Robert M. Wilson v. Commissioner of Social Security

*The Honorable Karl S. Forester, Chief United States District Judge
for the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.
1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0255P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 04a0255p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
ROBERT M. WILSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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No. 03-1588
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.
No. 02-00197—Wendell A. Miles, District Judge.
Argued: June 16, 2004
Decided and Filed: August 2, 2004
Before: GILMAN and ROGERS, Circuit Judges;
FORESTER, Chief District Judge.*
2 Wilson v. Comm’r of Social Security No. 03-1588
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Lewis M. Seward, SEWARD, TALLY &
PIGGOTT, Bay City, Michigan, for Appellant. James B.
Geren, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Chicago, Illinois, for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: Lewis M. Seward, SEWARD,
TALLY & PIGGOTT, Bay City, Michigan, for Appellant.
James B. Geren, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL,
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Chicago,
Illinois, for Appellee.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
ROGERS, Circuit Judge. Robert M. Wilson, the
plaintiff/appellant, challenges the decision of an
administrative law judge (the “ALJ”) of the Social Security
Administration, which became the final decision of the
Commissioner, denying Wilson’s application for Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social
Security Act. Because the ALJ, by failing to articulate
reasons for discounting the opinion of Wilson’s treating
physician, violated the agency’s own procedural regulation,
we vacate the judgment of the district court affirming the
ALJ’s decision and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
Wilson worked as a deputy sheriff from 1960 until 1985,
when he retired because of a heart attack. He then found
employment as a manual laborer with the Howard City Paper
Company, but he resigned from that position in 1986. Wilson
did not engage in any full-time work after leaving the paper
company, but worked part-time as the weekend manager for

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No. 03-1588 Wilson v. Comm’r of Social Security 3
a flea market around 1999. Wilson’s insured status for
purposes of DIB expired on March 31, 1995.
Wilson underwent three hernia repair surgeries in 1991,
1992, and 1994, respectively. Wilson claims that, as a result
of the surgeries, he suffers from “entrapment neuropathy,” a
condition involving a nerve fiber tied up in a scar that causes
intense pain whenever he changes positions. Wilson was
diagnosed with diabetes in the early 1990s.
Wilson applied for DIB on July 21, 1999, claiming
disability since December 31, 1993, due to leg and back pain.
The Regional Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration denied Wilson’s application initially and on
reconsideration, finding that Wilson had not become disabled
on or before March 31, 1995, when his insured status expired.
Wilson then filed a timely request for a hearing before an
ALJ. Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a decision
finding that Wilson had not become disabled on or before
March 31, 1995, because, taking into account his limitations,
there were a significant number of jobs in the national
economy that Wilson could perform.
In finding that Wilson had not become disabled while
insured, the ALJ performed the required five-step analysis.
See Heston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th
Cir. 2001). First, the ALJ found that Wilson has not engaged
in any substantial gainful activity since his disability onset
date. Second, the ALJ determined that Wilson suffered from
severe impairments on the last date he was
insured—specifically, insulin dependent diabetes mellitus
with neuropathy in the lower extremities, lumbar spondylosis
and facet arthritis, coronary artery disease, entrapment
neuropathy, and sympathetic mediated pain syndrome. Third,
the ALJ concluded that Wilson’s impairments did not meet or
medically equal any of the listed impairments. Fourth, the
ALJ found that, when his coverage expired, Wilson retained
the residual functional capacity to perform a significant range
of light work, but that Wilson could not perform any of his
4 Wilson v. Comm’r of Social Security No. 03-1588
past relevant work. Fifth, the ALJ determined that, given
Wilson’s residual functional capacity and vocational profile
at the time his coverage expired, there were a significant
number of jobs in the national economy that Wilson could
perform, including a range of semi-skilled clerical jobs.
Based on this last finding, the ALJ concluded that Wilson was
not “disabled” at any time through the date he was last
insured for benefits.
The Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration
denied Wilson’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision, at
which point the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of
the Commissioner of Social Security. Miles v. Chater, 84
F.3d 1397, 1399 (11th Cir. 1996). Wilson then commenced a
civil action in district court for judicial review of the
Commissioner’s final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). A magistrate judge issued a Report and
Recommendation recommending that the district court affirm
the ALJ’s decision. The district court adopted the Report and
Recommendation, and Wilson timely appealed.
Although substantial evidence otherwise supports the
decision of the Commissioner in this case, reversal is required
because the agency failed to follow its own procedural
regulation, and the regulation was intended to protect
applicants like Wilson. The regulation requires the agency to
“give good reasons” for not giving weight to a treating
physician in the context of a disability determination.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (2004). This requirement is part
of the “treating source” regulation adopted by the Social
Security Administration in 1991. See generally Schaal v.
Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 503 (2d Cir. 1998).
Pursuant to this regulation, an ALJ must give more weight
to opinions from treating sources since
these sources are likely to be the medical professionals
most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of
[the claimant’s] medical impairment(s) and may bring a

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No. 03-1588 Wilson v. Comm’r of Social Security 5
unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be
obtained from the objective medical findings alone or
from reports of individual examinations, such as
consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). An ALJ must give the opinion
of a treating source controlling weight if he finds the opinion
“well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques” and “not inconsistent with
the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” Id. If the
opinion of a treating source is not accorded controlling
weight, an ALJ must apply certain factors—namely, the
length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of
examination, the nature and extent of the treatment
relationship, supportability of the opinion, consistency of the
opinion with the record as a whole, and the specialization of
the treating source—in determining what weight to give the
opinion. Id.
Importantly for this case, the regulation also contains a
clear procedural requirement: “We will always give good
reasons in our notice of determination or decision for the
weight we give [the claimant’s] treating source’s opinion.”
Id. A Social Security Ruling explains that, pursuant to this
provision, a decision denying benefits “must contain specific
reasons for the weight given to the treating source’s medical
opinion, supported by the evidence in the case record, and
must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent
reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating
source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.”
Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5 (1996). “The
requirement of reason-giving exists, in part, to let claimants
understand the disposition of their cases,” particularly in
situations where a claimant knows that his physician has
deemed him disabled and therefore “might be especially
bewildered when told by an administrative bureaucracy that
she is not, unless some reason for the agency’s decision is
supplied.” Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 1999).
The requirement also ensures that the ALJ applies the treating
6 Wilson v. Comm’r of Social Security No. 03-1588
physician rule and permits meaningful review of the ALJ’s
application of the rule. See Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d
28, 32-33 (2d Cir. 2004).
It is an elemental principle of administrative law that
agencies are bound to follow their own regulations. As the
Ninth Circuit well summarized in applying this principle:
The Supreme Court has long recognized that a federal
agency is obliged to abide by the regulations it
promulgates. See Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 545
(1959); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 372 (1957);
Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 267 (1954). An
agency's failure to follow its own regulations “tends to
cause unjust discrimination and deny adequate notice”
and consequently may result in a violation of an
individual's constitutional right to due process. Where a
prescribed procedure is intended to protect the interests
of a party before the agency, “even though generous
beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that
procedure must be scrupulously observed.” Vitarelli, 359
U.S. at 547 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Note,
Violations by Agencies of Their Own Regulations, 87
Harv. L. Rev. 629, 630 (1974) (observing that agency
violations of regulations promulgated to provide parties
with procedural safeguards generally have been
invalidated by courts).
Sameena, Inc. v. United States Air Force, 147 F.3d 1148,
1153 (9th Cir. 1998) (parallel citations and circuit court
citations omitted). Consistent with this principle, courts have
remanded the Commissioner’s decisions when they have
failed to articulate “good reasons” for not crediting the
opinion of a treating source, as § 1527(d)(2) requires. See,
e.g., Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 456 (5th Cir. 2000);
Snell, 177 F.3d at 134; see also Halloran, 362 F.3d at 33
(“We do not hesitate to remand when the Commissioner has
not provided ‘good reasons’ for the weight given to a treating
physician’s opinion and we will continue remanding when we

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No. 03-1588 Wilson v. Comm’r of Social Security 7
encounter opinions from ALJ’s that do not comprehensively
set forth the reasons for the weight assigned to a treating
physician’s opinion.”).
In the instant case, the ALJ has violated § 1527(d)(2) by
failing to give good reasons for his rejection of Dr. DeWys’s
opinion. According to Wilson, DeWys treated him from
January of 1993 through at least May of 2000. Wilson
submitted DeWys’s opinion to the ALJ. The DeWys opinion
identified greater restrictions on Wilson’s ability to work than
those ultimately found by the ALJ, and stated that these
deficits had been in effect since December 31, 1993. The
opinion also contains what Wilson claims are notes made by
DeWys contemporaneous with his treatment of Wilson. The
ALJ stated in his ruling that he had “considered” DeWys’s
opinion, but concluded that while “this opinion may be an
accurate assessment of [Wilson’s] current limitations, the
undersigned must assess the claimant’s limitations on
March 31, 1995, the date he was last insured for benefits.”
The ALJ’s summary dismissal of DeWys’s opinion fails to
meet the requirement that the ALJ “give good reasons” for
not giving weight to a treating physician. It is uncontested
that Dr. DeWys was Wilson’s treating physician, and the
record appears to make clear that Dr. DeWys treated Wilson
during the period that he alleged he was disabled. See e.g.,
J.A. at 176, 329. To state that Dr. DeWys’s opinion “may be
an accurate assessment,” followed by a bald statement of the
issue that the ALJ must ultimately resolve, can hardly amount
to “giving good reasons” for rejecting Dr. DeWys’s opinion.
The sentence in the ALJ’s ruling might mean that, on the
ALJ’s reading, DeWys’s opinion offered only a current
assessment of Wilson’s condition. If so, the ALJ’s
determination in this regard is not supported by substantial
evidence, given the presence in the administrative record of
treatment notes by DeWys for the earlier, relevant period. On
the other hand, the sentence in the ALJ’s ruling might mean
that the ALJ understood DeWys’s opinion and simply
8 Wilson v. Comm’r of Social Security No. 03-1588
rejected his assertion that Wilson suffered from the identified
limitations while insured. If, in fact, the latter is the case, the
ALJ did not give good reasons for this conclusion. In
particular, the ALJ failed to clarify whether DeWys’s opinion
was not “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques” or was “inconsistent with
the other substantial evidence in [the] case record,” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(d)(2), did not identify the evidence supporting
such a finding, and did not explain its application of the
factors listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) to determine the
weight given to DeWys’s opinion. Reversal is therefore
required.
The ALJ’s failure to give “good reasons” for not crediting
DeWys does not constitute harmless error, notwithstanding
the district court’s reasoning and the Commissioner’s
argument on appeal. The district court stated that it “appears”
that “the ALJ may have incorrectly interpreted Dr. DeWys’s
opinion as articulating only those limitations from which
[Wilson] was then suffering, rather than recognizing that Dr.
DeWys had determined that such limitations originated on
December 31, 1993.” However, the court found that
DeWys’s opinion was not supported by the record, and thus
concluded that “there exists substantial evidence supporting
the ALJ’s determination, intentional or otherwise, to give
little weight to Dr. DeWys’s opinion.” Echoing the district
court, the Commissioner contends that, assuming for
argument’s sake that the ALJ misread DeWys’s opinion, this
mistake qualifies as harmless error. The Commissioner
asserts that the ALJ’s rejection of DeWys’s opinion is
supported by substantial evidence, as the ALJ “could” have
relied on evidence in the record—namely, Wilson’s testimony
and the opinions of two consulting physicians, which,
according to the Commissioner, contradict DeWys’s
opinion—to reject the opinion.
The argument is not persuasive in the context of this case.
A court cannot excuse the denial of a mandatory procedural
protection simply because, as the Commissioner urges, there

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No. 03-1588 Wilson v. Comm’r of Social Security 9
is sufficient evidence in the record for the ALJ to discount the
treating source’s opinion and, thus, a different outcome on
remand is unlikely. “[A] procedural error is not made
harmless simply because [the aggrieved party] appears to
have had little chance of success on the merits anyway.”
Mazaleski v. Treusdell, 562 F.2d 701, 719 n.41; see also
Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp.
Programs, 102 F.3d 1385, 1390 (5th Cir. 1996). To hold
otherwise, and to recognize substantial evidence as a defense
to non-compliance with § 1527(d)(2), would afford the
Commissioner the ability the violate the regulation with
impunity and render the protections promised therein illusory.
The general administrative law rule, after all, is for a
reviewing court, in addition to whatever substantive factual or
legal review is appropriate, to “set aside agency action . . .
found to be . . . without observance of procedure required by
law.” Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D)
(2001).
Our conclusion is consistent with the statement in Connor
v. United States Civil Service Commission, 721 F.2d 1054,
1056 (6th Cir. 1983), that “an agency’s violation of its
procedural rules will not result in reversible error absent a
showing that the claimant has been prejudiced on the merits
or deprived of substantial rights because of the agency’s
procedural lapses” (emphasis added). A procedural right
must generally be understood as “substantial” in the context
of this statement when the regulation is intended to confer a
procedural protection on the party invoking it. The Supreme
Court has recognized the distinction between regulations
“intended primarily to confer important procedural benefits
upon individuals” and regulations “adopted for the orderly
transaction of business before [the agency].” Am. Farm Lines
v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1970)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In the former case, the
regulation bestows a “substantial right” on parties before the
agency, and “it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their
own procedures . . . even where the internal procedures are
possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required.”
10 Wilson v. Comm’r of Social Security No. 03-1588
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974); see also Vitarelli
v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 540 (1959); United States ex rel.
Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 267 (1954). In
contrast, in the case of procedural rules “adopted for the
orderly transaction of business,” an agency has the discretion
“to relax or modify its procedural rules” and such action “is
not reviewable except upon a showing of substantial prejudice
to the complaining party.” Am. Farm Lines, 397 U.S. at 539
(quotation omitted). Section 1527(d)(2) falls in the former
category, creating an important procedural safeguard for
claimants for disability benefits. Snell, 177 F.3d at 134.
That is not to say that a violation of the procedural
requirement of § 1527(d)(2) could never constitute harmless
error. We do not decide the question of whether a de minimis
violation may qualify as harmless error. For instance, if a
treating source’s opinion is so patently deficient that the
Commissioner could not possibly credit it, a failure to observe
§ 1527(d)(2) may not warrant reversal. Cf. NLRB v. Wyman-
Gordon, 394 U.S. 759, 766 n.6 (1969) (plurality opinion)
(where “remand would be an idle and useless formality,”
courts are not required to “convert judicial review of agency
action into a ping-pong game”). There is also the possibility
that if the Commissioner adopts the opinion of the treating
source or makes findings consistent with the opinion, it may
be irrelevant that the ALJ did not give weight to the treating
physician’s opinion, and the failure to give reasons for not
giving such weight is correspondingly irrelevant. Or perhaps
a situation could arise where the Commissioner has met the
goal of § 1527(d)(2)—the provision of the procedural
safeguard of reasons—even though she has not complied with
the terms of the regulation. However, none of these
possibilities is present in the instant case, and the ALJ
committed reversible error by depriving Wilson of the
procedural right given to him by the agency’s regulation.
Our decision in Heston v. Commissioner of Social Security,
245 F.3d 528 (6th Cir. 2001), cited by the Commissioner,
does not compel a contrary result. In that case, the court held

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No. 03-1588 Wilson v. Comm’r of Social Security 11
that the ALJ’s failure to discuss the report of the claimant’s
treating physician constituted harmless error, without
discussing § 1527(d)(2). Despite his failure to address the
treating physician’s opinion, the ALJ in Heston had
considered the limitations described by that physician in
determining whether the claimant could find other work at the
relevant step of the sequential analysis. Id. at 536. There was
no reason to remand the case because, wittingly or not, the
ALJ attributed to the claimant limitations consistent with
those identified by the treating physician. Id. In contrast,
Wilson has invoked § 1527(d)(2), and the ALJ explicitly
rejected DeWys’s opinion and found that Wilson had
limitations less severe than those described by DeWys.
Because the basis for the ALJ’s dismissal of DeWys’s
opinion is unclear, and because DeWys’s opinion is not
inadequate as a matter of law, we cannot deem the ALJ’s
failure to “give good reasons” for its rejection of DeWys’s
opinion harmless error. Brueggemann v. Barnhart, 348 F.3d
689, 695-96 (8th Cir. 2003).
While the foregoing analysis requires reversal, Wilson’s
alternative argument does not. The ALJ did not err when, in
the course of finding that Wilson could perform other work,
the ALJ did not identify the transferable skills that Wilson
had acquired during his work as a deputy sheriff.
In making a determination as to disability, an ALJ
undertakes a five-step sequential evaluation process mandated
by regulation. Heston, 245 F.3d at 534. First, the claimant
must demonstrate that he has not engaged in substantial
gainful activity during the period of disability. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i). Second, the claimant must show that he
suffers from a severe medically determinable physical or
mental impairment. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Third, if the
claimant shows that his impairment meets or medically equals
one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P,
App. 1, he is deemed disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii).
Fourth, the ALJ determines whether, based on the claimant’s
residual functional capacity, the claimant can perform his past
12 Wilson v. Comm’r of Social Security No. 03-1588
relevant work, in which case the claimant is not disabled. Id.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). Fifth, the ALJ determines whether,
based on the claimant’s residual functional capacity, as well
as his age, education, and work experience, the claimant can
make an adjustment to other work, in which case the claimant
is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).
The claimant bears the burden of proof during the first four
steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five.
Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir.
1997). At step five, the Commissioner must identify a
significant number of jobs in the economy that accommodate
the claimant’s residual functional capacity and vocational
profile. Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 474
(6th Cir. 2003). In many cases, the Commissioner may carry
this burden by applying the medical-vocational grid at 20
C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, which directs a conclusion
of “disabled” or “not disabled” based on the claimant’s age
and education and on whether the claimant has transferable
work skills. Wright v. Massanari, 321 F.3d 611, 615 (6th Cir.
2003); Burton v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 893 F.2d
821, 822 (6th Cir. 1990). However, if a claimant suffers from
a limitation not accounted for by the grid, the Commissioner
may use the grid as a framework for her decision, but must
rely on other evidence to carry her burden. Id. In such a case,
the Commissioner may rely on the testimony of a vocational
expert to find that the claimant possesses the capacity to
perform other substantial gainful activity that exists in the
national economy. Heston, 245 F.3d at 537-38; Cline v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 96 F.3d 146, 150 (6th Cir. 1996).
The ALJ found that Wilson suffered from limitations
beyond those accounted for by the grid, and therefore used the
grid merely as a “framework” in determining whether Wilson
could perform other work. The ALJ relied on the testimony
of Paul W. Delmar, a vocational expert, in determining that,
as of March 31, 1995, there were a significant number of jobs
in the national economy that Wilson could perform. Delmar
testified that an individual with Wilson’s profile could

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No. 03-1588 Wilson v. Comm’r of Social Security 13
perform work existing in the regional economy (the State of
Michigan) as of March 31, 1995, in any of 50,000 semi-
skilled clerical jobs, such as order clerk, information clerk,
account information clerk, stock and inventory clerk, and
shipping and receiving clerk. Delmar testified that Wilson
had acquired transferable skills while working as a deputy
sheriff, but did not identify these skills. Likewise, the ALJ
found that Wilson had transferable skills, but did not identify
these skills in his opinion.
Wilson contends that the ALJ’s failure to identify Wilson’s
transferable skills constitutes reversible error. He argues that
the absence of such a finding makes it impossible for a court
to review an ALJ’s conclusion that a claimant could perform
other work. He further contends that 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568
and SSR 82-41, a ruling promulgated by the Social Security
Administration, require such a finding.
Wilson’s arguments are unpersuasive. This court has held
repeatedly that the testimony of a vocational expert
identifying specific jobs available in the regional economy
that an individual with the claimant’s limitation could
perform can constitute substantial evidence supporting an
ALJ’s finding at step 5 that the claimant can perform other
work. See, e.g., Wright, 321 F.3d at 616; Cline, 96 F.3d at
150; Sias v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 861 F.2d 475,
481 (6th Cir. 1988). With respect to transferable skills, 20
C.F.R. § 404.1568 defines transferable skills, states how the
agency determines that skills are transferable to other jobs,
and describes a range of degrees of transferability of skills.
The regulation does not explicitly mandate the enumeration
of transferable skills at step 5. Wilson’s conclusory argument
does not supply a basis for reading such a requirement into
the regulation.
Finally, contrary to Wilson’s argument, SSR 82-41 does
not require the identification of transferable skills in the
instant case. We need not decide whether Social Security
Rulings are binding on the Commissioner in the same way as
14 Wilson v. Comm’r of Social Security No. 03-1588
1According to a regulation, Social Security Rulings “represent
precedent final opinions and o rders and statements of policy and
interpretations” adopted by the Social Security Administration and “are
bind ing on all components of the Social Security Administration.” 20
C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1) (20 04); see also Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 271
(3d Cir. 2000).
Social Security Regulations.1 Even assuming that they are,
an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is entitled to
substantial deference and will be upheld unless plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); United States v.
Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d 569, 578 (6th Cir. 2003). In
relevant part, SSR 82-41 reads, “When the issue of skills and
their transferability must be decided, the adjudicator or ALJ
is required to make certain findings of fact and include them
in the written decision,” and “When a finding is made that a
claimant has transferable skills, the acquired work skills must
be identified.” Soc. Sec. Rul. 82-14, 1982 WL 31389, at *7
(1982). The Commissioner insists that these passages apply
only when an ALJ relies solely on the grid, in which cases the
ALJ must ascertain whether the claimant has transferable
skills in order to apply the grid. Wilson offers only a muddy
and conclusory response to this argument, and, from our
review of the relevant materials, the Commissioner’s
interpretation of SSR 82-41 appears reasonable. We therefore
defer to the Commissioner’s view.
For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the judgment of
the district court with instructions to REMAND to the
Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

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