United States of America v. AUGUSTUS WRIGHT and RAYMIE HENDERSON

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Nos. 10-1249 & 10-1956
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
AUGUSTUS WRIGHT and RAYMIE HENDERSON,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:08-cr-00106—Elaine E. Bucklo, Judge.
ARGUED MAY 6, 2011—DECIDED JULY 12, 2011
Before BAUER, KANNE, and EVANS, Circuit Judges.
EVANS, Circuit Judge. Augustus Wright and Raymie
Henderson were convicted by separate juries of con-
spiring to engage in monetary transactions in criminally
derived property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956.
Henderson was additionally convicted of engaging in
a monetary transaction in criminally derived property,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. On appeal, Wright and

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2 Nos. 10-1249 & 10-1956
Henderson ask us reverse their convictions and/or
remand their cases for new trials on several grounds:
(1) the judge erred in denying a motion to dismiss
because the indictment was too late to satisfy the statute
of limitations; (2) the evidence was insufficient to
convict them; and (3) certain jury instructions were in
error. Wright also argues that the judge erred in finding
some bank records to be immaterial and in prohibiting
his counsel from using the phrase “statute of limita-
tions” in his opening statement and closing argument.
Henderson independently argues that: (1) the judge
erred in admitting hearsay testimony regarding Wright’s
statements to law enforcement officers in violation of
the Confrontation Clause; (2) the government made
improper closing argument comments which denied
him a fair trial; and (3) the judge erred in calculating
his advisory sentencing guideline range. We begin with
the facts as established at the trial and viewed, as they
must be, in the light most favorable to the jury verdict.
In 2001, James Williams, a drug dealer and gang
member, approached his longtime friend, Wright—the
owner of South Shore Imports, a car repair shop—about
“cleaning up” his drug proceeds and those of a fellow
dealer, Kenyatta Coates. Initially Wright was hesitant,
but he ultimately agreed to meet with Coates and
Williams to discuss the arrangement. The scheme was
straightforward: Coates and Williams would give
Wright their drug proceeds, Wright would buy real
estate and return to Coates and Williams real estate
and/or cash equivalent to the amount he had been
given. Shortly after the meeting, Williams gave Wright

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Nos. 10-1249 & 10-1956 3
Lando was also charged in the indictment, but he agreed 1
to testify against his co-defendants.
a backpack containing $800,000 in rubber-banded stacks
of cash—all of it was drug proceeds, or, to use the de-
fendant’s words, “street money.”
In May 2001, Wright gave $240,000 of the drug
proceeds to Nowell Patrick Lando, one of his employees1
at South Shore Imports, who was also involved in real
estate. Lando, who himself was a drug dealer and gang
member, knew that he was receiving street money.
Wright told Lando to invest the money in real estate
and return the equivalent value in real estate or cash
one year later. Lando agreed.
Lando and Henderson were partners in R&P New
Development, a real estate investment and renovation
company. Henderson had experience in the purchase
and renovation of real estate, and Lando was the source
of financing for their projects. After he received the
$240,000 in drug proceeds from Wright, Lando told
Henderson that he had received a substantial sum of
street money. Henderson asked for half, but Lando
refused, and ultimately they decided to use the money
to buy real estate.
In June 2001, Lando and Henderson brought $100,000
of the cash in a backpack to S.I. Securities—a business
that purchased delinquent real estate tax certificates—
and arranged to buy seven properties. Henderson took
the money and went into another room with John
Bridge, who worked at S.I. Securities. When Lando and

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4 Nos. 10-1249 & 10-1956
Henderson had previously put down $2,000 in “clean 2
money”on this property.
Henderson left, Lando understood that R&P had pur-
chased seven properties and that they would not im-
mediately receive title to them because the properties
were in tax foreclosure. Over the next few months, S.I.
issued deeds to R&P for each of the seven properties,
including a property located at 203 East 17th Street in
Chicago Heights (“203 17th”), for which Henderson
made a cash payment of $8,000. Each of the properties2
purchased with Coates’ and Williams’ drug proceeds
was held in R&P’s name.
Lando and Henderson also used a portion of the
$240,000 to pay off the balance due on a property located
at 10951 S. Michigan Avenue (“10951 Michigan”)—which
Henderson had arranged to purchase before Lando re-
ceived the cash from Wright. They then spent between
$50,000 and $75,000 of the drug proceeds renovating the
property. Once their real estate plan got going, Lando
informed Henderson that the money had come from
Wright, and he told Wright that the drug money had
been used to purchase and renovate properties.
A few months later, Coates began questioning Wright
about his money. Wright met with Lando and Coates
so that Lando could explain to Coates how the money
was spent. Prior to this meeting, Lando did not know
that the drug proceeds originated with Coates and Wil-
liams. Wright had only told him that the money belonged
to some “street guys,” which Lando understood to mean

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Nos. 10-1249 & 10-1956 5
Wright and Lando, concerned that Brown was telling Coates 3
they had stolen his money, later arranged to have Brown
killed. They hired Deron Hobbs, who shot Brown, but did
not kill him. The government presented evidence of the
shooting at Henderson’s trial but not at Wright’s.
gang members and drug dealers. At the meeting, Lando
gave Coates a fake list of properties he said he bought
with the $240,000 Wright had given him. Coates told
Lando that he had given Wright more than double that
amount and that he was holding Wright and Lando
accountable for the money. Lando told Henderson
about the meeting and said he thought it was safer to
just get Coates his money. Henderson assured Lando
they would find a way out of the situation.
In 2002, Wright, Lando, Coates, and Bruce Brown,
Coates’ “financial advisor, ” met to discuss the3
unresolved debt. At the meeting, Lando produced a list
of the actual properties he and Henderson had
purchased with the drug proceeds and offered them to
Coates to cover the $240,000 they owed, but Coates de-
clined.
R&P dissolved in 2002, due in part to the pressure to
repay the debt to Coates and Williams. Lando and
Henderson divided between them the properties they
had purchased with the drug proceeds. Lando, thinking
he held title to 10951 Michigan (at the time worth
more than $240,000) offered the property to Coates in
order to resolve the debt. But when Lando tried to
transfer the title to Wright for the benefit of Coates, he

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6 Nos. 10-1249 & 10-1956
learned that the property was still in Henderson’s name.
Lando unsuccessfully tried to contact Henderson to
transfer the property.
Eventually, in May 2002, Henderson gave Wright a
warranty deed for 10951 Michigan. Unfortunately for
Henderson, he did not have title to the property—he
only possessed a contractual right to purchase it from
Sherwyn Real Estate, the title-holder. Sherwyn conveyed
the title by quitclaim deed to Henderson in November
2002. Finally, on February 7, 2003 (a critical date as we
shall see), Henderson, at the insistence of Wright’s
lawyer, executed a quitclaim deed to Wright. The
deed stated that the purpose was to “correct and modify
previously recorded deed.” The corrected deed was
recorded by the Cook County Recorder of Deeds on
April 24, 2003. On October 10, 2003, Henderson sold 203
17th for approximately $92,500, receiving $49,623,20
in proceeds.
On February 5, 2008, Wright and Henderson were
indicted and charged with conspiring to engage in mone-
tary transactions in criminally derived property, in vio-
lation of § 1956 (Count One). Henderson was also
charged with engaging in a monetary transaction in
criminally derived property, in violation of § 1957 (Count
Two). Wright and Henderson filed a motion to dismiss
Count One as untimely, and Henderson filed a motion
to dismiss Count Two for failure to state an offense
under § 1957. The district judge denied both motions
and subsequently ordered that the trials of Wright and
Henderson be severed.

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Nos. 10-1249 & 10-1956 7
373 U.S. 83 (1963). 4
At Wright’s trial, a jury convicted him of violating § 1956.
Following his conviction, he moved for a new trial,
based on Brady v. Maryland, when it became clear the4
government had bank records showing that R&P used
checks to pay for the renovation of 10951 Michigan.
Wright argued that if work was done with funds from
R&P’s legitimate bank account, and not with the drug
money, it would contradict and impeach the testimony
of two of the government’s star witnesses—Lando and
James Robert Thomas (another co-conspirator). Initially
the judge denied Wright’s motion for a new trial, but
after Wright moved to reconsider, the judge granted the
motion and ordered a new trial, citing potential
credibility issues with Lando and a lack of confidence
the jury would have reached the same conclusion if the
bank records were in evidence.
Several months later, Wright moved to exclude as “not
relevant” the same bank records he claimed caused the
Brady violation. The government, accordingly, asked the
judge to reconsider the order granting a new trial to
Wright. The government stated that because Wright was
now arguing that the bank records were irrelevant, they
were neither exculpatory nor material and thus would
not support the previous finding of a Brady violation.
The judge agreed, granted the government’s motion to
reconsider, found that the records were not material
and would not have changed the outcome, and reinstated
the jury verdict. The judge then sentenced Wright to 103-
months’ imprisonment.

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8 Nos. 10-1249 & 10-1956
At Henderson’s trial, the government called FBI
Special Agent Donald Kaiser, Jr., to testify. During
Kaiser’s testimony, the government elicited statements
made by Wright during his interviews with law enforce-
ment. Wright, of course, did not testify at Henderson’s
trial. After hearing Kaiser’s testimony, as well as the
testimony of several other witnesses—including Lando—
and being presented with evidence in the form of
property deeds and bank records, the jury convicted
Henderson on Counts One and Two. The judge
sentenced Henderson to 69-months’ imprisonment.
The make-or-break issue on this appeal is whether
the prosecution of Wright and Henderson got started
before the five-year statute of limitations clock ran out.
The defendants were indicted, as we have said, on Febru-
ary 5, 2008. Too late, say Wright and Henderson,
because the conspiracy ran out of gas on May 26, 2002,
when its last act—Henderson’s execution of the
warranty deed conveying 10951 Michigan to Wright—
occurred. If they are right, the indictment came almost
nine months too late.
A conspiracy, however, does not wrap up until “the
occurrence of the last act in furtherance” of it is com-
pleted. United States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873, 876 (7th Cir.
1999). And here, the government claimed that the execu-
tion and filing of the quitclaim deed regarding
the transfer of 10951 Michigan from Henderson to
Wright on February 7, 2003, was an act done in
furtherance of the conspiracy. So, the government
argued, the February 5, 2008, indictment, albeit only by

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Nos. 10-1249 & 10-1956 9
two days, got the case off the ground before the statute
of limitations buzzer went off. We think the govern-
ment has the better argument.
Although no funds were exchanged in connection
with the quitclaim deed, it corrected the warranty deed
that was the underlying money laundering transaction,
and thus the quitclaim deed was a necessary act done
in furtherance of the initial aim of the conspiracy, which
was to conceal the original source of the proceeds. See
United States v. LaSpina, 299 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 2002). The
goal of the conspiracy was to clean up drug proceeds
through the purchase of real estate. The execution of the
February 7, 2003 quitclaim deed, transferring property
from Henderson to Wright for the benefit of Coates, was
an overt act to conceal the nature of the drug money
and thus an act in furtherance of the money laundering
conspiracy. Therefore, the indictment was timely.
Wright and Henderson next challenge the sufficiency
of the evidence against them. Here, they face a “nearly
insurmountable hurdle . . . we view all the evidence and
draw all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the [government].” United States v. King, 627
F.3d 641, 651 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted).
To establish a conspiracy to launder money, the gov-
ernment must prove that a defendant “was knowingly
involved with two or more people for the purpose of
money laundering and that he knew the proceeds used
to further the scheme were derived from an illegal activ-
ity.” United States v. Turner, 400 F.3d 491, 496 (7th
Cir. 2005). Unfortunately for Wright and Henderson, the

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10 Nos. 10-1249 & 10-1956
government presented the jury with more than enough
evidence to prove them guilty of conspiracy.
At trial, the government argued that Wright and
Henderson conspired with Lando, Coates, and Williams
to launder Coates’ and Williams’ drug proceeds by in-
vesting them in real estate. The jury heard testimony
from Williams and Lando (as well as others involved in
the scheme). Lando testified that he received $240,000
in drug proceeds from Wright, that he and Henderson
used the money to purchase and renovate properties,
and that Henderson turned over 10951 Michigan to
Wright for Coates’ benefit. The government also intro-
duced into evidence property deeds recorded by
the Cook County Recorder of Deeds. Lando’s and
Henderson’s names appeared on all of the deeds, despite
the fact that Coates’ and Williams’ drug money was
used to purchase the properties. And at the time
Henderson executed the warranty and quitclaim deeds
to Wright, he knew the aim of the transfer was to
satisfy the debt owed to Coates.
Wright and Henderson also argue that the February 7,
2003, quitclaim deed was not an act in furtherance of
the conspiracy because Henderson executed the deed
at the request of Wright’s attorney. The reason for the
corrected deed is immaterial—as we have found,
the correction was for the benefit of Coates’ and Williams’
money laundering scheme and thus was in furtherance
of the conspiracy. Given the abundance of facts, we
agree that a reasonable jury could find Wright and
Henderson guilty of a conspiracy under § 1956.

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Nos. 10-1249 & 10-1956 11
As noted, Henderson had previously put down $2,000 in 5
clean money.
Henderson separately argues that there was insufficient
evidence to prove he violated § 1957. In order to
convict Henderson under § 1957, the government had
to prove that when Henderson purchased 203 17th in
Chicago Heights with drug proceeds, he “knowingly
engag[ed] in or attempt[ed] to engage in a monetary
transaction in criminally derived property that is valued
greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlaw-
ful activity.” United States v. Haddad, 462 F.3d 783, 791
(7th Cir. 2006). Henderson maintains that the govern-
ment failed to prove its charge because the transaction
involved less than $10,000 in drug proceeds. Henderson
correctly notes that he used only $8,000 in drug proceeds
to purchase 203 17th. The government argues, however,5
that it is not the initial use of the $8,000 that violated
§ 1957, but rather Henderson’s sale of that property
resulting in $49,623.20 in proceeds. We think the gov-
ernment’s theory puts too much stress on § 1957.
Section 1957 looks to the initial transaction, not the
result that might be realized many years later. During
oral argument, we asked the government’s attorney this
hypothetical question: If a person sold a marijuana ciga-
rette for a dollar and then used the dollar to buy a lottery
ticket which turned out to be a one million dollar
winner, would that person be in violation of § 1957? The
response was yes because the “financial transaction”
should be viewed as including, for example, the cashing

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12 Nos. 10-1249 & 10-1956
We also note that under the government’s theory, the statute 6
of limitations would not begin to run until the sale of the
property, or the receipt of the lottery earnings, even if this
did not happen until twenty years after the criminally-
derived proceeds were used for the initial purchase. This
consequence of the government’s reading of the statute is
(continued...)
of the one million dollar lottery check at a bank. We
think that goes too far. Similarly, if that same person used
$1,000 in proceeds from selling marijuana to buy Apple
stock in 2004, would he violate § 1957 if he sold that
stock in 2011 for more than $31,000? We think not.
We have previously held that for a § 1957 conviction
to be proper, criminally derived property “must first
have existed, and then at a later time, the charged party
must have attempted to bring about or have actually
brought about a transaction with it.” United States v.
Lee, 232 F.3d 556, 559 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal citations
omitted). Here, property was criminally derived when
Wright gave the drug money to Lando and Henderson.
The transaction triggering a § 1957 violation occurred
when Henderson handed over $8,000 of that drug cash
to purchase 203 17th. The government now asks us to
allow it to choose ex ante to ignore this transaction
and wait for the proceeds to increase in value beyond
$10,000 in order to charge Henderson. We decline the
invitation. Because the financial transaction involved
less than the $10,000 minimum the statute requires,
Henderson’s conviction for violating § 1957 must be set
aside.6

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Nos. 10-1249 & 10-1956 13
(...continued) 6
equally troubling and reinforces our finding that the $10,000
must be present at the initial use of the illegal proceeds, not
at the future sale.
Wright and Henderson also argue that the judge erred
in her instructions to the jury. We review de novo
whether jury instructions accurately state the law and
look to the instructions as a whole to determine if,
taken together, they convey the issues fairly and accu-
rately.” See United States v. Johnson, 584 F.3d 731, 739 (7th
Cir. 2009).
Wright and Henderson argue that the judge incor-
rectly instructed the jury on the duration of the conspiracy
and the statute of limitations. The instruction said:
A conspiracy exists as long as any member of that
conspiracy commits an act to further the original
aims of the conspiracy to conceal and disguise the
nature, source, the ownership or control of the pro-
ceeds.
The judge recognized that, because the parties disagreed
about the last date of the alleged conspiracy and the
statute of limitations was at issue, the jury needed
an instruction to help it decide how long the money
laundering conspiracy lasted. Her instruction properly
lays out the elements the jury had to find in order for
Wright and Henderson to be guilty of conspiracy under
§ 1956.
Henderson also independently argues that the instruc-
tions in his trial were confusing to the jury. We dis-

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14 Nos. 10-1249 & 10-1956
agree. The judge correctly instructed the jury on money
laundering conspiracy in violation of § 1956. And since
we have determined that Henderson cannot be found
guilty under § 1957, we need not decide whether the
instruction was incorrect or confusing as to Count Two.
Henderson challenges the judge’s instruction re-
garding knowledge. The jury was instructed that:
When the word “knowingly” is used in these instruc-
tions, it means that the defendant realized what he
was doing and was aware of the nature of his
conduct, and did not act through ignorance, mistake
or accident. Knowledge may be proved by the defen-
dant’s conduct, and by all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case.
According to Henderson, this did not allow the jury to
find that if his actions occurred by mistake, accident, or
ignorance, he could not be found guilty. Yet, as the gov-
ernment points out, this is exactly what this instruction
provides. Henderson’s challenges to other jury instruc-
tions are meritless and require no comment.
Next, we address Wright’s argument that the judge
erred in finding certain R&P bank records immaterial
and in her resulting denial of a motion for a new trial.
We review the decision only for an abuse of discretion.
United States v. Palivos, 486 F.3d 250, 255 (7th Cir. 2007).
In Brady, the Supreme Court held, “the suppression
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence
is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective

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Nos. 10-1249 & 10-1956 15
of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady,
373 U.S. at 87. To prove a Brady violation, Wright must
prove that “(1) the evidence at issue is favorable to the
accused because it is either exculpatory or impeaching;
(2) the evidence has been suppressed by the gov-
ernment . . . ; and (3) the suppressed evidence resulted in
prejudice.” United States v. O’Hara, 301 F.3d 563, 569
(7th Cir. 2002). The judge ultimately found that the
R&P bank records were neither impeaching nor exculpa-
tory. We agree. Prior to his second trial, Wright moved
to exclude the very evidence that he claimed caused a
Brady violation in the first trial. He cannot have it both
ways. Either the evidence is material or not; and by
seeking to exclude the bank records, he made clear that
the evidence was anything but material to impeaching
Lando or to his overall defense. The judge did not abuse
her discretion in reversing course and denying
Wright’s motion for a new trial.
Finally, Wright argues that the judge erred in
prohibiting his counsel from using the phrase “statute
of limitations” in his opening statement and closing argu-
ment. We give the judge great latitude in limiting ar-
guments over “time consuming peripheral issues in
the interests of judicial economy and reducing juror
confusion.” United States v. White, 472 F.3d 458, 462 (7th
Cir. 2006) (quotations and citations omitted). Here, the
judge prohibited Wright from using the phrase “statute
of limitations” because it would only confuse the jurors.
The judge explained that statute of limitations was an
issue for the court, that Wright could still argue that the
conspiracy ended in November 2002, and that if the

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16 Nos. 10-1249 & 10-1956
jury decided the conspiracy had ended in Novem-
ber 2002, the case would be dismissed. This was, under
the circumstances, a legitimate restriction and not an
abuse of the judge’s discretion.
Henderson next argues that the admission of Agent
Kaiser’s hearsay testimony, about admissions that
Wright made, violated his Sixth Amendment right to
confront witnesses against him because Wright did not
testify at his trial. We review de novo whether an eviden-
tiary ruling violates the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment. United States v. Adams, 628 F.3d 407,
416 (7th Cir. 2010). We note that Henderson failed to
object to Kaiser’s testimony at trial. We review forfeited
issues for plain error. See United States v. DiSantis, 565
F.3d 354, 362 (7th Cir. 2009).
Henderson is correct. The court erred when it allowed
the government to elicit Wright’s statements from
Agent Kaiser during Henderson’s trial. This is only
helpful to Henderson, however, if the error was harmful.
In determining whether an error is harmless, we
consider factors such as “(1) the importance of a wit-
ness’s testimony in the prosecution’s case; (2) whether
the testimony was cumulative; (3) the presence or
absence of corroborating or contradictory evidence; and
(4) the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” Adams,
628 F.3d at 417.
The government argues that the admission was
harmless because Wright’s statements were primarily
about his own involvement and Lando’s, not
Henderson’s; the admissions were cumulative of other
evidence offered against Henderson (such as Williams’

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Nos. 10-1249 & 10-1956 17
and Lando’s testimony and the quitclaim deed to
Wright); and Wright’s statements were corroborated
by other witnesses and documentary evidence (such as
Thomas’ testimony, recorded conversations between
Wright and Henderson, and bank records). The govern-
ment is correct. Although the admission of Wright’s
statements through Agent Kaiser was in error, it was
harmless. Everything Wright said was either cumulative,
corroborative, or non-essential to the government’s case.
Henderson also argues that remarks and conduct of
the government were improper and denied him a fair
trial. Henderson, however, did not object to any of the
arguments he now raises on appeal, and so our review is
only for plain error, which requires him “to establish
not only that the remarks denied him a fair trial, but
also that the outcome of the proceedings would have
been different absent the remarks.” United States v. Bell,
624 F.3d 803, 811 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal citation and
quotation omitted). Henderson contends that the pros-
ecutor made several statements during closing and
rebuttal that were not substantiated by the evidence.
In particular, he argues that comments regarding:
(1) Henderson’s role in signing 10951 Michigan over
to Wright; (2) Henderson’s motivation in turning over
10951 Michigan; (3) Henderson’s knowledge of Lando’s
past when he chose him as his partner; and (4) the in-
volvement of John Bridge, were unsubstantiated and
improper. Henderson might not agree with statements
the prosecutor made, but they were all reasonable in-
ferences from the evidence presented to the jury. They
were not in plain error, and Henderson was not denied
a fair trial.

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18 Nos. 10-1249 & 10-1956
Finally, Henderson argues that the judge erred in
calculating his guideline range. We review a judge’s
interpretation and application of the sentencing guide-
lines de novo, and her findings of fact for clear error.
United States v. Hill, 563 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2009).
Henderson first argues that the judge incorrectly applied
a criminal history point for his 1996 conviction for
failure to transfer title, in violation of 625 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/3-113, because it was a petty offense. But, as the gov-
ernment notes, under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c) sentences for
misdemeanor and petty offenses are generally counted
when computing criminal history, except as specified in
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(1) and (2). We apply a common
sense comparison to determine “whether the prior con-
viction is categorically more serious than the listed of-
fenses.” United States v. Hagenow, 423 F.3d 638, 645-46 (7th
Cir. 2005) (internal citation and quotation omitted).
Henderson’s failure to transfer certificate of title 59
times is more serious than any of the driving-related
offenses listed in § 4A1.2(c)(1). See United States v. Boyd,
146 F.3d 499, 502 (7th Cir. 1998). Thus, the judge
correctly assessed one point to Henderson’s guideline
range.
Henderson also argues that the judge erred in
finding that the value of the laundered funds was
$240,000. To determine the value of funds involved in a
money laundering conspiracy, the district court must
look to Henderson’s relevant conduct. United States v.
Baker, 227 F.3d 955, 964 (7th Cir. 2000). That includes
“all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others
in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity,

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Nos. 10-1249 & 10-1956 19
that occurred during the commission of the offense
of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the
course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility
for that offense.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).
The government argues that the judge correctly
found the value attributable to Henderson was $240,000
because: (1) Lando brought $240,000 from Wright to
the partnership; (2) Lando told Henderson he had
received $240,000 in street money, and Henderson
asked for half; (3) Henderson admitted to Thomas that
Lando brought nearly a quarter million dollars to the
table; (5) Lando and Henderson used $100,000 to
purchase properties from S.I. Securities, and tens of
thousands of dollars more to pay off and renovate 10951
Michigan; and (6) when Coates demanded his money,
Henderson turned over 10951 Michigan (a property
worth more than $240,000) to Wright for the benefit of
Coates. Given the plethora of evidence, the judge
correctly found that the value of laundered funds at-
tributable to Henderson was $240,000.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the convictions of Wright
and Henderson under Count One of the indictment,
but REVERSE Henderson’s conviction on Count Two.
With Henderson’s Count-Two conviction out of
the picture, his case is REMANDED to the district court
for re-sentencing.
7-12-11

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