United States of America v. Carl A. Courtright , Iii

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 28, 2014
Decided August 1, 2014
Before
RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge
ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge
No. 13‐3564
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA ,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
CARL A. COURTRIGHT , III,
Defendant‐Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois.
No. 3:07‐cr‐30179
David R. Herndon,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Carl Courtright was convicted in 2009 of production, possession, and receipt of child
pornography and sentenced to life plus ten years in prison. 1 The sentencing court also imposed
several financial penalties, ordering Courtright to pay a Special Assessment of $500, a fine of
$1500, and $3100 in restitution. It described all three as “due immediately,” but later stated that
all financial penalties imposed by the judgment were to be paid “in equal monthly installments
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
1We affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. United States v. Courtright, 632 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 2011).

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No. 13‐3564 Page 2
of $50 or 10 percent of [Courtright’s] net monthly income, whichever’s greater, over a period
of 102 months, to commence 30 days after release from prison to a term of supervision.” The
written judgment resolved this by stating that “any financial penalty that is imposed by this
judgment and that remains unpaid at the commencement of the term of supervised release”
was to be paid in accordance with the payment plan outlined at sentencing. Pursuant to the
written judgment, the Bureau of Prisons began attempting to collect the fine from Courtright.
It imposed a payment plan on Courtright, and threatened administrative penalties—such as
lower pay, restricted spending, and ineligibility for certain jobs—if he did not comply.
Courtright filed a motion with the district court, asking it to exercise its authority under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 to correct what he describes as a “clerical error” in the
written judgment. Specifically, he asked the court to remove the phrase “and that remains
unpaid” from the written judgment, as it implied that he should be making payments while in
prison. He argued that this was inconsistent with the court’s oral pronouncement of sentence,
which described a payment plan that was to begin 30 days after his release from prison. The
district court denied the motion, because after reviewing Courtright’s judgment and the
transcript of the sentencing hearing, it found the written judgment to be correct. Courtright
appeals this denial, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to correct
the error and that its refusal to do so demonstrates malice on the part of the court.
We typically review a district court’s denial of a Rule 36 motion to correct a clerical error
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Niemec, 689 F.2d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 1982). But we don’t
think the purported discrepancy is truly a clerical error—i.e., a clerk’s failure to accurately
record the sentence pronounced from the bench in open court. United States v. Eskridge, 445 F.3d
930, 934 (7th Cir. 2006). The sentence pronounced from the bench was ambiguous, at times
anticipating that Courtright would pay fines immediately and at times anticipating that he
would not pay until released from prison. In such a case, we have held that the written
judgment can correct those discrepancies. United States v. Daddino, 5 F.3d 262, 266 (7th Cir. 1993)
(noting that, although typically the oral sentence controls when there is a conflict between the
written and oral sentences, a written sentence can serve to correct ambiguities in the oral
sentence). The written judgment anticipates that Courtright will make payments while in
prison, and the district judge confirmed that this was the proper interpretation of his oral
statement when he denied Courtright’s Rule 36 motion. This is the logical interpretation of the
court’s oral sentence, as Courtright was sentenced to life plus ten years in prison; were he not
to pay until his release, it is unlikely he would pay anything at all. We therefore AFFIRM the
district court’s denial of Courtright’s motion to correct his sentence.

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