No. 12-­--3121 PRINCE ATUM-­--RA UHURU MUTAWAKKIL, also known as NORMAN C. GREEN, JR v. Peter Huibregtse

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 12-­‐‑3121
PRINCE ATUM-­‐‑RA UHURU MUTAWAKKIL, also known as
NORMAN C. GREEN, JR.,
Plaintiff-­‐‑Appellant,
v.
PETER HUIBREGTSE, et al.,
Defendants-­‐‑Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Wisconsin.
No. 11-­‐‑cv-­‐‑471-­‐‑bbc — Barbara B. Crabb, Judge.
____________________
SUBMITTED AUGUST 15, 2013 — DECIDED AUGUST 19, 2013
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and WOOD and
HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge. Norman C. Green, Jr., was
convicted of first-­‐‑degree murder and sentenced to a long
term of imprisonment in Wisconsin. While an inmate, Green
decided to adopt what he calls a “spiritual name”: Prince
Atum-­‐‑Ra Uhuru Mutawakkil. Atum-­‐‑Ra was an Egyptian de-­‐‑
ity representing a fusion of the gods Atum and Ra; uhuru is

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No. 12-­‐‑3121 2
the Swahili word for freedom; and al-­‐‑Mutawakkil was an
Abbasid caliph who ruled in Samarra during the ninth cen-­‐‑
tury of the Christian calendar. The addition of “Prince” is a
mystery; the United States does not have a royal house from
which plaintiff could be descended. The four parts of his
adopted name come from different regions and traditions;
plaintiff does not contend that he chose the name as part of
his devotion to a particular faith—though he does describe
his beliefs, which he calls “The Divine Vision of Growth &
Development”, as religious. For current purposes we refer to
plaintiff as Mutawakkil, because that is his preference.
Mutawakkil’s suit presents several claims that do not re-­‐‑
quire discussion in a published opinion. A short order is-­‐‑
sued contemporaneously addresses them. The one argument
that justifies a precedential opinion is his contention that ei-­‐‑
ther the Constitution or the Religious Land Use and Institu-­‐‑
tionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc–5, re-­‐‑
quires the prison to permit him to be known by his spiritual
name alone. The state’s current policy is to permit an inmate
to use the name on the judgment of conviction (the “commit-­‐‑
ted name”), or the committed name in conjunction with a
second name (whether or not the second name is religiously
inspired), but not to use a second name by itself unless a
court grants a petition for change of name. In other words,
Wisconsin’s prisons do not permit their inmates to employ
the common-­‐‑law approach under which anyone may change
his name by using a new one consistently, without trying to
deceive someone else. See State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226
(1998). Prisoners may change their names only through an
application to the judiciary under Wis. Stat. §786.36.

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3 No. 12-­‐‑3121
Mutawakkil tells us that he is willing to use both names
inside the prison, though he would prefer not to, but suffers
injury when the state insists that others follow the same rule.
For example, a letter addressed to “Prince Atum-­‐‑Ra Uhuru
Mutawakkil” will be returned to the sender, while a letter
addressed to “Norman C. Green, Jr.” or to both names will
be delivered to him.
Azeez v. Fairman, 795 F.2d 1296 (7th Cir. 1986), holds that
a materially identical policy used by Illinois does not violate
either the speech clause or the free-­‐‑exercise clause of the first
amendment (applied to the states by the fourteenth). We
concluded in Azeez that legitimate interests in maintaining
security and order within prisons support requiring inmates
to use their committed names unless a state court approves a
change-­‐‑of-­‐‑name application. Nothing the Supreme Court
has decided since 1986 calls Azeez into question, so it con-­‐‑
trols Mutawakkil’s constitutional contentions.
He insists that Wisconsin’s policy violates the equal pro-­‐‑
tection clause, even if not the first amendment, because he
thinks that “Norman C. Green, Jr.” sounds like a white
man’s name, and he is not white. Yet it is the name his par-­‐‑
ents gave him; it was not forced on him by the state. He
could have changed his name in common-­‐‑law fashion before
committing murder. Mutawakkil does not contend that any
inmate, of any race (or any religion), is allowed to change his
name on his own say-­‐‑so after being convicted and demand
that the prison recognize the self-­‐‑selected name to the exclu-­‐‑
sion of the committed name. The complaint does not make
out a plausible claim of racial discrimination.
This leaves the statute, which often goes by the unpro-­‐‑
nounceable initialism RLUIPA but which we call “the Act”

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No. 12-­‐‑3121 4
so that the opinion can be understood by normal people.
Section 2000cc–1(a) provides this general rule: “No govern-­‐‑
ment shall impose a substantial burden on the religious ex-­‐‑
ercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, as
defined in section 1997 of this title … unless the government
demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that com-­‐‑
pelling governmental interest.” See generally Cutter v. Wil-­‐‑
kinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). The inmate’s burden under the
Act is lighter than the burden of showing a violation of the
Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment
against Mutawakkil after concluding that he had not shown
a “substantial burden” from the prison’s use of his commit-­‐‑
ted name, alone or in conjunction with his spiritual name.
A religion calling for use of a religious name only could
lead to a serious claim that a policy’s such as Wisconsin’s
imposes a “substantial burden” if it is hard to persuade a
court to change a name formally. But Mutawakkil does not
contend that his beliefs make the use of “Norman C. Green,
Jr.” odious. He says that it would be preferable (from his
perspective) if he were allowed to use just his spiritual
name, and if he did not have to make sure that his corre-­‐‑
spondents know about the prison’s policy, but preference or
convenience is not the standard. The Act requires an inmate
to show that the policy creates a “substantial burden” on
“religious exercise”. Wisconsin’s does not—not for Muta-­‐‑
wakkil, anyway.
At least one other court of appeals has held that prisons
are entitled to use committed-­‐‑name or dual-­‐‑name policies
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.

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5 No. 12-­‐‑3121
§§ 2000bb to 2000bb–4, which is substantively identical to
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.
See Fawaad v. Jones, 81 F.3d 1084, 1086–87 (11th Cir. 1996).
We agree with Fawaad. There is no authority to the contrary.
For an inmate who finds his committed name religiously
intolerable, the statutory question would be whether the
need to use the judicial name-­‐‑change mechanism creates a
“substantial burden”. That could depend on how readily
state courts accommodate inmates’ requests for changes of
name. Mutawakkil tells us that he has never sought a formal
change, because Williams v. Racine County Circuit Court, 197
Wis. 2d 841 (Wis. App. 1995), establishes that inmates’ re-­‐‑
quests for changes of name cannot be granted. That is not
what Williams holds, however. The circuit court denied one
inmate’s request, holding that a new name could be confus-­‐‑
ing to the prison and that the inmate did not have a good
reason for his request. The court of appeals held that the cir-­‐‑
cuit court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion. Williams
did not say that a circuit court is forbidden to approve a new
name for an inmate. Nor did that case deal with a prisoner’s
contention that religious beliefs lay behind his desire to use a
different name. (The name Williams proposed was “Roman-­‐‑
ceo Sir Tasty Maxibillion”; he was trying to play games, not
to exercise a sincerely held religious belief.)
Mutawakkil should present his position to the state judi-­‐‑
ciary rather than asking federal judges to assume that state
judges would be unduly hostile to religiously inspired re-­‐‑
quests. He did ask the state judiciary to change the name on
his judgment of conviction, and the court of appeals held
that such a request must be entertained. State v. Green, 288
Wis. 2d 658 (Wis. App. 2005). The circuit court then added

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No. 12-­‐‑3121 6
“aka Prince Atum-­‐‑Ra Uhuru Mutawakkil” to the judgment.
That addition does not enable him to stop using “Norman C.
Green, Jr.” within the prison system. But the procedure un-­‐‑
der Wis. Stat. §786.36 could do so. The best way for Muta-­‐‑
wakkil to find out what would happen, if he tried, is to try.
As far as federal law is concerned, it does not matter how
the state judiciary would respond to a name-­‐‑change applica-­‐‑
tion. Wisconsin’s policy does not create a “substantial bur-­‐‑
den” for Mutawakkil. Whether it would do so for some oth-­‐‑
er inmate is a question we need not address.
AFFIRMED

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