United States of America v. Anthony Jacob (03-3348); Ramon Gallardo (03-3351)

*The Honorable Milton Shadur, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0240P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 04a0240p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY JACOB (03-3348);
RAMON GALLARDO
(03-3351),
Defendants-Appellants.
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Nos. 03-3348/3351
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.
No. 02-00408—David D. Dowd, Jr., District Judge.
Argued: June 18, 2004
Decided and Filed: July 26, 2004
Before: KENNEDY and GILMAN, Circuit Judges;
SHADUR, District Judge.*
2 United States v. Jacob, et al. Nos. 03-3348/3351
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: John B. Gibbons, Cleveland, Ohio, Amy B.
Cleary, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE,
Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellants. Ronald B. Bakeman,
ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Cleveland,
Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: John B. Gibbons,
Cleveland, Ohio, Michael G. Dane, FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER’S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellants.
Kenneth S. McHargh, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
KENNEDY, Circuit Judge. Defendants Anthony Jacob and
Ramon Gallardo were indicted for 1) conspiracy to distribute
more than five kilograms of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 846 and 2) possession with intent to distribute more than
five kilograms of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. After both of their
motions to suppress were denied, Jacob conditionally pled
guilty, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion
to suppress. Following a jury trial, Gallardo was convicted on
both counts.
The defendants Anthony Jacob and Ramon Gallardo appeal
the district court’s denial of their respective motions to
suppress on the ground that the evidence was obtained in
violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. Jacob contends
that investigators lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the
vehicle he was driving. Gallardo, on the other hand, does not
challenge the finding that reasonable suspicion existed to stop
the vehicle in which he was a passenger. He does argue,
however, that his subsequent detention constituted an arrest

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Nos. 03-3348/3351 United States v. Jacob, et al. 3
1It was later learned that Gallardo had been acquitted of the charges
associated with that arrest.
without probable cause. Gallardo further appeals the district
court’s decision to permit the government to introduce an
audio recording containing statements made by Jacob in a
conversation between them on the ground that the statements
were inadmissible hearsay. Finally, Gallardo argues that the
district court abused its discretion when it permitted the jury
to use a transcript of the audio recording as an aid while
listening to the recording. For the following reasons, we
AFFIRM.
BACKGROUND
On September 15th, 2002, members of a drug interdiction
task force received information from a confidential informant
that Ramon Gallardo had checked into the Ramada Inn, room
#217, in Beachwood, Ohio. The task force further learned
from the informant that Gallardo was uncertain as to how
long he would stay at the hotel, that he had paid in cash, and
that he had provided a State of Arizona identification. After
receiving this information, Agent Kahler, a member of the
task force, ran a criminal history check on Gallardo, which
revealed that he had previously been arrested in California for
transporting narcotics in 2001.1
That afternoon, members of the task force began
surveillance of Ramada Inn room #217 and of a green 1999
Toyota Camry. The investigators believed that the Camry
was associated with Gallardo because it had State of
California license plates and because it was parked in the
parking lot near room #217. Due to their suspicion that the
vehicle was associated with Gallardo, the investigators
requested Ohio Highway Patrol Trooper Terry Helton to bring
Alex, a K-9 drug detection dog, to the Ramada Inn to check
the Camry. Before asking Alex to check the Camry, Trooper
Helton walked Alex around Agent Kahler’s vehicle, as he
4 United States v. Jacob, et al. Nos. 03-3348/3351
knew it did not have any drugs in it, to test the dog; Alex did
not alert. When Alex sniffed the Camry he gave a positive
indication to the trunk area of the vehicle and showed interest
in the right wheel tire area. Trooper Helton believed, based
on the manner in which Alex alerted, that the Camry possibly
had a hidden compartment.
The next morning, on September 16th, Gallardo left his
room and entered the Camry that investigators had suspected
was associated with him. From his hotel, he drove a short
distance to a Residence Inn and parked at a side door
entrance. Gallardo waited in the parking lot for
approximately 15 to 20 minutes before Jacob let him into the
hotel through a side door. While he was waiting in the
parking lot, Agent Kahler testified that Gallardo constantly
scanned the driveway, street and parking lot, which he
interpreted as conducting counter surveillance.
Later that morning, the defendants traveled a short distance
to a gas station where they were not seen to have purchased
anything. Within minutes, they returned to the Residence
Inn; upon entering the driveway entrance, the Camry stopped
abruptly and paused approximately 15 to 20 seconds. Based
on this behavior, the members of the task force believed the
defendants were conducting further counter surveillance.
Around noon, the defendants and a female left the
Residence Inn with two luggage carts containing various
bags, including a green duffel bag later found to contain
cocaine. Gallardo and the female loaded the luggage into the
trunk. Once the vehicle had been loaded, Gallardo handed the
keys to Jacob, who took over the driving of the vehicle.
Investigators, in three or four vehicles, followed the Camry.
Trooper Helton, with Alex, the K-9 drug detection dog, was
a member of the caravan following the Camry. Agent Riolo,
a member of the task force, testified that the investigators
planned to continue to surveil the Camry to see if the
occupants were going to meet anybody. However, after

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Nos. 03-3348/3351 United States v. Jacob, et al. 5
following the Camry on the interstate for a short while,
investigators believed that their surveillance had been
compromised based on the erratic manner in which Jacob was
driving. For instance, at the intersection of Interstate 480 and
271, investigators testified that the Camry appeared to be
heading toward 480, but rather abruptly changed lanes to
remain on 271. It then took the first exit off the interstate.
Once the Camry exited the interstate, it drove below the speed
limit in an attempt, the investigators believed, to get cars
behind it to pass to determine if it was being followed.
Consequently, investigators decided to stop the Camry.
Immediately before they attempted to do so, the Camry turned
into a karaoke club parking lot. It began to drive behind the
karaoke club when an officer engaged his lights and sirens on
his vehicle in an attempt to stop it. At that point, Agent
Khaler testified, the Camry appeared to speed up and then
stop. When other members of the surveillance pulled in front
of the Camry to block it in, the Camry was observed to lunge
forward. Other officers then assisted in stopping the Camry
by drawing their weapons and ordering the occupants from
the vehicle.
After exiting the vehicle, the defendants were placed on the
ground and patted down. While the officers were patting
down Jacob, a small amount of marijuana and $1,000 was
found on his person. The defendants were handcuffed and
placed in the backseat of a patrol vehicle. (The patrol vehicle
contained written notice that an active recording device was
inside). While the defendants were detained in the vehicle,
Trooper Helton had drug detection dog Alex sniff the Camry;
Alex gave a positive indication to the presence of narcotics.
Agent Kahler testified that approximately 10-15 minutes
elapsed between the time of the stop and the time Alex sniffed
the Camry. Following Alex’s positive indication,
investigators searched the Camry and discovered in the trunk
a green duffel bag that contained four large bricks and eight
smaller bricks of cocaine.
6 United States v. Jacob, et al. Nos. 03-3348/3351
Subsequently, Agent Riolo prepared a transcript of the tape
recorded conversation between Gallardo and Jacob that
occurred while they were detained in the patrol vehicle. Over
defense objection, the district court permitted the jury to use
the prepared transcript, which was not admitted as evidence,
as an aid during trial. The district court also permitted the
jury to use the transcript when the jury requested to hear a
portion of the tape again during deliberations. The jury,
however, was not given the transcript to take back into the
jury room. Rather, after the request, the jurors were brought
into the court room where they again received the transcript
as an aid while the tape was played.
ANALYSIS
A. We first consider whether the district court erred in
denying Jacob’s motion to suppress on the ground that
specific and articulable facts existed which gave rise to
reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop of the
Camry.
A district court’s factual findings concerning a motion to
suppress are upheld unless clearly erroneous. United States
v. Williams, 962 F.2d 1218, 1221 (6th Cir. 1992). The district
court’s conclusions of law, such as a reasonable suspicion
determination, are reviewed de novo. Id.
An investigatory stop of a vehicle is permissible under the
Fourth Amendment if supported by reasonable suspicion.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). Since an investigatory
stop is less intrusive to one’s personal security than an arrest,
the level of suspicion necessary for such a stop is thus
“considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a
preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). For purposes of determining whether
reasonable suspicion exists, the Supreme Court has instructed
that a reviewing court must consider the “totality of
circumstances ... to see whether the detaining officer has a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal

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Nos. 03-3348/3351 United States v. Jacob, et al. 7
wrongdoing.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273
(2002) (quotation marks omitted). The Court further
instructed that in considering all the circumstances, the
question is not whether there is a possible innocent
explanation for each of the factors, but whether all of them
taken together give rise to reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity may be afoot. Id. at 274-75, 277 (holding that a court
may not discount each factor that is readily susceptible to
innocent explanation and confirming that a series of
seemingly innocent acts can, taken together, give rise to
reasonable suspicion).
In arguing that reasonable suspicion did not exist to justify
the stop, Jacob contends that the stop of the Camry was not
“supported by an objective manifestation that criminal
activity was afoot” since the “totality of circumstances relied
upon by the District Court Judge were subjective conclusions
arrived at by the observation of otherwise innocuous activity.”
The district court took into consideration a number of
factors that, in their entirety, give rise to reasonable suspicion.
Investigators learned from an informant that Gallardo had
checked into a hotel, paid cash, and displayed Arizona
identification. The district court noted that Arizona is a
source state of narcotics that enter the Cleveland area.
Investigators further learned that Gallardo had been
previously arrested for transportation of narcotics. In
addition, a drug detection dog gave a positive indication to
the Camry and showed interest in the right wheel tire area, an
indication of the possible existence of a hidden compartment.
Moreover, the district court found that it was reasonable for
an investigator to conclude that the defendants engaged in
counter surveillance. Investigators observed Gallardo
constantly scan the street, driveway, and parking lot as he
waited at Jacob’s hotel. They further observed the defendants
engage in counter surveillance after they drove to a gas
station for no apparent reason. Finally, the defendants
appeared to engage in counter surveillance as they drove
erratically on the freeway.
8 United States v. Jacob, et al. Nos. 03-3348/3351
2To the extent that Jacob seeks to join this argument, he may not, as
the officers had probable cause to arrest him when an officer discovered
marijuana on his person shortly after he was ordered out of the vehicle.
In his brief, Jacob argues that his “extend ed detention” was an unlawful
seizure. This argument is without merit as his detention in the po lice
vehicle was justified by probable cause. The marijuana was discovered on
him within minutes after he was ordered out of the car and before he was
placed in the police car.
We agree with the district court that these facts provided a
sufficient basis upon which the investigators conducted a
Terry stop. Based upon these facts, a well trained officer
could reasonably conclude that criminal activity was possibly
afoot. Therefore, the investigators were permitted to conduct
a stop to investigate their suspicion.
B. We next consider whether the investigatory stop ripened
into an unlawful arrest based upon the manner in which the
officers effectuated the stop and detained the suspects.
“When establishing that a detention, which was not
supported by probable cause, was reasonable, the government
must demonstrate that ... ‘the detention and investigative
methods used were reasonable under the circumstances.’”
United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522, 529 (6th Cir. 2001)
(quoting United States v. Winfrey, 915 F.2d 212, 216 (6th Cir.
1990)). “Moreover, the degree of force utilized by officers
during a detention must be ‘reasonably related in scope to the
situation at hand.’” Heath, 259 F.3d at 530 (quoting United
States v. Hardnett, 804 F.2d 353, 356-57 (6th Cir. 1986)).
Gallardo argues that he was placed under arrest without
probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment after he
was ordered out of the Camry at gunpoint, handcuffed, and
placed in a patrol car.2 He cites our opinion in United States
v. Richardson, 949 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1991), in support of this
argument. In Richardson, four officers approached the
defendant and an individual, Harris, who was with the
defendant, and informed them that they were the subject of a

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Nos. 03-3348/3351 United States v. Jacob, et al. 9
drug investigation. The officers then asked the defendant for
consent to search his vehicle and his nearby storage locker.
Id. at 854. When he refused to consent, the police removed
him from his vehicle and detained him in the back seat of a
police car. Id. The officers then proceeded to question Harris
out of the defendant’s earshot. Id. After obtaining a
confession from Harris, the officers then proceeded to
question Richardson and again requested that he consent to a
search. Id. at 854. This Court, as Gallardo points out,
concluded that the agents exceeded the bounds of Terry when
they placed him in the patrol car because, at that point, the
seizure “crossed the line into an arrest,” which was
unsupported by probable cause. Id. at 857. Similarly,
Gallardo argues, a court must find that he was placed under
arrest without probable cause when the officers placed him in
the back seat of a locked police car.
Gallardo also relies upon Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491
(1983), in arguing that his detention ripened into an arrest. In
Royer, Gallardo notes, the Supreme Court held that the limits
of a Terry stop had been exceeded when the detectives asked
the defendant to accompany them to a small room at an
airport, gave him no indication that he was free to leave, and
retained his flight ticket and driver’s license. Since the limits
of a Terry stop were exceeded in Royer, a court must find,
Gallardo concludes, that the limits of a Terry stop were
exceeded in the instant case where he was not only secured in
the backseat of a patrol car, but had also been ordered out of
the Camry at gunpoint and handcuffed.
Although the plurality in Royer did hold that the police
conduct in that case had exceeded the limits of a Terry stop,
460 U.S. at 507, the plurality also noted that the “scope of the
intrusion permitted” in a Terry stop “will vary ... with the
particular facts and circumstances of each case.” 460 U.S. at
500. Ultimately, the Court has instructed that for a temporary
detention on less than probable cause to be legitimate, it must
satisfy the test of reasonableness. Royer, 460 U.S. at 499; See
also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 699 (1981); United
10 United States v. Jacob, et al. Nos. 03-3348/3351
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 683 (1985). The issue is,
therefore, whether the investigators’ conduct in detaining the
defendants and in pursuing a means of investigation that was
likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly was
reasonable under the circumstances. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 683,
686. We believe that it was.
When the investigators attempted to stop the defendants
who were suspected of drug trafficking, the defendants’
vehicle lunged forward as if they were attempting to escape.
Under these circumstances, the investigators’ decision to
draw their weapons to prevent an escape was reasonable. See
United States v. Dotson, 49 F.3d 227, 230-31 (6th Cir. 1995)
(finding that officer’s use of physical force to restrain
defendant who attempted to flee from traffic stop was
reasonable); See also United States v. Haye, 825 F.2d 32, 35
(4th Cir. 1987) (finding that, as a Terry stop is involuntary,
use of force to stop a suspect from fleeing is reasonable).
The investigators’ decision to order the defendants out of
the vehicle as they approached the car and to handcuff them
was also reasonable, as concern for the investigators’ safety
was at its height under those circumstances. This Court has
concluded that officers who stop a person who is “reasonably
suspected of carrying drugs” are “entitled to rely on their
experience and training in concluding that weapons are
frequently used in drug transactions,” and to take reasonable
measures to protect themselves. Heath, 259 F.3d at 530
(finding it reasonable for agents, after stopping a person
suspected of drug trafficking, to draw their weapons to order
a suspect out of his car and to frisk and handcuff the suspect);
Houston v. Clark County Sheriff Deputy John Does 1-5, 174
F.3d 809, 815 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that the use of
handcuffs does not exceed the bounds of a Terry stop).
We further find that it was reasonable under the
circumstances for the investigators to place Gallardo in a
police car while the officers pursued their investigation in an
attempt to confirm or dispel their suspicions. Gallardo’s

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Nos. 03-3348/3351 United States v. Jacob, et al. 11
3Gallardo argues that the investigators cannot use the fact that the car
lunged forward in justifying his detention since he was not driving the
Cam ry. The Suprem e Court, however, has noted that “a car p assenger ...
will often be engag ed in a common enterp rise with the driver,” and that
it is reasonable for an officer to infer such a common enterprise.
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 , 304 -5 (19 99); Ma rylan d v. Pringle,
124 S.Ct. 795, 80 1 (2003 )
4Agent Kahler testified that sometime after the investigators stopped
the Camry, news media began gathering at the scene.
reliance upon Richardson in arguing that the temporary
detention ripened into an unlawful arrest when he was placed
in the back of a patrol car is unavailing. The investigatory
detention ripened into an arrest in Richardson, not merely
because the defendant was placed in a police car, but rather
because placing him in the police car was unreasonable under
the circumstances. Richardson, 949 F.2d at 857; See also,
United States v. Hood, Nos. 92-5112, 92-5113, 1992 WL
322373 at *4 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 1992) (unpublished opinion)
(finding that placing defendants in the back of a locked patrol
car does not, per se, require probable cause). After
Richardson refused to consent to a search of his storage
locker and vehicle, the agents placed him in the back of a
police car and thereafter continued to question him. Id. As
in Royer, what had begun as an inquiry in a public place had
escalated into a custodial interrogation in what was in essence
a police interrogation room. Royer, 460 U.S. at 503. Unlike
Richardson, the investigators’ conduct here was not
unreasonable where 1) the defendants had attempted to flee as
investigators initiated the stop;3 2) the investigators needed to
control the stop environment;4 3) the police did not question
the defendants; and 4) the defendants were placed in a patrol
car merely to secure the scene as Trooper Helton, who had
been following the Camry, began using the drug detection
dog to investigate the investigators’ suspicions.
Since the investigators’ conduct in effectuating the stop and
in detaining the suspects while they diligently pursued a
12 United States v. Jacob, et al. Nos. 03-3348/3351
5Once the drug detection d og alerted to the presence of drugs shortly
after the stop, the investigators had probab le cause to search the vehicle.
Upon searching the vehicle, the investigators discovered cocaine. At this
point, there was probab le cause to place the defendants under arrest.
means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel
their suspicions was reasonable under the circumstances, we
conclude that the detention did not ripen into an unlawful
arrest.5
C. We next consider whether the district court erred in
permitting the government to admit an audio recording that
contained a conversation between Jacob and Gallardo over
Gallardo’s objection that Jacob’s statements were
inadmissible hearsay. We review evidentiary decisions such
as exclusion of hearsay for abuse of discretion. United States
v. Wright, 343 F3d 849, 865 (6th Cir. 2003). However, the
court’s legal conclusion concerning whether the statement is
hearsay is reviewed de novo. Maliszewski v. United States,
161 F.3d 992, 1007 (6th Cir. 1998).
On the apparent assumption that Jacob’s statements would
be admissible only through the “co-conspirator statement”
exception to the hearsay rule, Gallardo addresses only this
exception. Gallardo argues that the exception does not apply
because Jacob’s statements did not further the ends of the
conspiracy since no overt acts of concealment followed
Jacob’s statements designed to conceal the conspiracy.
Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216-17 (1946).
Additionally, the exception does not apply, he argues, because
the statements were not made during the conspiracy since the
defendants were apprehended when the statements were
made.
The defendant does not address, however, whether the
statements would be admissible on the ground that they are
not being offered for their truth, but are rather being offered
to provide context to Gallardo’s party admissions. See United
States v. Zizzo, 120 F.3d 1338, 1338 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding

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Nos. 03-3348/3351 United States v. Jacob, et al. 13
that statements were not admitted for their truth but rather to
give context to the conspirators’ ends of the conversations).
Since we conclude that most of Jacob’s statements would be
admissible on this ground, we need not address whether they
would have alternatively been admissible under the “co-
conspirator statement” exception. Any statements that may
have been admitted that did not provide context to Gallardo’s
side of the conversation would still not warrant reversal, as
Gallardo has failed to point to any prejudice resulting from
the admission of those statements. United States v.
Breitkreutz, 977 F.2d 214, 221 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding that
the defendant failed to establish any prejudice affecting his
substantial rights, and therefore declining to reverse the
judgment or order a new trial).
D. Finally, we consider whether the district court abused its
discretion when it permitted the jurors to use a transcript as an
aid when listening to the tape recorded conversation between
Jacob and Gallardo during the trial and, after they had
requested to hear a portion of it again, during deliberations.
We review a district court’s rulings as to a jury’s use of
transcripts under an abuse of discretion standard. United
States v. Robinson, 707 F.2d 872, 876 (6th Cir. 1983). A
defendant challenging the use of a transcript at trial must
show prejudice. United States v. King, 272 F.3d 366 (6th Cir.
2002).
Gallardo appears to argue that it was prejudicial per se for
the district court to permit the jury to use the transcript of the
audio conversation during the trial and deliberations without
precisely following the procedures set forth in Robinson. In
Robinson, we noted that the ideal procedure for assuring the
transcript’s accuracy is to have both sides stipulate to a
transcript’s accuracy. 707 F.2d at 878. In the absence of a
stipulation, we advised, “the transcriber should verify that he
or she has listened to the tape and accurately transcribed its
content. The [district] court should also make an independent
14 United States v. Jacob, et al. Nos. 03-3348/3351
determination of accuracy by reading the transcript against
the tape.” Id. at 879.
This Court has noted that the goal of a procedure as in
Robinson, “is to provide the jury with transcripts which bear
a ‘semblance of reliability.’” United States v. Burke, No. 97-
5889, 1999 WL 617972 at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 12, 1999)
(unpublished opinion) (quoting Robinson, 707 F.2d at 879).
In Burke, the district court judge did not make an independent
determination of the transcript’s accuracy by reading it while
listening to the tape. Id. Nonetheless, this Court held that the
transcripts contained a ‘semblance of reliability’ because the
transcriber was familiar with the materials he transcribed
since he had listened to the conversation between the
conspirators while it was initially being recorded. Id. at 4.
Moreover, the Burke court concluded that any error by the
district judge was harmless as the defendant was unable to
point to even one error in the transcript. Id.
In this case, the district court judge did listen to the tape
while reading the transcript, but did not make any explicit
findings as to the transcript’s accuracy. Nonetheless, the
transcriber, Agent Riolo, testified concerning how he listened
to the tape and prepared the transcript. In particular, he
testified that he had spoken with both of the defendants and
was thus able to determine who each speaker was on the tape.
He also explained that he listened to the tape repeatedly, each
time adding to the content of the transcript. This record
provides a sufficient basis for a court to conclude that the
transcripts bore a semblance of reliability.
Even if the judge erred in failing to make explicit findings
concerning the accuracy of the transcript, any error was
harmless. Not only did the district court repeatedly instruct
the jurors that the transcript was not evidence, but it also
emphasized to the jurors that if they did not hear what Agent
Riolo said he heard, then they should disregard what he
wrote. In addition, this case is unlike Robinson where a
substantial portion of the tape was inaudible so that the

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Nos. 03-3348/3351 United States v. Jacob, et al. 15
transcripts, regardless of the judge’s instructions to the
contrary, became, in essence, the evidence. Here, in contrast,
Gallardo did not allege that the tape was substantially
inaudible. Id. at 878. Rather, Gallardo only points to one
alleged discrepancy in the transcript: he argued that the tape
reveals Gallardo saying, “ah oh, they found a bag,” not, as the
government contends, “oh, oh, they found it man.” Not only
did Gallardo point to only one alleged discrepancy, but he
also raised his alternative interpretation both during his cross-
examination of Agent Riolo and during his closing argument.
We find, therefore, that Gallardo has not demonstrated
prejudice and that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in permitting the jury to use a transcript as an aid during the
trial and deliberations.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.

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