5228), Murray Allen v. Corrections Corporation of America

1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0299P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 04a0299p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
LOUIS BOYD; SAMMIE
EVERETT,
Plaintiffs-Appellants
(03-5227/5228),
MURRAY ALLEN; HOWARD R.
HARRIS; JOSHUA O. KYLES;
LARRY B. LEMONS; JESUS
VILLANUEVA MATA; PATRICK
U. MCGEE; RANDA LL
MILLER; PAUL NEMCHEK;
LUIS NIEVES; JEROME PAUL;
CORY PURIFOY; SHANNON
QUINN; TRACY SMITH,
Plaintiffs-Appellants
(03-5389),
v.
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION
OF AMERICA; PATRICK
WHALEN, Warden; STEVEN
DOTSON; MIKE TWEETY; JIM
COOKSEY; TONYA BOYD;
PRISON REALTY TRUST, INC.,
a/k/a PRISON REALTY
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Nos. 03-5227/
5228/5389
2 Boyd et al. v. Corrections
Corp. of Am. et al.
Nos. 03-5227/5228/5389
*The Honorable Robert H. Cleland, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
CORPORATION; PRISON
MANAGEMENT SERVICES,
INC.; DOCTOR R. CRANTS;
BENNY REEVES; DAVID
PAYNE; CORRECTIONAL
MANAGEMENTS;
CHRISTOPHER CARY,
Defendants-Appellees.
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N
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Tennessee at Jackson.
Nos. 99-01262; 99-01270; 00-01050—J. Daniel Breen,
District Judge.
Argued: June 15, 2004
Decided and Filed: September 8, 2004
Before: GILMAN and COOK, Circuit Judges; CLELAND,
District Judge.*
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: C. Michael Robbins, ROBBINS & THOMAS,
Memphis, Tennessee, Sarah F. Kaas, CANNON &
DUNPHY, Brookfield, Wisconsin, for Appellants. James I.
Pentecost, PENTECOST, GLENN & RUDD, Jackson,
Tennessee, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: C. Michael Robbins,
ROBBINS & THOMAS, Memphis, Tennessee, Sarah F.

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Nos. 03-5227/5228/5389 Boyd et al. v. Corrections
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3
Kaas, Mark L. Thomsen, CANNON & DUNPHY,
Brookfield, Wisconsin, for Appellants. Tom Anderson,
ANDERSON LAW FIRM, Jackson, Tennessee, for
Appellees.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. The 15 plaintiffs
in these three consolidated cases are prisoners who were
convicted by Wisconsin state courts and held, at all relevant
times, at the Whiteville Correctional Facility (WCF) located
in Whiteville, Tennessee. WCF is operated by the
Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), a private entity.
The plaintiffs allege that they were severely beaten and
subjected to racial epithets by members of WCF’s Special
Operations Response Team (SORT) in August of 1998, in
violation of their rights under both federal and state law.
A magistrate judge decided these cases with the parties’
consent. The judge dismissed the claims of all 15 of the
named plaintiffs, reasoning that they had not exhausted their
available administrative remedies before filing suit as
required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. For the reasons
set forth below, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment as
to plaintiffs Allen, Harris, Kyles, Lemons, Mata, McGee,
Miller, Paul, Purifoy, Quinn, and Smith, REVERSE the
judgment as to plaintiffs Boyd, Everette, Nemchek, and
Nieves, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
4 Boyd et al. v. Corrections
Corp. of Am. et al.
Nos. 03-5227/5228/5389
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual background
This case concerns the efforts of the plaintiffs to utilize
WCF’s grievance procedure. The grievance procedure is
summarized in this section, while the plaintiffs’ claims are
discussed under the individual subheadings in Part II.C.
below.
WCF’s grievance procedure in effect during August of
1998 was outlined in an inmate handbook dated July 6, 1998,
which states in relevant part as follows:
Each inmate at Whiteville Correctional Facility has the
right to utilize the grievance procedure without fear of
reprisal. The grievance procedure provides a forum in
which inmates may formally raise their concerns over
incidents or conditions which personally affect them and
allows these complaints to be considered and addressed
at an institutional level.
Informal resolution of grievances is encouraged. This
process is initiated prior to the formal logging of a
grievance in which the inmate agrees to allow a staff
member to attempt to resolve his complaint.
Prior to filing a grievance, you should attempt to obtain
an answer or solution to your grievance through a
member of the unit team or you may also contact the
grievance chairperson for assistance. The grievance
office is located in the F wing.
Grievance forms are available from any unit team
member or in the library. Grievances may be deposited
in the locked mail box located in front of the inmate
dining room. The mail box is emptied daily, Monday
through Friday. Emergency grievances should be

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5
forwarded to the grievance chairperson or shift
supervisor (whenever the chairperson is not available) for
immediate attention. If the matter is deemed a non-
emergency, then it will be processed through normal
procedures.
All grievances must be filed within seven (7) days of the
occurrence or most recent in a series of occurrences
giving rise to the grievance.
The district court explained the operation of the grievance
system as follows:
In order to initiate the grievance procedure, an inmate
must complete a grievance form identified as Form 14-
5A and place it in the Grievance Mail Box or forward it
to the Facility Grievance Officer. Upon receipt of the
grievance, the Facility Grievance Officer assigns a
number to the case and maintains a permanent grievance
log. That individual shall, within fifteen (15) days of
receipt of the grievance, conduct an investigation into the
issue raised in the grievance and render a written
decision, which is set forth in the “Report and Decision”
portion of the grievance form. A copy of the decision is
forwarded to the inmate. In the event an inmate is not
satisfied with the decision of the Facility Grievance
Officer, he may, within five (5) days of his receipt of the
decision, appeal to the warden or his designee by
completing the Request for Warden Review portion of
the grievance form and submitting it to the warden. . . .
The warden’s written decision is to be rendered within
fifteen (15) days of his receipt of the appeal. A copy of
the grievance form will then be returned to the Facility
Grievance Officer, who will forward a copy to the
inmate.
6 Boyd et al. v. Corrections
Corp. of Am. et al.
Nos. 03-5227/5228/5389
B. Procedural background
The plaintiffs originally brought these suits in the Middle
District of Tennessee, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, and
Tennessee state law. All three cases were eventually
transferred to the Western District of Tennessee. The parties
consented to having the cases heard by a magistrate judge,
who subsequently granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss
all of the claims under review based upon the plaintiffs’
alleged failure to exhaust their administrative remedies before
filing suit in federal court.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of review
We review de novo a district court’s interpretation of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e. Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 503 (6th Cir. 2001).
The same standard of review applies to the dismissal of a
prisoner’s civil rights complaint for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997).
B. Does the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement apply
to prisoners who bring suit against correctional
institutions run by private entities?
The PLRA states in relevant part: “No action shall be
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983
of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined
in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). In the present case, the district court
dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice for failure
to satisfy the exhaustion requirement of § 1997e(a). The

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7
plaintiffs, however, contend that they were not required to
exhaust WCF’s grievance procedure before filing suit because
“[a] grievance system entirely under the control of a private[,]
for profit corporation engaged in [the] housing of state
prisoners with no oversight by any agency of the state or
federal government is not an available administrative remedy
as that term is used in the PLRA.”
This court has no published opinion holding that the
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to prisoners held in
privately operated correctional facilities. In one unpublished
opinion, however, this court affirmed the dismissal of a
prisoner’s suit against CCA because the prisoner had failed
“to set forth any allegations that [he] submitted his complaints
to the prison’s formal grievance process and that any
grievances were appealed to the highest authority.” Butler v.
Gardner, No. 00-4524, 2001 WL 1299000, at *1 (6th Cir.
Aug. 9, 2001); see also Robinson v. Corrections Corp. of
America, No. 99-5741, 2001 WL 857204, at *2 (6th Cir. June
20, 2001) (unpublished) (applying a separate provision of the
PLRA in a prisoner’s suit against CCA); Treat v. Corrections
Corp. of America, No. 00-6000, 2001 WL 856981, at *1 (6th
Cir. June 18, 2001) (unpublished) (stating that “[t]he PLRA
applies to privately-operated prisons” and affirming the
dismissal of the prisoner’s suit as frivolous).
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have likewise concluded that
the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to suits against
privately operated prisons. Ross v. County of Bernalillo,
365 F.3d 1181, 1184 (10th Cir. 2004) (“This requirement
applies fully when the plaintiff is a federal or state inmate
held in a privately operated facility.”); Murphy v. Jones, No.
01-35336, 2001 WL 1450636, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 2001)
(unpublished) (“Because the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(‘PLRA’) states that a prisoner ‘confined in any jail, prison,
or other correctional facility’ cannot bring an action about
prison conditions without exhausting administrative remedies,
appellants’ contention that the PLRA is inapplicable to
8 Boyd et al. v. Corrections
Corp. of Am. et al.
Nos. 03-5227/5228/5389
private correctional facilities lacks merit.”). As the Tenth
Circuit explained in Ross,
[t]he purpose of this exhaustion requirement is to reduce
the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits.
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152
L.Ed.2d 12 (2002). It is designed to achieve this purpose
by 1) allowing prison officials an opportunity to satisfy
the inmate’s complaint, thus potentially obviating the
need for litigation; 2) filtering out some frivolous claims;
and 3) creating an administrative record that facilitates
review of cases that are ultimately brought to court. Id.
at 525.
365 F.3d at 1184.
We are persuaded that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement
applies to prisoners held in private facilities. This conclusion
is consistent with the language of the statute and the holdings
of this and all other courts that have considered the issue. Our
ruling is also consistent with the purpose of the exhaustion
requirement, which applies with equal force whether the
prisoner is held in a prison run by a governmental entity or
one operated by a private corporation. The remaining issue
in the present cases, then, is whether the plaintiffs exhausted
their administrative remedies before filing these lawsuits.
C. Did the plaintiffs exhaust their administrative
remedies before filing suit in federal court?
This court has held that, in order to satisfy the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement, “a prisoner must plead his claims
with specificity and show that they have been exhausted by
attaching a copy of the applicable administrative dispositions
to the complaint or, in the absence of written documentation,
describ[ing] with specificity the administrative proceeding
and its outcome.” Knuckles El v. Toombs, 215 F.3d 640, 642

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Nos. 03-5227/5228/5389 Boyd et al. v. Corrections
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(6th Cir. 2000). The court in Knuckles El explained that the
policy behind the heightened pleading standard is that
[d]istrict courts should not have to hold time-consuming
evidentiary hearings in order simply to determine
whether it should reach the merits or decline under the
mandatory language of § 1997e (“No action shall be
brought . . . .”). In the absence of particularized
averments concerning exhaustion showing the nature of
the administrative proceeding and its outcome, the action
must be dismissed under § 1997e.
Id. A dismissal under § 1997e should be without prejudice.
Id. (holding that “the district court properly dismissed the
entire complaint without prejudice”); Brown v. Toombs, 139
F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Because in the present case
there is no indication that the requirements of the statute have
been complied with, the case should be dismissed without
prejudice, and the activity that the new statute contemplates
should now occur—state adjudication of the claims.”).
In order to determine whether the plaintiffs in the present
cases have satisfied this pleading requirement, we now turn
to the relevant allegations contained in the amended
complaints as to each plaintiff, along with the supporting
documentation. This individualized analysis follows.
1. Louis Boyd
Louis Boyd alleged that in August of 1998 he was assaulted
and subjected to racial epithets by members of SORT. The
other plaintiffs all made substantially similar allegations.
Boyd further alleged that, within a few days after being
attacked,
he obtained the assistance of Senior Correction Officer
Roosevelt Jones. Plaintiff requested Senior Jones to
provide him with a grievance form so that he could make
10 Boyd et al. v. Corrections
Corp. of Am. et al.
Nos. 03-5227/5228/5389
complaint of the events of the evening of August 11,
1998. Jones provided a grievance form to the plaintiff.
Plaintiff completed the form and attached a letter to it,
addressed to the warden of WCF, Patrick Whalen.
Within a day or so of his receipt of the form, plaintiff
placed it with the letter in the hand of Senior Corrections
Officer Roosevelt Jones with the request that it be
delivered to the appropriate officers of the facility.
Senior Jones thereafter personally delivered this
grievance submitted by plaintiff to Ms. Diane Currie, the
Grievance Chairperson at WCF at the time. Plaintiff has
not received any response either to his letter to the
warden or to the grievance he submitted.
Another allegation in Boyd’s complaint, which is stated
verbatim in the complaints of the other plaintiffs, is that
[i]n August 1998 and the months following, Ms. Currie
[the Grievance Chairperson at WCF] failed to accurately
record or log the actual grievances received in her office
from inmates at WCF. A number of these grievances
concerned complaints about excessive force being used
by SORT teams against inmates. Further, Ms. Currie’s
office was entered without authority on occasions, and
she later found that grievances had been removed. Ms.
Currie notified the Chief of Security at WCF at the time,
Jim Cooksey, of these matters. Chief Cooksey took no
action whatsoever to investigate this discrepancy or to
ensure that it would not happen again.
Chief of Security Cooksey at various times, during the
August 1998 incidents at WCF concerning SORT team
excessive force and thereafter, affirmatively acted to
destroy evidence developed in the process of an “in
house” investigation of the complaints about the SORT
teams, including the secreting of photographic evidence
of an inmate, who showed signs of physical abuse, in his
office; and the removal of inmate grievance forms

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11
complaining of SORT team assaults from Diane Currie’s
office.
The district court concluded that Boyd had “failed to bear
his burden of showing he exhausted his administrative
remedies” because he did not attach a copy of his grievance
to the complaint, and that he did not make “any allegation that
he ever attempted to inquire into the status of the grievance he
filed or that he utilized the appeals process.” Regarding
Boyd’s failure to attach any documentation, a prisoner-
plaintiff may bear his pleading burden either “by attaching a
copy of the applicable administrative dispositions to the
complaint or, in the absence of written documentation,
describ[ing] with specificity the administrative proceeding
and its outcome.” Knuckles El, 215 F.3d at 642. The lack of
documentation is thus not fatal to Boyd’s claim that he has
exhausted his administrative remedies.
As for Boyd’s failure to follow up on his submitted
grievance, the district court relied on Nunez v. Goord, 172 F.
Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). In Nunez, the court cited the
plaintiff’s failure to follow up on a complaint letter written to
the prison superintendent as one reason supporting its
conclusion that the plaintiff had not exhausted his
administrative remedies. Id. at 429. Nunez itself, however,
cites no authority for the proposition that a plaintiff is
obligated to follow up on a submitted complaint in order to
exhaust administrative remedies, and we have found no other
case that has adopted such a rule.
The district court also cited Jorss v. Vanknocker, No. C97-
3719CRB (PR), 2001 WL 823771, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 19,
2001) (unpublished), for the proposition that the “failure to
receive [a] response to [a] grievance [is] no excuse for not
completing the process.” But in Jorss, unlike the present
case, the prisoner received no response to his grievance
submitted pursuant to the prison’s preliminary, informal
grievance procedure—the approximate equivalent of WCF’s
12 Boyd et al. v. Corrections
Corp. of Am. et al.
Nos. 03-5227/5228/5389
informal procedure for resolving complaints without the need
to file a formal grievance. The district court in Jorss noted
that “Plaintiff was not foreclosed from proceeding with the
prison appeal process and exhausting available administrative
remedies because he did not receive a response to his
informal appeal.” Id. at *2. Boyd, in contrast, was required
to wait for a grievance officer to make a decision regarding
his formal grievance before he could appeal to the warden.
We conclude that the two cases relied upon by the district
court have little persuasive value as applied to Boyd’s
situation. In contrast to Nunez and Jorss, moreover, several
circuits have held that the exhaustion requirement is satisfied
where prison officials fail to timely respond to an inmate’s
written grievance. See Jernigan v. Stuchell, 304 F.3d 1030,
1032 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e agree that the failure to respond
to a grievance within the time limits contained in the
grievance policy renders an administrative remedy
unavailable[.]”); Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th
Cir. 2002) (“We join the Eighth and Fifth circuits on this
issue because we refuse to interpret the PLRA ‘so narrowly as
to . . . permit [prison officials] to exploit the exhaustion
requirement through indefinite delay in responding to
grievances.’ ”); Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687, 698 (8th Cir.
2001) (“[O]nce [the prison] failed to respond to [the
prisoner’s written grievance], no further administrative
proceedings were ‘available’ to him.”); Powe v. Ennis, 177
F.3d 393, 394 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (“A prisoner’s
administrative remedies are deemed exhausted when a valid
grievance has been filed and the state’s time for responding
thereto has expired.”). Following the lead of the four other
circuits that have considered this issue, we conclude that
administrative remedies are exhausted when prison officials
fail to timely respond to a properly filed grievance.
In the present case, Boyd specifically alleged that (1) he
submitted a grievance form by giving it to a corrections
officer, (2) the grievance covered “the events of the evening

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13
of August 11, 1998,” (3) the grievance was delivered to the
Grievance Chairperson, who is designated in the grievance
procedure as the appropriate recipient of grievances, and
(4) prison officials totally failed to respond to the grievance.
These detailed allegations satisfied Boyd’s burden to
“describe with specificity the administrative proceeding and
its outcome,” Knuckles El, 215 F.3d at 642, and establish
that Boyd has exhausted his administrative remedies. We
therefore reverse the district court’s judgment as to Boyd’s
claims and remand his case for further proceedings.
2. Sammie Everette, Paul Nemchek, and Luis
Nieves
Sammie Everette alleged that within approximately four
days of the assault, “he requested an officer to provide him
with a grievance form. Plaintiff wrote on . . . his grievance to
the effect that he had been assaulted by the officers; that he
had been denied medical attention; and that he desired to
contact Wisconsin officials. Plaintiff never received any
response to this grievance.” Although Everette’s allegations
lack the detail of Boyd’s, he still stated that he submitted a
grievance that addressed the incident in question and that he
received no response. Everette’s case is a close one under the
Knuckles El standard, but we believe that he has adequately
alleged the essential facts necessary to avoid a motion to
dismiss. We therefore reverse and remand his claims for
further proceedings. For the same reason, we reverse and
remand the claims of Paul Nemchek and Luis Nieves. Like
Everette, Nemchek and Nieves both made similar allegations
that they filed a grievance relating to the incident in question
but that CCA failed to respond.
3. Murray Allen
Murray Allen alleged that, after he was assaulted by
members of SORT, he
14 Boyd et al. v. Corrections
Corp. of Am. et al.
Nos. 03-5227/5228/5389
filed CCA grievances regarding the incidents . . . among
other matters. CCA never held a hearing nor adequately
responded and CCA’s response was consistent with what
the plaintiffs believe was the defendants’ intentional
and/or deliberately indifferent CCA practice and de facto
policy of attempting to conceal CCA’s unlawful conduct
as alleged herein, including, but not limited to, the fact
the Internal Affairs Office was pilfered and grievances
pertaining to the use of force by SORT members
removed and/or destroyed by [Chief of Security Jim]
Cooksey, among others.
(Emphasis in original.) Allen attached a copy of his
grievance form to the complaint. This document is illegible
in the Joint Appendix and, consequently, we have no way to
determine whether the form is signed by Allen or stamped
“Received” by WCF. The district court’s opinion, however,
states that the document “showed no signs of having been
submitted.”
Even assuming that Allen’s document was signed and
stamped, the allegations of the complaint fail to satisfy
the requirement that a prisoner-plaintiff “describe with
specificity the administrative proceeding and its outcome.”
Knuckles El, 215 F.3d at 642. Allen asserts that “CCA never
held a hearing nor adequately responded . . . .” But WCF’s
grievance procedures give prisoners no right to a hearing, and
the allegation that CCA did not “adequately respond” does
not indicate whether CCA failed to respond at all, or whether
CCA did in fact investigate the matter and that Allen was
simply unhappy with the result. The district court was
therefore correct in dismissing his claims without prejudice.
4. Howard R. Harris
Howard R. Harris alleged that he did “not recall filing a
grievance pursuant to the informal grievance policy because
he feared for his safety but submits that CCA would not have

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responded to any grievance . . . .” The district court
concluded that Harris’s “conclusory allegations of fear with
respect to filing a grievance are not sufficient to excuse his
failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.”
In Larkin v. Galloway, 266 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2001), the
prisoner-plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he had not used
the prison grievance system before filing suit because he was
“afraid to complain. I threw the grievance procedure away
because I did not want to provoke this administration.” Id. at
720. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint without discussing the effect of the prisoner’s
alleged fear on his obligation to file a grievance. Id. at 723-
24. Although Larkin supports the decision below, the
Seventh Circuit did not squarely address the issue of whether
fear of retaliation will excuse the failure to exhaust. We need
not address the issue either, because even assuming that a fear
of retaliation might excuse a prisoner’s duty to exhaust,
Harris has alleged no facts in support of his conclusion that
“he feared for his safety . . . .” Because a prisoner-plaintiff
must “describe with specificity the administrative proceeding
and its outcome[,]” Knuckles El, 215 F.3d at 642, a prisoner
who contends that he failed to exhaust out of fear should also
have to “describe with specificity” the factual basis for his
fear.
As for Harris’s allegation that “CCA would not have
responded to any grievance[,]” the district court properly
observed that “[a]ny subjective belief on [his] part as to what
the outcome might have been had [he] done so hardly excuses
[his] failure to exhaust.” See Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d
720, 733 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Exhaustion . . . requires a plaintiff
to bring a grievance to the state before coming to federal court
even when the state has made clear that it will not grant the
relief requested.”); Edwards v. Alabama Dep’t of Corrs., 81
F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1256-57 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (“Regardless of
their chances of success using the defendants’ grievance
16 Boyd et al. v. Corrections
Corp. of Am. et al.
Nos. 03-5227/5228/5389
procedures, the PLRA requires the plaintiffs to exhaust
them.”).
In sum, Harris’s nonspecific allegations of fear and his
subjective feeling of futility do not excuse his failure to
exhaust his administrative remedies. The district court was
therefore correct in dismissing Harris’s claims without
prejudice.
5. Joshua Kyles
Joshua Kyles alleged that he “requested grievance forms
and filed grievances pursuant to the informal grievance
procedure . . . . CCA did not respond adequately and/or
destroyed the grievance(s) . . . .” Kyles attached copies of his
grievance forms to his complaint. These grievance forms,
however, do not address the alleged assault by members of
SORT. One form complains about being housed in a cell
with an inmate who smoked, and the others complain about
being held in a high security unit. The district court therefore
correctly concluded that Kyles “clearly failed to exhaust the
claim for which he now seeks relief.”
6. Larry B. Lemons
Larry Lemons alleged that he “filed at least three CCA
grievances, including, but not limited to, the grievances
attached hereto . . . . However, CCA failed to ever adequately
respond and/or destroyed grievances.” Lemons attached three
grievance forms to his complaint. But as the district court
noted, the first form is not signed and, unlike the other two,
was not stamped “Received” by WCF. On the third form,
moreover, Lemons checked the box indicating that he did not
want to appeal from the adverse decision of the grievance
officer. The strongest evidence that Lemons exhausted his
administrative remedies is provided by the second form,
which is signed by Lemons, stamped “Received,” and
includes comments by the grievance officer. Lemons,

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moreover, checked the box indicating that he wanted to
appeal from the adverse decision of the grievance officer.
The district court concluded, however, that Lemons failed to
demonstrate exhaustion because “there is nothing to indicate
that he made any effort to determine the status of his appeal
on the other.” For the reasons discussed above in connection
with Louis Boyd’s grievance, the great weight of authority is
against using the plaintiff’s failure to follow up on a properly
lodged grievance as a factor that militates against a finding of
exhaustion.
The more significant problem with Lemons’s complaint is
his allegation that “CCA failed to ever adequately respond
. . . .” As previously discussed with regard to Murray Allen’s
complaint, this ambiguous allegation does not adequately
describe “the administrative proceeding and its outcome” as
required by Knuckles El. The district court was therefore
correct in dismissing Lemons’s claims without prejudice.
7. Jesus Villanueva Mata
Jesus Villanueva Mata alleged that he “does not recall but
may have filed grievances pursuant to the informal policy, but
submits that CCA would not have adequately responded to
his grievances and/or destroyed the grievances . . . .” For the
reasons discussed above in connection with Howard R.
Harris’s grievances, the district court correctly concluded that
this noncommital statement does not demonstrate that Mata
exhausted his administrative remedies.
8. Patrick U. McGee
Patrick McGee similarly stated that he “does not recall
filing a CCA grievance because he believed that CCA would
not respond adequately . . . .” As with Mata’s claim, the
district court was correct in deciding that McGee had failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies.
18 Boyd et al. v. Corrections
Corp. of Am. et al.
Nos. 03-5227/5228/5389
9. Randall Miller
Randall Miller alleged that he “filed CCA grievances
pursuant to its informal grievance procedure . . . . These
grievances were not adequately responded to by CCA.”
Miller attached four documents to his complaint. The first is
a typed letter addressed to “Complaint/Grievance
Investigator,” which addresses the alleged assault by
members of SORT. This letter is not stamped “Received” by
WCF. The district court therefore correctly concluded that
this document is insufficient to demonstrate that Miller
actually submitted the grievance to WCF officials.
Also attached to the complaint is another letter that
complains about Miller’s confinement in a high security unit.
This letter is not stamped and does not address the alleged
assault. The third document is a letter to Warden Patrick
Whalen complaining about Miller’s continued confinement in
the high security unit. This letter also is not stamped and
does not address the assault. The fourth document attached
to the complaint is a grievance form in which Miller
complains that he has not received mail that was sent to him
from outside the prison. Because none of these documents
address the alleged assault, the district court correctly
concluded that Miller had failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies with respect to that claim.
10. Jerome Paul
Jerome Paul conceded in his complaint that he “did not file
a CCA grievance because he did not know about the existence
of a legitimate grievance procedure.” But as the district court
observed, the grievance policy is set forth in the inmate
handbook that “is provided to inmates as part of the prison
orientation process.” Paul, moreover, “does not allege that he
never received a handbook or that prison officials somehow
otherwise denied him access to an inmate handbook or to
other information relative to the grievance procedure.” The

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Nos. 03-5227/5228/5389 Boyd et al. v. Corrections
Corp. of Am. et al.
19
district court therefore correctly concluded that Paul failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies.
11. Cory Purifoy
Cory Purifoy alleged that he “did file grievances pursuant
to the existing informal grievance procedure . . . . CCA did
not adequately respond . . . .” Purifoy attached copies of two
grievance forms to the complaint. The first grievance
addresses the use of force by the members of SORT, but the
form was not stamped “Received” and Purifoy did not attach
the second page of the form that would include the grievance
officer’s decision and the boxes for Purifoy to indicate
whether he wanted to appeal. Similar to the allegation by
Murray Allen, moreover, the allegation by Purifoy that CCA
did not “adequately respond” does not sufficiently describe
“the administrative proceeding and its outcome” as required
by Knuckles El. The district court was therefore correct in
dismissing his claims without prejudice.
In the second grievance form, Purifoy requested that he be
returned to the general population and have access to
institutional programs. The second form does not address the
alleged assault and therefore does not demonstrate that
Purifoy exhausted his administrative remedies on the issue in
question.
12. Shannon Quinn
Shannon Quinn conceded in his complaint that he “did not
file a grievance pursuant to CCA’s informal grievance
procedure believing that CCA did not intend to adequately
respond . . . .” For the same reasons discussed in regard to
Howard R. Harris’s similar excuse, Quinn’s allegation is
insufficient to satisfy the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.
The district court’s conclusion that Quinn failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies is therefore correct.
20 Boyd et al. v. Corrections
Corp. of Am. et al.
Nos. 03-5227/5228/5389
13. Tracy Smith
Tracy Smith alleged the following in his complaint: “After
the incident described above, upon information and belief,
Mr. Smith did file a CCA grievance but CCA did not
adequately respond to any such grievance and/or destroyed
the grievance.” For the reasons discussed above in
connection with several of the named plaintiffs, this vague
assertion does not satisfy the requirement of specific
pleadings as set forth in Knuckles El. The district court was
therefore correct in concluding that Smith had failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies.
III. CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the
district court’s judgment as to plaintiffs Allen, Harris, Kyles,
Lemons, Mata, McGee, Miller, Paul, Purifoy, Quinn, and
Smith, REVERSE the judgment as to plaintiffs Boyd,
Everette, Nemchek, and Nieves, and REMAND for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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