MICHAEL BREGANT and LORENA WILKINS v. Victor Vigluicci

*The Hon. Jerome Farris, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 04a0161n.06
Filed: December 16, 2004
No. 03-4380
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL BREGANT and LORENA
WILKINS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
VICTOR VIGLUICCI, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
Before: DAUGHTREY, COOK, and FARRIS,* Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. The plaintiffs, Michael Bregant and Lorena Wilkins, appeal the
district court’s order granting summary judgment to the defendants, who are officers in the
Ravenna (Ohio) Police Department, the City of Ravenna, and the county prosecutor. The
complaint filed by the plaintiffs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, charged that on September
10, 2000, Ravenna police officers had used excessive force in arresting Bregant and had
seized property belonging to Wilkins without probable cause; that the county prosecutor
had advised the officers not to return Wilkins’s property on an unspecified date; and that
the City of Ravenna had “failed to institute and/or implement any type of overview for the
misconduct of its officers involving acts of brutality or excessive force,” all in violation of the
plaintiffs’ civil rights.

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No. 03-4380
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The complaint was filed on September 13, 2002, and resulted in motions to dismiss
by the defendants, alleging that the it was not timely filed under Ohio’s two-year statute of
limitations, Ohio Revised Code § 2305.10. Plaintiff Bregant responded by claiming that the
statute was tolled from September 10, 2000, at least through September 13, 2000, during
which period he was hospitalized for viral encephalitis and meningitis, conditions that
rendered him “of unsound mind.” Wilkins claimed that she did not know that her property
had been seized until Bregant was discharged from the hospital on September 14, 2000,
and that she had demanded and was refused the return of her property on September 19,
2000, thus tolling the statute during that additional period of time. The district court found
that the explanations given by both plaintiffs were legally inadequate to support application
of tolling and dismissed the complaint.
Having studied the record on appeal and the briefs of the parties, we are not
persuaded that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint. Because the reasons
why judgment should be entered for the defendants have been fully articulated by the
district court, the issuance of a detailed opinion by this court would be duplicative and
would serve no useful purpose. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court
upon the reasoning set out by that court in its order dated September 26, 2003.

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