Yong En Lin v. Alberto R. Gonzales

Lin did not raise the denial of his petition for withholding of removal or relief pursuant1
to the CAT in his appellate brief, but merely argues that he has met the less stringent burden for
asylum. Accordingly, it would appear that he has abandoned the issue. See Shkabari v.
Gonzales, 427 F.3d 324, 327 n.1 (6th Cir. 2005); Grider v. Abramson, 180 F.3d 739, 750 n.14
(6th Cir. 1999).
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 07a0139n.06
Filed: February 20, 2007
No. 06-3183
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
YONG EN LIN,
Petitioner,
v.
ALBERTO R. GONZALES,
Respondent.
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ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF
AN ORDER OF THE BOARD OF
IMMIGRATION APPEALS
BEFORE: MERRITT, DAUGHTREY, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner Yong En Lin (“Lin”), a native and citizen of China, seeks review of a final order
of removal issued against him by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) on January 10, 2006.
In its order, the BIA affirmed the decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Lin’s request for
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture Act (“CAT”). Lin
has timely petitioned this court for review. Specifically, Lin asserts that the BIA incorrectly1
affirmed the erroneous legal findings of the IJ. For the reasons set forth below, we disagree and deny

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Lin v. Gonzales
The date stamp on Lin’s initial petition is not legible. Nevertheless, the IJ stated in his2
June 10, 2004, opinion, that Lin “executed his application on December 10, 2003 and then
subsequently filed the application with the court.”
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the petition for review.
I.
Petitioner Lin is a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China. He originally entered
the United States on a non-immigrant visa, but applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and
relief under the CAT on December 10, 2003. On June 10, 2004, following a hearing and2
submission of evidence, the IJ denied Lin’s application. The BIA dismissed Lin’s appeal of that
decision on January 10, 2006, and this petition for review followed.
In Lin’s initial asylum application, he indicated that, in 1949, the Chinese government took
land and “houses” from his grandfather. He further stated that, in 1997, the government again took
land from his family, providing “little compensation” in return. He explained that he feared
detention or persecution if he were to return to China. Specifically, he feared being “maybe fined
or arrested.” Finally, he stated that he had been a member of the Christian Church since 2000, his
family in China were practicing Christians, and his father was an accountant for a local Christian
church.
The IJ held a hearing on June 10, 2004, at which Lin testified that the government took his
family’s land in 1997 for use as a military base and failed to provide full compensation as a return.
Lin further stated that his family had unsuccessfully complained to the government about this
discrepancy. He stated that his grandfather had lost all of his land during the revolution when the

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Lin v. Gonzales
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People’s Republic of China was established, although on cross-examination, he testified that his
family was still farming. According to Lin, his family originally owned seven to eight “mu,” but
following the government’s seizure, they only owned two to three “mu.”
Lin also testified that the village government refused to give him the requisite documentation
needed to work and did not give a reason for the denial. Lin believes that it is in retaliation for his
parents’ complaints about the compensation for their land and their refusal to donate money for the
construction of a Buddhist temple in the village. Lin stated that he is a Christian, but that the
government had “confiscated [his church] . . . for the use of streets.” He testified that he had
witnessed two members of his church arrested and detained for less than twenty-four hours.
Nevertheless, he admitted that upon release they were “fine.” Based upon these actions, Lin stated
that he fears persecution because of his religion.
On cross-examination, Lin testified that he left China in May 2000 and traveled to Hong
Kong, Amsterdam, Suriname, and the Virgin Islands. He also noted that he possessed tourist visas
for Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia. He stated that these visas were procured with the help of a
wealthy aunt who “had a relationship with the government,” as a graduation present.
In a June 10, 2004, oral decision, the IJ denied Lin’s petition for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the CAT. Specifically, the IJ found that Lin’s petition was untimely
because it was filed nearly two years after he entered the United States. Nevertheless, the IJ assumed
timeliness and denied the petition on the merits, ruling that Lin “failed to sustain his burden of proof
and persuasion that he was either persecuted in the past or that there is a reasonable possibility of

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his persecution in the future on account of one or more of the five protected enumerated grounds
should he be returned to the People’s Republic of China.” The IJ did not make a finding of
credibility, but stated that it could “at best . . . find that [Lin] experienced certain acts of
discrimination,” not persecution. According to his testimony, Lin’s family remained in China and
were both practicing Christians and employed. The IJ also found that Lin had failed to provide
reasonable corroboration of his claim, noting that Lin’s cousin, with whom he lived in Ohio, did not
testify. Accordingly, the IJ denied Lin’s petition on all counts.
Lin appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA. On January 10, 2006, the BIA dismissed the
appeal, ruling, in relevant part:
[Lin] has failed to establish that the government’s acquisition of a portion of his
family’s farm land in exchange for what may have been inadequate compensation,
and the village officials’ refusal to issue him a work certificate, amount to past
persecution.
(citing Ali v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 407 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that persecution is an extreme concept
that does not include every sort of treatment that society regards as offensive)). Like the IJ, the BIA
assumed timeliness, but went on to hold that Lin had not established any harm – physical or
economic – that would rise to the level of “persecution” sufficient to establish his burden to obtain
asylum, withholding of removal, or relief under the CAT.
Lin appeals the BIA’s order denying his petition.
II.
We review the factual findings underlying an IJ’s denial of asylum with great deference and
uphold them on appeal “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

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contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). To reverse, we must conclude that the evidence not only
supports a contrary conclusion, but indeed compels it. I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481
n.1 (1992); Klawitter v. I.N.S., 970 F.2d 149, 151-52 (6th Cir. 1992) (identifying the standard of
review as the substantial evidence standard).
Before a request for asylum may be granted, the applicant must sustain his burdens of
production and persuasion for qualification as a refugee. Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 950 (6th
Cir. 2004). To meet his burden, an alien must establish either past persecution, or a well-founded
fear of persecution upon return to the country of origin. Singh v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 396, 401 (6th
Cir. 2005). The “well-founded fear of persecution” must be on account of “race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion,” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b); 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), and must be both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.
Mikhailevitch v. I.N.S., 146 F.3d 384, 389 (6th Cir. 1998).
“Economic deprivation constitutes persecution only when the resulting conditions are
sufficiently severe.” Daneshvar v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 615, 625 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Matter of
Acosta, 19 I & N Dec. 211, 222, 1985 WL 56042 (B.I.A. 1985) (stating that persecution can “consist
of economic deprivation or restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to an individual’s life
or freedom”); see also Akhtar v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that the
imposition of “economic disadvantage” on the Mohajirs in Pakistan, through generic discrimination
of limited number of spots for Mohajirs in universities and difficulty advancing to high levels in
employment, did not amount to economic deprivation rising to level of persecution that would

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warrant a grant of asylum).
Here, Lin asserts that the decisions of the IJ and BIA were not supported by substantial
evidence. Specifically, Lin contends that his testimony establishing that the government took away
his family’s land without just compensation and denied him work documentation based on his
religion met his burden. Lin further argues that because there was neither contrary evidence in the
record, nor a negative finding of credibility, he must be presumed credible, and, thus, he has
established his burden of a “well-founded fear” of persecution. Accordingly, he requests that we
grant his petition for review and reverse the decision of the BIA.
The BIA ruled that Lin “failed to establish that the government’s acquisition of a portion of
his family’s farm land in exchange for what may have been inadequate compensation, and the village
officials’ refusal to issue him a work certificate, amount to past persecution.” Following our review,
we conclude that the record does not compel a contrary conclusion. As the BIA stated, the record
does not indicate that Lin has ever been threatened, arrested, detained by the police, or physically
harmed. Lin testified that his Christian family is still farming on a portion of their land in China.
Further, the record does not indicate that any of the “harm” Lin suffered was a result of his or his
family’s religion. Although Lin insists otherwise, the record evidence did not compel the BIA to
draw the inference that he was not issued a work certificate because his parents lodged a complaint
regarding inadequate compensation or refused to donate money to the Buddhist temple. Indeed, in
his asylum application, Lin stated that his family continues to practice Christianity and that his father
serves as an accountant for the local Christian church.

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In summary, after applying our deferential standard of review, we conclude that the record
does not compel a contrary conclusion to that reached by the BIA, see Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at
481 n.1.
III.
For the reasons stated above, we deny the petition for review.

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