Bradley Michael Gustafson v. Commissioner of Social Security

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 14a0022n.06
No. 13-1475
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
BRADLEY MICHAEL GUSTAFSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
MICHIGAN
BEFORE: SUHRHEINRICH, SILER, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. Bradley Michael Gustafson appeals the district court’s judgment
affirming the decision that Gustafson was no longer entitled to disability insurance benefits.
In 2001, the Social Security Administration (SSA) determined that, as of January 1, 1999,
Gustafson was disabled and entitled to disability insurance benefits. In 2007, the SSA
determined that Gustafson was no longer disabled and that, as a result, he was no longer entitled
to benefits. Gustafson sought a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ
determined that, as of February 1, 2007, Gustafson was no longer disabled. The Appeals
Council affirmed the ALJ’s decision, and the district court affirmed the decision of the Appeals
Council.
On appeal, Gustafson raises the following arguments: (1) the ALJ failed to identify his
functional capacity at the time of the previous disability determination and failed to properly
consider the evidence underlying that determination; (2) the ALJ erred by concluding that he did
not meet the regulatory listing for mental retardation; (3) the ALJ erred by discounting his

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testimony and the testimony of his father; and (4) the ALJ erred by giving little weight to his
vocational and medical evidence.
“Our review of the ALJ’s decision is limited to whether the ALJ applied the correct legal
standards and whether the findings of the ALJ are supported by substantial evidence.” Blakley v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2009). “The substantial-evidence standard is
met if a reasonable mind might accept the relevant evidence as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Id. at 406 (internal quotation marks omitted). “We give de novo review to the
district court’s conclusions on each issue.” Id.
Gustafson first argues that the ALJ failed to identify his functional capacity at the time of
the previous disability determination and failed to properly consider the evidence underlying that
determination. The record, however, does not support Gustafson’s contention. The ALJ
explicitly discussed the severity of Gustafson’s impairments and his functional limitations at the
time of the prior disability determination and explained that more recent evidence demonstrated
medical improvement that increased Gustafson’s ability to perform work-related functions.
Gustafson next argues that the ALJ erred by concluding that he did not meet the
regulatory listing for mental retardation. To meet the listing, Gustafson must demonstrate
“significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning
initially manifested during the developmental period” and either mental incapacity, an IQ score
of 59 or less, or an IQ score of 60 to 70 with other specified impairments. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,
subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.05; Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 354 (6th Cir. 2001). Substantial
evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that Gustafson did not meet the listing in § 12.05, given
that many of Gustafson’s IQ scores, including the only scores from after his medical
improvement date, were above 70 and that his daily activities and social abilities did not

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demonstrate deficits in adaptive functioning. See West v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 240 F.
App’x 692, 698 (6th Cir. 2007). In addition, the ALJ’s finding was supported by the opinions of
two reviewing psychologists, who concluded that Gustafson did not meet the regulatory listing
for mental retardation.
Gustafson next argues that the ALJ erred by discounting his testimony and the testimony
of his father concerning Gustafson’s inability to work and by giving little weight to the opinions
of Dr. Douglas Bentley, a psychologist, and Katherine Gute, a social worker, who both
concluded that it would be difficult for Gustafson to sustain productive employment. We accord
great weight and deference to an ALJ’s credibility findings, but such findings must be supported
by substantial evidence. Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997).
The ALJ reasonably discounted the testimony of Gustafson and his father on the basis
that it conflicted with other substantial evidence in the record, which included Gustafson’s
significant daily activities, the findings of Dr. Hugh Bray, a psychologist who evaluated
Gustafson in 2007, that Gustafson’s responses were within normal limits, the conclusions of the
reviewing psychologists and psychiatrist that Gustafson did not have serious work-related
limitations, and the fact that Gustafson had not had the same problems with anger, impulsivity,
and interpersonal relationships that he had near the time of the prior disability determination.
Likewise, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision to give little weight to the opinions
of Dr. Bentley and Ms. Gute because their conclusions conflicted with both the results of
intelligence and personality testing conducted by Bentley and other significant evidence in the
record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527.
Finally, Gustafson waived his remaining arguments by failing to properly raise them in
the district court. See Heston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 534-35 (6th Cir. 2001).

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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

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