05-2200•Lanise Bason v. Joan Yukins
05-2200Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit12 de mai. de 2009
The Hon. James S. Gwin, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio,*
sitting by designation.
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 09a0324n.06
Filed: May 12, 2009
05-2200
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
LANISE BASON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
JOAN YUKINS,
Respondent-Appellee.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
Before: DAUGHTREY and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges; GWIN, District Judge.*
PER CURIAM. Petitioner Lanise Bason appeals the denial of her petition for
habeas corpus relief from her Michigan prison sentence of 18-50 years for the second-
degree murder of her husband, Bryant Branch. The district court granted Bason a
certificate of appealability “as to Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim,” and
Bason now identifies four components of that claim: (1) “by failing to follow procedural
rules, trial counsel caused the critical expert report to be excluded”; (2) “counsel ‘forgot’ to
test the prosecution’s case by moving for a directed verdict”; (3) “trial counsel failed to put
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on a case for the defense”; and (4) “trial counsel also failed to present important mitigating
evidence at sentencing.” See Appellant’s Br. at iii.
However, Bason raised only the second and third issues before the Michigan state
appellate courts. Indeed, the first and fourth claims listed in Bason’s appellate brief were
never advanced before the Michigan appellate courts, were not argued before the district
judge, and were not even mentioned in the district court’s opinion denying habeas relief,
despite a passing reference in Bason’s amended petition to the ineffectiveness of counsel
at sentencing by failing to offer the testimony of an expert witness knowledgeable in the
diagnosis of “battered spouse syndrome.” Because Bason did not fairly present these
issues to the Michigan state courts, and because she no longer has the opportunity to do
so, see M.C.R. § 6.508(D)(3), they are considered procedurally defaulted, see Engle v.
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125 n.28 (1982); Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789, 806 (6th Cir.
2006); Martin v. Mitchell, 280 F.3d 594, 603 (6th Cir. 2002). Bason has failed to
demonstrate cause and actual prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to
overcome the procedural default. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991).
Even assuming no procedural default, Bason’s failure to raise these issues before the
district court further counsels against appellate review by this court. See Foster v. Barilow,
6 F.3d 405, 407 (6th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, we decline to consider the merits of the first
and fourth ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims presented by the petitioner.
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Moreover, the opinion of the district judge denying habeas relief to Bason thoroughly
analyzes the two ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims that were properly presented to
the Michigan state courts. Having had the benefit of oral argument, and having carefully
considered the record on appeal and the briefs of the parties, we are not persuaded that
the district judge erred in denying the habeas corpus petition. The reasons justifying such
a denial have been ably articulated by the district court, and the issuance of a full written
opinion by this court would be duplicative and serve no useful, jurisprudential purpose.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court regarding Bason’s exhausted
claims upon the reasoning set out by that court in its opinion and order filed on June 28,
2005.
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