Curtis Pratt, Jr. v. United States of America

The Honorable John Corbett O’Meara, United States District Judge for the Eastern District*
of Michigan, sitting by designation.
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 07a0050n.06
Filed: January 22, 2007
No. 05-4123
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
CURTIS PRATT, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
Before: MERRITT and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges; and O’MEARA, District Judge.*
JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Curtis Pratt, Jr. pled
guilty in district court to one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), felon in possession of a
firearm. As part of the plea agreement, Pratt reserved his right to appeal the district court’s denial
of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his bedroom in his mother’s house. The district
court found that Pratt’s mother consented to the warrantless search of her house, including her son’s
bedroom. For the following reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress
evidence.
I.
On September 24, 2003, six law enforcement officers, including Deputy United States

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Marshall Hebert and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Special Agent Jean-Marc Behar,
went to the home of Pratt’s mother, Barbara Pratt, to arrest Pratt on a warrant for assault. Pratt
lived with his mother in the upper flat of a duplex she owned on Hampden Avenue in Cleveland,
Ohio. Pratt did not pay rent for the single bedroom he occupied in the flat.
The six officers were met by Pratt’s mother and his aunt, Margaret Pratt, when they
arrived at the residence. Although she actually owned the residence, Barbara Pratt incorrectly
informed the officers that she was the sole leaseholder. She also informed the officers that Pratt
“stayed” there. Pratt’s mother ultimately clarified to the officers that she alone had legal
possession of the residence.
The officers requested to search the residence for Curtis Pratt, but his mother notified
them that he was not present. Hebert then asked to further search the premises for weapons or
drugs and presented Pratt’s mother with a “Consent to Search” form. Barbara Pratt signed the
form, which authorized the officers “to conduct a complete search of [the] premises” and to take
from the premises “any letters, papers, materials or other property which they may desire.” Pratt
has not asserted that his mother’s consent was coerced or otherwise improperly obtained.
During the search, the officers came upon Pratt’s locked bedroom door. The parties
dispute whether Pratt’s mother provided the officers with a key to the bedroom. Barbara Pratt
testified, however, that she ordinarily kept an extra key to Pratt’s bedroom but had given this
spare key to Pratt the day before because Pratt had misplaced his key. Pratt’s mother further
testified that she “had access to [the room] any time [she] wanted.” According to Pratt’s mother,
she currently did not have a key only because her son had recently borrowed it and failed to

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return it. Nonetheless, the officers somehow gained entry to the room. Once inside, Behar
discovered a pistol and ammunition in a dresser drawer.
Pratt subsequently moved to suppress all evidence obtained from the locked bedroom.
The district court denied his motion to suppress. Pratt has appealed the denial on the grounds
that his mother lacked authority to consent to the search of the locked bedroom and that the
police were unreasonable in relying on an appearance that she had such authority.
II.
Review of a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress is for clear error as to findings
of fact and de novo as to conclusions of law. United States v. Henry, 429 F.3d 603, 607 (6th Cir.
2005).
III.
The Fourth Amendment recognizes as valid a warrantless search of a person’s house when
a person possessing authority over the house gives consent to the search. Georgia v. Randolph, 126
S. Ct. 1515, 1520 (2006) (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990)). “That person
might be . . . a fellow occupant who shares common authority over property, when the suspect is
absent, and the exception for consent extends even to entries and searches with the permission of a
co-occupant whom the police reasonably, but erroneously, believe to possess shared authority as an
occupant.” Id. (citing Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186; United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170
(1974); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973)).
A warrantless search does not violate the Fourth Amendment when a person who possesses
common authority over the premises with the suspect consents to the search. Matlock, 415 U.S. at

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170-71. “Common authority” derives from the “mutual use of the property by persons generally
having joint access or control for most purposes.” Id. at 171 n.7. Typically, all family members
have common authority over all of the rooms in the family residence. United States v. Clutter, 914
F.2d 775, 777 (6th Cir. 1990). However, family members may be deprived of common authority
access to an enclosed space over which one family member has “clearly manifested an expectation
of exclusivity.” Id. at 778.
Mere possession or non-possession of a key at the time of a search is not dispositive in
determining whether a co-occupant has common authority over an enclosed space. See Rodriguez,
497 U.S. at 181 (co-occupant did not have common authority though she had keys to the residence);
United States v. Gillis, 358 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting the district court’s finding that a
co-occupant had common authority though she did not have keys to the residence’s exterior doors).
Instead, courts consider a number of factors in determining whether common authority exists,
including: whether the co-occupant owns the residence or is named on the lease; if the individual
contributed rent; and whether the individual visited the residence when the co-occupant was not
present. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181.
Here, although we assume that Barbara Pratt lacked a key to her son’s bedroom at the time
of the search, it is clear that she ordinarily retained a key to the room and accordingly had regular
access to the room. As such, Pratt did not have a clear expectation of exclusivity by simply locking
the door. Moreover, Pratt provides no authority to support the proposition that, by itself, a temporary
inability to access a room for lack of a key deprives a co-occupant of common authority over that
room. On the contrary, the case law places no particular emphasis on whether co-occupants possess

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keys in determining their authority over an enclosed space; possession of a key is merely a factor in
the analysis. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181; see also Gillis, 358 F.3d at 390. Pratt’s mother
had title to the entire residence, including Pratt’s bedroom. Pratt did not even contribute rent.
Barbara Pratt lived in the residence and had access to Pratt’s room “anytime [she] wanted.” In light
of these facts, we conclude that Barbara Pratt had actual authority to consent to the search of her
son’s locked bedroom.
IV.
Although the determination that Barbara Pratt had actual authority to consent to the search
is dispositive of the appeal, we consider the issue of apparent authority as well. The police may also
search a residence with the permission of an occupant whom they reasonably, even if erroneously,
believe to have authority to consent to the search. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186. Shared occupancy
has been found to include an “assumption of risk” that one occupant might permit a search of the
premises against the wishes of an absent co-occupant. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1522; Matlock, 415
U.S. at 171 n.7. Further, police officers are entitled to rely on this “assumption of risk,” and there
is no burden on the police to eliminate the possibility of atypical shared occupancy arrangements
absent some “reason to doubt that the regular scheme is in place.” Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1522.
In fact, “it would be unjustifiably impractical to require the police to take affirmative steps to
confirm the actual authority of a consenting individual whose authority was apparent.” Id. at 1527.
Typically, all family members have common authority over all of the rooms in the family
residence. Clutter, 914 F.2d at 777. Evidence that the co-occupant is a leaseholder of the residence
strongly supports the reasonableness of an officer’s reliance on the co-occupant’s apparent authority.

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Gillis, 358 F.3d at 390. Further, officers may also reasonably rely on the apparent authority of a co-
occupant who merely “shows that she belongs” in a residence. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1521. Police
officers may also reasonably rely on the appearance of authority even when a co-occupant does not
have a key to the premises. Gillis, 358 F.3d at 390.
In this case, the officers had no reason to conclude that Pratt’s mother did not have authority
to consent to a search of a bedroom occupied by her son, as family members typically have authority
over the entire family residence. In addition, Barbara Pratt identified herself to the officers as the
sole leaseholder of the residence. Barbara Pratt also “showed that she belonged” in the residence
because she was entertaining a guest, Margaret Pratt, and further by authorizing the officers to search
the premises for her son. The mere fact that Barbara Pratt temporarily lacked a key to the bedroom
would not have made the officers’ reliance on the appearance of her authority unreasonable. We
therefore conclude that, even if she lacked actual authority, Barbara Pratt had apparent authority to
consent to the search of her son’s locked bedroom.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s denial of the appellant’s motion to suppress is
AFFIRMED.

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MERRITT, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Here one of the deputy marshals asked for Ms. Pratt’s
permission to search the residence for weapons and drugs and presented a consent to search form,
stating that Ms. Pratt consented to a “complete search” of her premises. Ms. Pratt signed the
document and stated that Pratt, her son, did not pay rent. The door to Pratt’s bedroom was locked.
The District Court stated explicitly that “the record tends to reflect that Barbara Pratt did not possess
a key during the search . . . .” (J.A. 31). Ms. Pratt testified that she told the officers that she
generally kept a key to Pratt’s room but had given the key to Pratt the day before at his request.
Thus, it seems clear that the officers entered and searched the locked room without the permission
of the occupant. They must have done so by breaking the lock, not by unlocking the door.
When Pratt took back his mother’s key to his locked bedroom, the situation changed. The
locked bedroom door –– locked without a key available from anyone other than the occupant ––
makes this situation different from others where common authority existed over an openly accessible
room. Pratt’s actions in taking back the key and stashing contraband in a dresser drawer signals his
expectation of exclusivity. Under these circumstances I do not think the government has carried its
burden of showing that Ms. Pratt — with no key and no way to enter — had either actual or apparent
common authority to consent to the search of her adult son’s bedroom.
The majority’s holding that Ms. Pratt had actual authority to consent to the search of Pratt’s
room is directly contrary to the applicable test from United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974)
and contradicts relevant precedent from this Court and others. As my colleagues note, an individual
has common authority if she has “mutual use of the property” with “joint access or control for most
purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit

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the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk.” Id. at 171 n.7, quoted in
Georgia v. Randolph, ____ U.S. ____, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1521 (2006). The court believes that Ms.
Pratt had “mutual use” and “joint access or control” of Pratt’s room –– even though Pratt withdrew
from his mother any use or access by locking the door and retaining the only key. How Mrs. Pratt
has “mutual use” of her son’s locked bedroom which she cannot enter is left unexplained. This
contradiction runs counter to cases finding no actual common authority over an enclosed area in the
home in which a non-minor child targeted for the search “has clearly manifested an expectation of
exclusivity.” United States v. Clutter, 914 F.2d 775, 777 (6th Cir. 1990); see also State v. Vinuya,
32 P.3d 116, 131-32 (Haw. Ct. App. 2001) (mother without a key did not have actual common
authority to consent to a search of her son’s locked bedroom); State v. Gordnoshnka, No. 86319,
2006 WL 302354, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2006) (unpublished) (father without keys or a right
of access to his son’s locked bedroom did not have actual authority to consent to a search thereof).
On the other hand, had Pratt left his door unlocked or provided his mother a key, there would be little
doubt that Ms. Pratt would have had actual common authority. See Clutter, 914 F.2d at 778 (minor
children had common authority to consent to inspection of their parents’ open bedroom); United
States v. Cork, 18 Fed. App. 376, 383 (6th Cir. Sept. 6, 2001) (unpublished) (homeowner had
common authority over unlocked bedroom shared by her nephew); State v. Harris, 642 A.2d 1242,
1247 (Del. Super. Ct. 1993) (mother with a key to her son’s locked bedroom possessed common
authority over the room).
The two cases cited for the finding of actual common authority, United States v. Gillis, 358
F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2004) and Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990), provide no support for that

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proposition. Gillis expressly declined to address whether actual authority was present: “Because we
agree with the district court’s decision that Williams had apparent authority, we need not consider
whether she also possessed actual authority.” Gillis, 358 F.3d at 391. In Rodriguez, the Supreme
Court went a step further, holding that no actual authority existed and proceeded to analyze the case
under the doctrine of apparent common authority. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179, 181-82, 189.
The location of the contraband in a dresser drawer makes Ms. Pratt’s purported authority
even less reasonable. See Randolph, 126 S. Ct. at 1522 (“when it comes to searching through bureau
drawers, there will be instances in which even a person clearly belonging on premises as an occupant
may lack any perceived authority to consent . . . .”); Clutter, 914 F.2d at 778 (stating that, although
minor children had authority to consent to a search of their parents’ open bedroom, their authority
to consent to a search of a bureau drawer therein was “a closer question”). Randolph is the Supreme
Court’s latest decision on consent searches. It holds that “a warrantless search of a shared dwelling
for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be justified
as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the police by another resident.” Randolph,
126 S. Ct. at 1526. By analogy, an absent resident cannot be held to have given consent to search
dresser drawers when he has locked his room and has the only key. There cannot be apparent
authority to search in dresser drawers or other nooks and crannies of the room when the police must
break the lock or climb in a window in order to gain access to the room. We should not permit the
erosion of Fourth Amendment principles that has taken place in this case.

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