United States of America v. Josef Hope

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 06a0127n.06
Filed: February 16, 2006
No. 05-1201
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOSEF HOPE,
Defendant-Appellant.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
MICHIGAN
Before: SILER, BATCHELDER, and MOORE, Circuit Judges.
SILER, Circuit Judge. Defendant Josef Hope pled guilty to one count of armed bank
robbery and one count of discharging a firearm during a crime of violence. Hope appeals his
sentence under United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct 738 (2005), arguing that it is unreasonable. For
the following reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 2003, Hope robbed a bank in Grand Rapids, Michigan and fired a shot into the ceiling
during the robbery. He was charged with one count of armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. §
2113(a) and (d) and one count of discharging a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). The district court found Hope to be competent for trial, although he was
diagnosed as having a “severe mental illness.”

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Hope pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to both charges in 2004. The Presentence
Report (“PSR”) recommended a 171 month sentence, which included a 10-year mandatory minimum
sentence, required to run consecutively, for the § 924(c) violation and the 51-63 month Guidelines
range for the § 2113 violation. At the sentencing hearing, Hope renewed his request for a downward
departure due to his mental health issues. The court, while clearly giving consideration to the mental
health issues, determined that other factors in the case, such as Hope’s long criminal history, history
of substance abuse, the violent nature of the crime, and the need to protect the public, militated
against any leniency in the sentence. Ultimately, the court rejected Hope’s plea for a downward
departure and sentenced him to 174 months’ imprisonment.
DISCUSSION
Hope argues that his sentence is unreasonable because the district court gave insufficient
consideration to his mental difficulties and the role that those difficulties played in his criminal
conduct. In attempting to show this unreasonableness, he relies on two separate contentions. First,
he argues that “the explanation given by the sentenc[ing] court did not satisfy the criteria set forth
in” United States v. Jackson, 408 F.3d 301 (6th Cir. 2005). Second, he claims that the district court
erred by not attaching sufficient weight to certain factors that he believes justified a mitigation of
his sentence.
Booker held that henceforth all sentences were to be reviewed for reasonableness. 125 S.Ct.
at 765. “Therefore, when a defendant challenges a district court’s sentencing determination, we are
instructed to determine ‘whether [the] sentence was unreasonable.’” United States v. Webb, 403
F.3d 373, 383 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 766). In determining reasonableness,

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“[b]oth district courts in the first instance as well as appellate courts reviewing sentences on appeal
are to be guided by the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),” which includes the applicable
Sentencing Guidelines range as a factor. Jackson, 408 F.3d at 304 (citation omitted). “[W]e may
conclude that a sentence is unreasonable when the district judge fails to ‘consider’ the applicable
Guidelines range or neglects to ‘consider’ the other factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and instead
simply selects what the judge deems an appropriate sentence without such required consideration.”
Webb, 403 F.3d at 383 (citation and footnote omitted). Recently, we have noted that “sentences
properly calculated under the Guidelines” should be credited with a “rebuttable presumption of
reasonableness.” United States v. Williams, --- F.3d ---, 2006 WL 224067, at *1 (6th Cir. January
31, 2006).
A. Procedural Unreasonableness
Hope first argues that his sentence is unreasonable because the district court failed to provide
the requisite analysis as required under Jackson. In Jackson, the district court provided a list of the
various characteristics of the defendant that it considered in granting a downward departure during
sentencing, but failed to include any reference to the applicable Guidelines provisions or any
accompanying analysis. 408 F.3d at 305. We held,
[E]ven post-Booker, the list provided by the district court, without any accompanying
analysis, is insufficient to justify the sentence imposed, as it renders our
reasonableness review impossible. Although . . . district courts [have] greater
flexibility in sentencing, we nonetheless find that, pursuant to Booker, we as an
appellate court must still have the articulation of the reasons the district court
reached the sentence ultimately imposed, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). In our
view, Booker requires an acknowledgment of the defendant’s applicable Guidelines
range as well as a discussion of the reasonableness of a variation from that range.

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Further, in determining the sentence, the district court must consider the advisory
provisions of the Guidelines and the other factors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Id. (citation omitted). “Such consideration, however, need not be evidenced explicitly” and a “ritual
incantation” of the § 3553(a) factors has never been required. Williams, --- F.3d ---, 2006 WL
224067, at *2 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Applying these principles to the case at bar, the district court recognized the relevant factors,
discussed those factors as they affected Hope’s sentence, and articulated the reasons for its ultimate
sentence. Further, although not listing the § 3553(a) factors by name, the court explicitly considered
the relevant § 3553(a) factors in its decision, including specific consideration of facts relating to §
3553(a)(1), (2), (3), (4), and (7). Given the district court’s in-depth consideration of the appropriate
factors and articulation of the reasoning behind its sentence, Hope has not made the showing
necessary to rebut the presumption of reasonableness afforded a sentence within the Guidelines
range. See Williams, --- F.3d ---, 2006 WL 224067, at *1.
B. Unreasonableness of the Sentence Imposed
Turning to the second argument, Hope asserts that the court unreasonably attached
insufficient weight to certain factors justifying a mitigation in his sentence, namely his mental
difficulties and the role that those difficulties played in the offense. Initially, we must determine the
precise nature of Hope’s challenge. There are two separate ways Hope’s argument can be
characterized: (1) the district court was unreasonable in its decision to not grant a downward
departure based upon this evidence; or (2) in light of the highlighted information, the sentence meted
out by the district court was unreasonable.

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As to the first contention, this court has made clear that “the [United States v.] Stewart [306
F.3d 295 (6th Cir. 2002)] standard foreclosing review of a decision not to depart downward survived
Booker” and all recent developments in this area. United States v. Puckett, 422 F.3d 340, 344-45
(6th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Jones, 417 F.3d 547, 551 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005)). “Therefore
. . . we shall not review decisions of a district court not to depart downward ‘unless the record
reflects that the district court was not aware of or did not understand its discretion to make such a
departure.’” Id. at 345 (quoting Stewart, 306 F.3d at 329). Since Hope does not contend that the
district court was unaware of or misunderstood its discretion to depart downward, this claim
necessarily fails.
Hope’s other potential argument for the unreasonableness of the sentence has three aspects:
(1) based upon the mitigation evidence of Hope’s long history of mental difficulties and their
connection to the crime, the district court’s sentence was unreasonable; (2) any threat of potential
violence was accounted for in the 10 year mandatory minimum sentence he was to receive for the
firearm offense and, thus, a reliance upon that factor when issuing the sentence for the robbery count
constituted “double counting” and was therefore unreasonable; and (3) the district court “put too
much weight” on Hope’s drug and alcohol abuse.
Despite Hope’s arguments for unreasonableness, “there is no evidence in the record that the
district judge acted unreasonably by, for example, selecting the sentence arbitrarily, basing the
sentence on impermissible factors, failing to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors, or giving an
unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factors.” Webb, 403 F.3d at 385. Hope’s first
objection can be dismissed because the district court considered Hope’s mental state during

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sentencing. Further, the court explicitly provided for mental health assessment and treatment for
Hope in its sentence. See Webb, 403 F.3d at 385 (this court noted that a sentence ordering substance
abuse and education programs for the defendant “indicates that at sentencing the district court was
concerned not only with ensuring that the imposed sentence protects the public safety, but also that
it meets [the defendant’s] needs”).
Secondly, Hope offers no authority for his double counting argument. Given the rebuttable
presumption afforded a sentence within the Guidelines range, there is no apparent reason why the
district court’s consideration of Hope’s likelihood of recidivism and danger to the public is
unreasonable. See Williams, --- F.3d ---, 2006 WL 224067, at *1. Lastly, the district court did
emphasize to Hope that he “need[ed] to get away from drugs and get away from alcohol” and, to that
effect, ordered him to receive alcohol and substance abuse treatment while in prison. Consideration
of a defendant’s chemical dependency status is not inherently unreasonable. See Webb, 403 F.3d
at 385 (applauding the district court for taking into account a defendant’s substance abuse problems,
noting that the sentence was thereby tailored to the defendant’s needs). Even Hope concedes that
he is “not claiming that the sentencing court was wrong to express concern about his abuse.” Given
that the district court considered Hope’s substance abuse as one of many factors in sentencing and
the Williams presumption, the court’s sentence cannot be deemed unreasonable.
AFFIRMED.

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