredo client. Hence, LPS contends that its intent
was to engage in efficient and legitimate business practices,
not to “deceive or cheat” the counties. Pust, 798 F.3d at 600.
Examining the “scheme” itself, we conclude that no rea-
sonable juror could infer that LPS had an intent to defraud.
In other words, LPS’s conduct was not “reasonably calculat-
ed to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehen-
sion.” Id. at 601. First, LPS used its web-harvester even in
those counties that did not charge a print fee. If LPS’s intent
was to evade print fees, it would have only used its web-
harvester in counties that did charge print fees. The fact that
LPS used its web-harvester in all counties suggests that its
goal was to accelerate its data acquisition efforts. Second,
LPS continued to pay for unlimited subscriptions in all 82
counties, even though it was not logging any time by using
its web-harvester. If LPS intended to defraud the counties, it

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10 No. 15-1830
could have selected a limited subscription for less money.
Third, LPS did not conceal its use of a web-harvester.2 In
fact, each of LPS’s SOAP requests contained its unique iden-
tifier. As a result, no reasonable jury could conclude that LPS
had the requisite intent to defraud based only on the scheme
itself.
Moreover, Fidlar failed to present sufficient circumstan-
tial evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude
that LPS intended to commit fraud, or even that LPS knew
its actions were fraudulent. LPS maintains that it honestly
believed that its conduct was permissible under the county
agreements. Fidlar cannot demonstrate that LPS intended to
commit fraud without evidence that LPS knew that its con-
duct was fraudulent. See id. at 601 (considering whether the
defendant knew “the fraudulent nature of the scheme” in
assessing intent to defraud).
2 Fidlar argues that LPS did conceal its conduct because LPS’s web-
harvester did not send SOAP calls that track user activity. But this con-
duct is entirely consistent with LPS’s purported non-fraudulent reason
for using a web-harvester in the first place. LPS designed its web-
harvester to obtain records and a tracking function like the one built into
Laredo was irrelevant to accomplishing that purpose.
Typically, a person who is concealing fraudulent activity will take
unusual, out of the ordinary steps to do so. For example, in United States
v. Westerfield, we considered the fact that a criminal defendant had di-
rected fraudulent proceeds to a third party as evidence of concealment
when “a seller rarely—if ever—directs 100% of the proceeds to a third
party.” 714 F.3d 480, 485–86 (7th Cir. 2013). In this case, LPS did not go
out of its way to conceal its conduct. Rather, it merely designed a web-
harvester in the simplest way it knew how. In fact, an LPS employee ex-
pressed skepticism as to whether LPS even could have ascertained how
Fidlar tracked user activity.

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No. 15-1830 11
None of the circumstantial evidence, including the testi-
mony of LPS employees, the agreements governing LPS’s
access to county records, and the Laredo technology itself,
undermines LPS’s claim that it believed it could permissibly
download records through its web-harvester without paying
print fees. First, LPS presented testimony from its employees
indicating that they believed that although printing a record
resulted in a fee, downloading a record did not. For exam-
ple, LPS’s former Senior Vice President Erick Marroquin
stated that he believed that LPS was “entitled to download
images from the Laredo program without incurring a print
charge.” LPS also offered evidence that it did not use a web-
harvester to avoid print fees. The employee who oversaw
development of the web-harvester, John McCabe, testified
that in designing the web-harvester, “no part of [the process]
was to avoid a print fee” and that the purpose was
“[e]fficiency, speed.”3
3 In a declaration supporting LPS’s request for a temporary restrain-
ing order, McCabe stated that “many counties engage Fidlar Technolo-
gies to act as the exclusive provider of internet access to the county’s
public records” and that “[a]nyone interested in reviewing the public
records online must download Fidlar’s Laredo software and obtain a
username and password from the county.” These statements do not sup-
port a finding of intent to defraud. Taking the second statement first, it is
undisputed that in order to gain access to these records, initially, LPS
had to download the Laredo client and obtain a username and password
from each county. But as McCabe’s complete declaration illustrates,
LPS’s conduct did not stop there. Our inquiry is focused on what hap-
pened after—when LPS created and used its web-harvester. As for the
first statement, it is also undisputed that the counties contracted exclu-
sively with Fidlar to provide internet access to their records. But LPS did
access the records through Fidlar. LPS’s web-harvester connected
through the middle tier to the county databases, both of which were

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12 No. 15-1830
Fidlar’s own conduct, moreover, bolsters LPS’s testimony
on this point. LPS presented evidence that Fidlar knew that
at least two of LPS’s competitors used third party programs
to acquire record data via Laredo. In particular, CoreLogic
used a “screen-scraper” to collect data from county records.
Similarly, the First American Title Company used its own
web-harvester to acquire records. Fidlar was aware of this
conduct yet did not do anything to stop it. Indeed, in an in-
ternal e-mail, a Fidlar employee stated that Fidlar could make
screen-scraping or web-harvesting illegal with a “simple dis-
claimer that states the information can’t be scraped from the
image.” Taken together, this evidence suggests that even Fid-
lar itself did not believe that web-harvesting was impermis-
sible.
Second, the agreements between LPS and the counties
did not prohibit LPS from using a web-harvester or require
LPS to access the records through the Laredo client. Cf. EF
Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 2003)
(“[T]he public website provider can easily spell out explicitly
what is forbidden …. If [the plaintiff] wants to ban [certain
conduct], let it say so on the webpage or a link clearly
marked as containing restrictions.”). These agreements also
did not prohibit LPS from downloading records or require
LPS to pay a print fee for any records it downloaded.4 Yet,
maintained by Fidlar, and did not access the county records directly. The
question therefore is whether the Laredo client was the exclusive means
of accessing county records, not whether Fidlar was the exclusive pro-
vider of remote access.
4 Some of the county agreements and invoices stated that there was
an additional fee for making “copies.” But evidence presented by LPS
indicates that it understood “copy” fees as synonymous with “print” fees
and that neither a print fee nor a copy fee applied to downloads.

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No. 15-1830 13
LPS derived its authority to access records entirely from
these agreements. The agreement between LPS and Fidlar,
the Laredo client EULA, stated that it does not grant access
to any county information. So the EULA, by its own terms,
did not limit—or even affect—LPS’s access to county rec-
ords.
Third, the Laredo client’s technological limitations do not
support an inference that LPS knew it could not download
records. Fidlar contends that because the client was designed
to prevent downloading records, LPS should have known
that it was not authorized to do so.5 But the client’s techno-
logical limitations only show that LPS knew that it could not
download records through the Laredo client. We see no reason
why LPS should have inferred that it could not download
records through a completely different program that it de-
signed. LPS’s access to records was tied to the individual
agreements with each county—agreements that did not re-
quire LPS to use the Laredo client and that Fidlar was not
even party to. Further, the EULA, which was the only
agreement between Fidlar and LPS, expressly provided that
it did not grant access to records and that access could only
be granted by the relevant county. In other words, if LPS be-
lieved that the county agreements granted it the authority to
access records through its own software, the limitations on
5 The client did not give the user the option to download records and
it disabled certain standard computer function such as the copy-paste
and the print-screen functions. It also inhibited third party software from
taking screen shots. Fidlar presented evidence that it hobbled the client
intentionally as a way to generate revenue for the counties from print
fees.

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14 No. 15-1830
the Laredo client would seem to have no bearing on the
permissible uses of that software.
Additionally, other characteristics of Fidlar’s services
suggested that downloading records through another pro-
gram, like a web-harvester, was permissible. The middle tier
did not impose any limitations on LPS’s use of a web-
harvester. Fidlar did not encrypt SOAP calls between the
middle tier and the Laredo client. And the middle tier was
accessible by means other than the Laredo client, including
other Fidlar software products, such as Fidlar’s Tapestry
platform, as well as third-party applications. So while the
option to download records was limited on the front-end by
the client user-interface, it was completely open on the back-
end by the middle tier’s use of unsecured SOAP calls.
Fidlar attempts to cast doubt on LPS’s claim that it did
not intend to defraud the counties. First, Fidlar argues that
the county invoices, which did not indicate any of LPS’s
web-harvester activity, support an inference that LPS intend-
ed to defraud the counties. Even assuming that LPS knew its
activities were not being tracked as a result of these invoices,
the invoices do not undermine LPS’s contention that it be-
lieved its conduct was permissible. LPS’s access was gov-
erned by the county agreements and the invoices did not
give LPS cause to change its understanding of these agree-
ments. The fact that LPS was not being billed for download-
ing records would only reinforce LPS’s belief that its conduct
was permissible under its unlimited subscriptions. Similarly,
the fact that the counties continued to accept LPS’s unlimited
subscription fees (and that Fidlar continued to provide LPS
access) without any inquiry into the company’s minimal ac-
tivity might have further reinforced LPS’s understanding of

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No. 15-1830 15
its arrangement. As a result, the invoices do not make an in-
tent to defraud any more likely.
Second, Fidlar cites the testimony of Lynda Taylor. Tay-
lor was a Senior Vice President at LPS until June 2010, prior
to LPS’s creation and use of its web-harvester. Taylor ex-
plained that during her tenure at LPS, her plan was to “pay
selectively,” “on an as-needed basis … because Laredo
charged for time to be on the system and to look at the doc-
ument images online, and then you paid extra if you wanted
to actually get a copy of an image.” She also stated that La-
redo did not allow a user to “take control of the digital im-
age” of a record. Fidlar argues that this testimony shows that
LPS knew it could either view a record in the client or pay to
print a record from the client, but could not download or
“take control” of a record.
However, Fidlar misreads Taylor’s testimony. Taylor was
only referring to the limitations of the Laredo client. She did
not testify that LPS was prohibited from downloading rec-
ords using a web-harvester or through other means. In fact,
Taylor’s tenure predates LPS’s creation and use of the web-
harvester. And individuals employed at LPS at that time
consistently testified that they believed LPS’s conduct to be
permissible.
Third, Fidlar points to testimony from Michael Hall,
LPS’s Director of Data Acquisition, who stated that a hypo-
thetical fee of $0.50 or more per page to print a record would
have been “cost prohibitive” for LPS. This hypothetical fee is
the same as the actual print fee charged by some of the 82
counties. Accordingly, Fidlar argues that Hall’s testimony
supports an inference that LPS was defrauding the counties
of this fee.

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16 No. 15-1830
But Fidlar’s argument largely misses the mark. Undoubt-
edly, Hall’s testimony shows that LPS had much to gain if it
wanted to avoid print fees. But this is obvious; LPS does not
dispute that acquiring records via a web-harvester was far
less expensive than printing them via the Laredo client. The
problem with Fidlar’s argument is the fact that printing rec-
ords via the client was more expensive, or even economically
infeasible for LPS, does not demonstrate that LPS intention-
ally avoided this expense. Hall’s testimony is entirely con-
sistent with LPS’s narrative that it was not trying to avoid
print fees. Rather, the fees were simply inconsequential to
LPS’s data acquisition efforts. Hence, Hall’s testimony does
not support an inference of an intent to defraud.
In sum, Fidlar attempts to convert its failure to prohibit
LPS’s action by contract into an allegation of criminal con-
duct. Despite its extensive efforts to paint LPS’s conduct as
fraudulent in nature, Fidlar has not pointed to any evidence
that would allow a reasonable jury to find that LPS believed
its conduct was fraudulent. Hence, we agree with the district
court that no reasonable jury could conclude—based on this
evidence alone—that LPS acted with an intent to defraud.
2. Damage Under § 1030(a)(5)(A)
Next, Fidlar contends that LPS violated § 1030(a)(5)(A),
which punishes anyone who:
[K]nowingly causes the transmission of a pro-
gram, information, code, or command, and as a
result of such conduct, intentionally causes
damage without authorization, to a protected
computer ….

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No. 15-1830 17
The district court held that LPS did not violate this provision
because it found that LPS did not cause any damage under
the statute.
Under the CFAA, “damage” is defined as “any impair-
ment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a sys-
tem, or information ….” § 1030(e)(8). Hence, “causes dam-
age” encompasses clearly destructive behavior such as using
a virus or worm or deleting data. See, e.g., Int’l Airport Ctrs.,
L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2006). But it may
also include less obviously invasive conduct, such as flood-
ing an email account. See, e.g., Pulte Homes, Inc. v. Laborers'
Int’l Union, 648 F.3d 295, 301–02 (6th Cir. 2011).
Fidlar claims that LPS caused damage to a protected
computer—the middle tier servers—by “stopp[ing] the flow
of information, causing a diminution in the completeness or
availability of data.” However, Fidlar admits that LPS did
not alter any data or disrupt Fidlar’s services in any way.
LPS just avoided Fidlar’s method of tracking user activity by
not sending the necessary SOAP calls.
This interruption is not “damage” as defined by the stat-
ute. LPS’s web-harvester did not impair the integrity or
availability of Fidlar’s data or systems; it simply download-
ed the data requested without leaving a trace. Put another
way, the middle tier servers, including the logs, were unal-
tered after LPS used its web-harvester.
Fidlar attempts to liken this case to United States v. Mitra,
405 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2005), but the two are readily distin-
guishable. In Mitra, this Court held that a defendant caused
damage by blocking emergency radio communications. 405
F.3d at 494. Unlike in this case, the defendant in Mitra actual-

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18 No. 15-1830
ly impaired the availability and integrity of a protected
computer. His conduct prevented others from communi-
cating through the public communication system. See id. at
493 (noting that the defendant’s conduct “prevented the
computer from receiving, on the control channel, data essen-
tial to parcel traffic among the other 19 channels” and that
“[w]hen disturbances erupted, public safety departments
were unable to coordinate their activities because the radio
system was down”). By contrast, LPS did not prevent any-
one from using the middle tier and county database servers
nor did it alter any of the content on the servers.
Fidlar tries to sidestep this distinction by arguing that
LPS caused damage to the entire “Laredo system” because it
prevented the tracking component from functioning as Fid-
lar intended. But the statute only protects against damage
“to a protected computer,” including to systems on such a
computer. §§ 1030(a)(5)(A); 1030(e)(8). The Laredo system is
not a “computer,” but rather a description of Fidlar’s multi-
tier architecture. See § 1030(e)(1) (defining “computer” as
“an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other
high speed data processing device”). Hence, LPS cannot be
liable for damaging the entire “Laredo system” under this
statute.
In reality, Fidlar’s claim is trespassory in nature. LPS ac-
cessed the middle tier servers without following Fidlar’s
“rules” (i.e., logging its activity or using the Laredo client).
But by using the word “damage,” and in light of the statuto-
ry definition, Congress intended this provision reach actual
disruptions in service, not mere access, even if trespassory.
See Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420 (“Congress was concerned with
both … attacks by virus and worm writers, … and attacks by

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No. 15-1830 19
disgruntled programmers who decide to trash the employ-
er’s data system on the way out ….”); cf. § 1030(a)(2) (prohib-
iting unauthorized access to obtain information from a pro-
tected computer without requiring damage). Therefore, the
district court was correct that no reasonable jury could con-
clude that LPS caused any damage within the meaning of
the statute.
B. Illinois Computer Crime Prevention Law Claim
Like the CFAA, the Illinois CCPL is a criminal statute
with a civil suit provision. Section 720 ILCS § 5/17-51(c) pro-
vides that “[w]hoever suffers loss by reason of a violation of
subdivision (a)(4) of this Section may, in a civil action against
the violator, obtain appropriate relief.” Fidlar claims that
LPS violated subdivision (a)(4)(C), which provides that:
(a) A person commits computer tampering
when he or she knowingly and without the au-
thorization of a computer’s owner or in excess
of the authority granted to him or her: … (4)
Inserts or attempts to insert a program into a
computer or computer program knowing or hav-
ing reason to know that such program contains in-
formation or commands that will or may: … (C)
cause loss to the users of that computer or the
users of a computer which accesses or which is
accessed by such program ….
720 ILCS § 5/17-51(a)(4)(C) (emphasis added). The district
court held that LPS had no reason to know that its use of a
web-harvester would or might cause loss under the statute.
The court reasoned that LPS never believed that the counties

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20 No. 15-1830
were entitled to print fees for its use of a web-harvester, and
thus there was no loss to the counties that LPS knew or
should have known it was causing.
In support of its position that LPS violated the CCPL,
Fidlar incorporates the same argument it made under CFAA
§ 1030(a)(4): LPS intentionally defrauded, and consequently
intended to cause loss to, the counties. Indeed, under Illinois
law, Fidlar can establish knowledge by demonstrating that
LPS acted intentionally. See 720 ILCS § 5/4-5 (“When the law
provides that acting knowingly suffices to establish an ele-
ment of an offense, that element also is established if a per-
son acts intentionally.”).
But as discussed above, Fidlar cannot show that LPS in-
tended to defraud the counties. LPS demonstrated that its
intent was to efficiently acquire records in a way it believed
to be permissible under the governing agreements. Its intent
was not to avoid print fees. Accordingly, LPS did not intend
to cause loss to the counties.6
For the same reason, Fidlar cannot show that LPS knew
or had reason to know that it might cause loss to the coun-
ties. LPS was aware that some counties imposed print fees
and that the counties obtained revenue from these fees. But
given that LPS believed that it was entitled to download rec-
ords without incurring a fee, it follows that LPS did not
know or have reason to know that it was causing a loss. The
fact that LPS could have paid print fees but chose not to does
not establish a loss to the counties because LPS was not
6 We note that the term “loss” in this provision is not defined by the
CCPL nor by Illinois case law. But we agree with the district court that
no matter what definition applies, the result is the same.

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No. 15-1830 21
printing records. At a minimum, Fidlar must demonstrate
that LPS had reason to know that the counties were entitled
to the print fees they allegedly lost. However, from LPS’s
perspective, the counties were not entitled to anything be-
yond the unlimited subscription fees LPS was already pay-
ing. Therefore, we agree with the district court that no rea-
sonable jury could conclude that LPS knew or had reason to
know that it would or might cause a loss.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we A FFIRM the judgment of the
district court.

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