Jimmie Lee Riley v. David T. Kurtz

* The Honorable Leon Jordan, Senior United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of Tennessee, sitting by designation.
1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0081P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 04a0081p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
JIMMIE LEE RILEY,
Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
DAVID T. KURTZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
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No. 02-1488
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 94-71263—Denise Page Hood, District Judge.
Argued: July 30, 2003
Decided and Filed: March 17, 2004
Before: GILMAN and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges;
JORDAN, District Judge.*
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Linda M. Olivieri, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellant.
2 Riley v. Kurtz No. 02-1488
1Since any recovery of attorney’s fees will go directly to
Mr. Manville, we will refer to the fee application arguments as
Mr. Manville’s.
Daniel E. Manville, LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL E.
MANVILLE, Ferndale, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:
John L. Thurber, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Lansing, Michigan, for Appellant. Daniel E. Manville, LAW
OFFICE OF DANIEL E. MANVILLE, Ferndale, Michigan,
for Appellee.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
LEON JORDAN, District Judge. Daniel Manville,
appointed counsel for the prisoner plaintiff,1 obtained a jury
verdict in favor of his client in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, for
which he was awarded attorney’s fees as a prevailing party.
The defendant appealed only the jury verdict. We overturned
the jury verdict on one of the plaintiff’s four claims and
remanded the case for a new trial on the issue of punitive
damages unless the plaintiff accepted a remittitur. The
plaintiff chose the remittitur, and an amended judgment was
entered by the district court. Mr. Manville then filed an
application for appellate fees which was granted. The
defendant appeals the district court’s award of trial and
appellate fees, arguing that the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(42 U.S.C. § 1997e) limits an award of attorney’s fees.
Mr. Manville argues that the defendant failed to appeal the
award of attorney’s fees for his trial work, and this court does
not have jurisdiction to consider the district court’s award of
these fees. Concerning his request for appellate fees,
Mr. Manville argues that the Prison Litigation Reform Act
does not apply because an appeal by the defendant is not an
“action brought by a prisoner” and application of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act under these circumstances would

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No. 02-1488 Riley v. Kurtz 3
violate the Equal Protection Clause. For the reasons set forth
below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court as to
the award of trial fees, and REVERSE the district court’s
award of appellate fees.
I. BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, a prisoner, filed a pro se complaint in the
federal district court in 1994. On April 8, 1996, the district
court appointed attorney Daniel Manville to represent the
plaintiff on a pro bono basis. Mr. Manville states that he
accepted the appointment with the understanding that if the
plaintiff prevailed, he could recover attorney’s fees under
42 U.S.C. § 1988. On April 26, 1996, the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA) became effective. In December 1996,
Mr. Manville filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the
plaintiff because of the PLRA’s potential limit on attorney’s
fees. The district court denied his motion.
The plaintiff won a jury verdict on all four of his claims for
a total damage award of $25,003.00, and judgment was
entered in December 1997. On January 5, 1998,
Mr. Manville submitted an application for attorney’s fees and
expenses for his trial work in the amount of $32,097.80. The
defendant filed a notice of appeal of the jury verdict on
January 12, 1998, but did not appeal Mr. Manville’s request
for attorney’s fees at that time, or later when the district court
granted the request (May 30, 1998).
On appeal, this court overturned the verdict on one of the
plaintiff’s claims and remanded the remaining claims for a
new trial on the issue of punitive damages or a remittitur.
The plaintiff chose the remittitur, and an amended judgment
for $1,003.00 was entered on July 13, 2000. Thereafter,
Mr. Manville was allowed to withdraw, and he filed a request
for appellate fees and expenses on July 11, 2000, in the
amount of $25,754.54. The defendant then objected to both
the trial and appellate fee requests as being outside the
PLRA’s limitations. The matter was referred to a magistrate
4 Riley v. Kurtz No. 02-1488
judge who determined that Mr. Manville was entitled to his
trial fees because the defendant did not appeal that issue in
1998. The district court agreed with the magistrate judge’s
determination on this point. As to the appellate fees, the
district court found that the PLRA does not limit
Mr. Manville’s appellate fees because Mr. Manville was
appointed prior to the enactment of the PLRA; Mr. Manville
was not allowed to withdraw from the case; and the PLRA
does not apply to time spent by a prevailing prisoner plaintiff
defending challenges of judgments by prison officials.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
This court’s review of an application for attorney’s fees is
for an abuse of discretion. Glover v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 229,
251 (6th Cir. 1998). Statutory interpretation, however, is
subject to de novo review. Id. at 249.
B. Attorney’s Fees Under § 1988 and the Prison
Litigation Reform Act – 42 U.S.C. § 1997e
Traditionally, parties to litigation bear their own costs
unless a specific statute or contractual provision provides
otherwise. In 1976, the courts were given discretion to award
a reasonable attorney’s fee to prevailing civil rights litigants.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); Glover, 138 F.3d at 248; see also
Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 39 (1st Cir. 2000) (discussing
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)). Section 1988(b) provides that a “court,
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”
“[A] plaintiff ‘prevails’ when actual relief on the merits of his
claim materially alters the legal relationship between the
parties by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that
directly benefits the plaintiff.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S.
103, 111-12 (1992). The Supreme Court held in Farrar that
a plaintiff who is awarded nominal damages may be
considered a prevailing party. Id. at 112. The size of the

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No. 02-1488 Riley v. Kurtz 5
award of damages, however, “does bear on the propriety of
fees awarded under § 1988.” Id. at 114.
In 1996, Congress enacted the PLRA which placed limits
on the amount of fees that may be awarded under § 1988 to
attorneys who litigate prisoner lawsuits. Section 1997e(d) of
Title 42, United States Code, provides in relevant part:
(1) In any action brought by a prisoner who is confined
to any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, in which
attorney’s fees are authorized under section 1988 of this
title, such fees shall not be awarded, except to the extent
that –
(A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in
proving an actual violation of the plaintiff’s rights
protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee may
be awarded under section 1988 of this title; and
(B)(i) the amount of fee is proportionately related to
the court ordered relief for the violation; or
(ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in
enforcing the relief ordered for the violation.
(2) Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in an
action described in paragraph (1), a portion of the
judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to
satisfy the amount of attorney’s fees awarded against the
defendant. If the award of attorney’s fees is not greater
than 150 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be
paid by the defendant.
(3) No award of attorney’s fees in an action described in
paragraph (1) shall be based on an hourly rate greater
than 150 percent of the hourly rate established under
section 3006A of Title 18, for payment of court-
appointed counsel.
Subsection (2) of this portion of the PLRA has been
interpreted to mean that an attorney’s compensation comes
6 Riley v. Kurtz No. 02-1488
first from the damages (up to 25 percent), and then, if
inadequate, the defendant is liable for attorney’s fees under
§ 1988 up to 150 percent of the money judgment. See
Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 2003) (en
banc), petition for cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3373 (U.S. Nov.
17, 2003); see also Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 667 (6th
Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1095 (2002). Subsection
(3) limits the hourly rate for all attorney’s fees awarded under
subsection (1).
C. Mr. Manville’s Trial Fees
The defendant argues that the PLRA limits the district
court’s award of attorney’s fees for Mr. Manville’s trial work.
The total award of money damages, after appeal, was only
$1,003.00, so the defendant contends that the district court
abused its discretion in awarding Mr. Manville much more
than 150 percent of the damages. Mr. Manville argues that
the defendant waived any right to contest the amount of the
trial attorney’s fees because a timely notice of appeal of the
fees issue was not filed. We agree that the defendant’s failure
to file a timely appeal of the award of attorney’s fees is
dispositive of this issue.
Following a trial, judgment was entered in favor of the
plaintiff on December 18, 1997. Mr. Manville filed a request
for attorney’s fees as counsel for the prevailing party on
January 5, 1998. The defendant filed his appeal on
January 12, 1998, not raising the issue of Mr. Manville’s fee
request. On May 30, 1998, the district court awarded
Mr. Manville attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of
$32,097.80. The defendant did not appeal this award. After
remand, an amended judgment was entered, but the defendant
still did not raise the issue of Mr. Manville’s attorney’s fees.
Nevertheless, the defendant argues that on remand the
district court should have revisited, sua sponte, the issue of
attorney’s fees. At the time the district court awarded
Mr. Manville his trial fees, the law in the Sixth Circuit was

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No. 02-1488 Riley v. Kurtz 7
that the PLRA did not apply to cases that were pending at the
time the PLRA became effective. See Hadix v. Johnson, 143
F.3d 246, 252 (6th Cir. 1998). In 1999, however, while the
defendant’s first appeal was pending in this court, the United
States Supreme Court reversed this opinion and held that the
PLRA fee limitations apply to attorney work done after the
Act became effective even if the case was filed before the
effective date. Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 360-62 (1999).
The defendant argues that the decision in Martin required the
district court to review its previous fee award in light of the
PLRA. We disagree. In our opinion, the district court had no
duty to revisit its earlier order, especially in the absence of
any objection by the defendant. By the time the case was
remanded, the defendant had already waived his right to
object to the award of attorney’s fees. See Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(1)(A) (providing that a notice of appeal must be filed
within thirty days after the order appealed from is entered);
Morgan v. Union Metal Mfg., 757 F.2d 792, 794-95 (6th Cir.
1985) (holding that requests for attorney’s fees are collateral
to the main cause of action and a separate appeal may be
taken from the award of attorney’s fees).
The defendant also argues that the award of attorney’s fees
was based on the judgment entered after the jury trial, not the
amended judgment, so when the amount of damages was
reduced, the district court should have reduced the amount of
attorney’s fees also. This argument fails to recognize that the
district court’s award of attorney’s fees was pursuant to
§ 1988 and was not based on the amount of the damages, but
on the fact that the plaintiff was the prevailing party and on
the amount of time Mr. Manville spent litigating the case.
Thus, amending the judgment did not require an amendment
of the attorney’s fee award.
The district court did not err in concluding that the
defendant’s failure to appeal the award of trial attorney’s fees
waived any objection he might have had to the award of fees.
With a delay of over two years after the order was entered
awarding attorney’s fees and costs to Mr. Manville for his
8 Riley v. Kurtz No. 02-1488
trial work without a timely appeal having been filed, the
defendant’s challenge to the award of trial fees comes too late
for the district court to consider. See, e.g., Morgan, 757 F.2d
at 794-95; Day v. Wayne County Bd. of Auditors, 749 F.2d
1199, 1205 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding that issue of attorney’s
fees not before the court where no timely appeal had been
filed).
D. Mr. Manville’s Appellate Fees
1. Application of the PLRA
Mr. Manville was awarded $25,754.54 in fees and costs by
the district court for the appellate work he did for the plaintiff.
The district court agreed with the magistrate judge’s
reasoning that Mr. Manville was entitled to this amount of
fees because he was not allowed to withdraw from the case
until the matter was remanded from the Sixth Circuit. The
district court also found that when a verdict has been rendered
in favor of a prisoner-plaintiff, the plaintiff has proven an
actual violation of his rights. “An appeal by a losing
defendant and a plaintiff’s defense of the appeal cannot be
considered an action where a plaintiff must again ‘prove’ that
a violation of his rights has occurred since on appeal the
standard of review based on a finding by the trier of fact is a
higher standard.” Riley v. Kurtz, No. 94-CV-71263-DT, slip
op. at 5, (E.D. Mich. Mar. 29, 2002). The court then pointed
out that if Congress intended its legislation to change the
§ 1988 standards for awarding attorney’s fees, it could have
made that intent specific in the statute.
The defendant contends that the district court erred in not
applying the fee limitation provisions of the PLRA to
Mr. Manville’s request for appellate attorney’s fees. Relying
on the language of the statute that prohibits an award of fees
except under specific conditions and concluding that there is
no exception for fees earned defending an award of damages,
the defendant contends that no fees for appellate work may be
awarded. In any event, the defendant argues that the PLRA’s

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No. 02-1488 Riley v. Kurtz 9
fee cap applies to all work performed in a case, whether at
trial, post-trial, or on appeal, so even if Mr. Manville was
entitled to appellate fees, they should have been considered as
part of Mr. Manville’s overall fee award that is limited to 150
percent of the monetary judgment, or $1,504.50.
In response, Mr. Manville argues that the PLRA does not
limit his appellate fee request because the PLRA does not
apply to appeals filed by the defendant. He submits that an
appeal filed by a defendant is not an “action brought by a
prisoner,” that the limitations on attorney’s fees do not apply
in this circumstance, and that he is entitled to the full amount
of his requested appellate fees.
Since both parties insist that the statutory language supports
their respective positions, the obvious place to begin our
analysis is the language of the statute itself. Walker v. Bain,
257 F.3d 660, 666 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S.
1095 (2002). The particular statutory language at issue as
well as the statute’s design as a whole must be considered.
Id. at 666-67. Statutes are to be read with “an eye to their
straightforward and commonsense meanings.” Id. at 666
(quoting Henry Ford Health Sys. v. Shalala, 233 F.3d 907,
910 (6th Cir. 2000)). “Every word in the statute is presumed
to have meaning, and we must give effect to all the words to
avoid an interpretation which would render words superfluous
or redundant.” Id. at 667. We may not rely on the literal
language of the statute if “absurd results or an interpretation
which is inconsistent with the intent of Congress” would be
the outcome. Id.
We start with Mr. Manville’s argument because he focuses
on the opening phrase of the statute: “In any action brought
by a prisoner . . . .” There is no dispute that this litigation
began with a case filed by Jimmy Lee Riley, a prisoner. The
issue, then, is whether the appeal filed by the defendant is part
of the original action, or if, as argued by Mr. Manville, it is a
completely separate action. The term “action” is not defined
in the statute, but Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as “any
10 Riley v. Kurtz No. 02-1488
judicial proceeding, which, if conducted to a determination,
will result in a judgment or decree.” Black’s Law Dictionary
29 (7th ed. 1999). There appears to be no reason why an
appeal brought by the losing party should be considered
anything other than a continuation of the original action.
There is no final judgment or decree until the appeals process
has ended. Therefore, we reject Mr. Manville’s first argument
and find that an appeal filed by the defendant is part of the
original action.
Moving on to the next part of the statute, we examine the
issue of whether attorney’s fees are authorized under § 1988.
As stated above, parties qualify for attorney’s fees under
§ 1988 of title 42, United States Code, if they are prevailing
parties. “[P]laintiffs may be considered ‘prevailing parties’
for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant
issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the
parties sought in bringing suit.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S.
103, 109 (1992) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,
433 (1983)). Although the plaintiff’s award of damages was
limited by this court, he succeeded on three of his four claims.
The fact that his success was nominal on these claims does
not change his prevailing party status. Id. at 114.
The defendant contends, however, that it was the intent of
Congress to limit the definition of prevailing party for
attorney’s fees purposes. In a February 6, 1995, report issued
by the House Committee on the Judiciary, the following
statements were made concerning the attorney’s fees section
of the Act:
This subsection permits prisoners challenging prison
conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to receive attorney
fees but reasonably limits the circumstances under which
fees may be granted as well as the amount of the fees.
This subsection limits awards of attorney fees in two
ways. First, it narrows the judicially-created view of a
“prevailing party” so that a prisoner’s attorney will be

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No. 02-1488 Riley v. Kurtz 11
reimbursed only for those fees reasonably and directly
incurred in proving an actual violation of a federal right.
Narrowing the definition of “prevailing party” will
eliminate both attorney fees that penalize voluntary
improvements in prison conditions and attorney fees
incurred in litigating unsuccessful claims, regardless of
whether they are related to meritorious claims. While
this provision eliminates the financial incentive for
prisoners to include numerous non-meritorious claims in
sweeping institutional litigation, it retains the financial
incentive to bring lawsuits properly focused on prison
conditions that actually violate federal law.
Second, this provision has the effect of reducing
attorney fee awards by eliminating fees for litigation
other than that necessary to prove a violation of a federal
right. This eliminates the financial incentive for
attorneys to litigate ancillary matters, such as attorney fee
petitions, and to seek extensive hearings on remedial
schemes.
Finally, this provision establishes a proportionality
requirement for attorney fee awards. Under current law,
the courts retain the discretion to award attorney fees that
greatly exceed the extent of the relief obtained by the
plaintiff prisoners. This proportionality requirement will
discourage burdensome litigation of insubstantial claims
where the prisoner can establish a technical violation of
a federal right but he suffered no real harm from the
violation. The proportionality requirement appropriately
reminds courts that the size of the attorney fee award
must not unreasonably exceed the damages awarded for
the proven violation.
H.R. Rep. No. 104-21, at 28 (1995), reprinted in 1 Bernard D.
Reams, Jr. & William H. Manz, A Legislative History of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134
Stat. 1321 (1997).
12 Riley v. Kurtz No. 02-1488
2The court notes tha t the Ninth Circuit has considered this issue when
interpreting the enforcem ent part of the PL RA’s fee limitations. Webb v.
Ada County, 285 F.3d 829, 834-35 (9th Cir. 2002). In Webb, the issue
was whether the attorneys’ post-judgment work related to enforcing a
consent decree was work proving an actual violation. Id. The Ninth
Circuit held that § 1997e(d)(1)(b)(ii) only requires that fees be directly
and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for the violation,
and allowed compe nsation for po st-judgm ent work. Id.
Thus, it appears that the defendant is correct in his assertion
that with this legislation Congress intended to limit the
definition of prevailing party. A prisoner may only qualify
for attorney’s fees under the PLRA if the fees were “directly
and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the
plaintiff’s rights” and if the fee is proportional to the amount
of damages awarded for the violation. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(d)(1)(A) and (B).
The defendant’s position is that defending a judgment on
appeal is not directly proving a violation, so the plaintiff is
not entitled to any fees for appellate work. Whether the
defense of a favorable judgment is part of directly proving an
actual violation of the prisoner’s rights is an issue of first
impression in this circuit.2 Nonetheless, a survey of the case
law surrounding the award of attorney’s fees under § 1988 for
appellate work is instructive.
Shortly after the enactment of § 1988, the courts interpreted
its provisions as including awards for fees earned for the
successful defense of a judgment on appeal. See, e.g., Hutto
v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-98 (1979) (affirming award of
appellate fees to prevailing party as part of the costs);
Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 54 (6th Cir. 1979)
(stating that fees for defending a judgment supported by
Congressional purpose of the Act); see also Adcock-Ladd v.
Sec’y of the Treasury, 227 F.3d 343, 351 (6th Cir. 2000)
(awarding reasonable appellate fees to prevailing party under
Title VII). There is no language in the PLRA that contradicts

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No. 02-1488 Riley v. Kurtz 13
the traditional view that reasonable appellate fees may be
awarded to prevailing parties.
We are to presume that when Congress passes legislation,
it is fully aware of the existing law. See Int’l Union, United
Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., Local
737 v. Auto Glass Employees Fed. Credit Union, 72 F.3d
1243, 1248 (6th Cir. 1996) (“It is a settled principle of
statutory construction that when Congress drafts a statute,
courts presume that it does so with full knowledge of the
existing law.”). Thus, the presumption is that Congress was
aware when passing the PLRA that, under § 1988, fees are
awarded to prevailing parties for work done by attorneys at
trial, post-trial, and on appeal.
These attorney’s fee awards, however, are limited by the
results obtained by the plaintiff. The Supreme Court has held
that plaintiffs should receive attorney’s fees for work
“expended in pursuit of the ultimate result achieved” and not
for work on claims unrelated to successful claims. See
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983) (citation
omitted). In this circuit, work on claims unrelated to the
claims upon which the plaintiff prevailed should not be
compensated. See Kelley v. Metro. County Bd. of Educ., 773
F.2d 677, 684-85 (6th Cir. 1985) (denying a request for
attorney’s fees for work on an unrelated matter); see also
Jenkins v. Missouri, 127 F.3d 709, 717 (8th Cir. 1997) (en
banc) (stating the question as whether the issues in the post-
judgment litigation are inextricably intertwined with those
upon which the plaintiff prevailed in the underlying suit).
However, an appeal by a defendant challenging a prisoner’s
success at trial is litigation related to the underlying suit, and
attorney’s fees would be allowed under § 1988 and Hensley.
To this court’s mind, the “related claim” limitation set out in
Hensley has been incorporated into the fee limitation section
of the PLRA. Although stated differently, this limitation on
attorney’s fees is like the limitation in the PLRA – attorney’s
fees are only available if “the fee was directly and reasonably
14 Riley v. Kurtz No. 02-1488
incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff’s rights
. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(A).
The only similar case that has come to our attention is a
district court decision from the Eastern District of Michigan.
Sallier v. Scott, 151 F. Supp. 2d 836 (E.D. Mich. 2001). In
Sallier, the issue was whether the post-judgment work done
by the prisoner’s attorney included “proving” a violation. Id.
at 838. Based on the definition of “prove” in Black’s Law
Dictionary (to establish or make certain), the district court
found that “hours spent defending the jury award, against the
defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law, may also
be considered hours spent to ‘make certain’ the verdict.” Id.
at 839.
We reject the defendant’s argument that attorney’s fees for
defending a judgment on appeal are not available under the
PLRA. We hold that a prisoner who prevails on appeal is
entitled to attorney’s fees under the PLRA because the hours
were part of proving or making certain an actual violation of
the prisoner’s rights. After all, if the prisoner’s favorable
verdict is being challenged on appeal, he is having to prove or
establish his violation again, this time to a higher court.
2. Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
Next, Mr. Manville contends that if the PLRA is applied to
his request for appellate fees, then the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fifth Amendment is violated. He concedes that
he must show that an application of the PLRA’s fee
limitations to appellate fees is not “rationally related to any
conceivable legitimate legislative purpose.” See Hadix v.
Johnson, 230 F.3d 840, 843 (6th Cir. 2000).
Under this standard the statute will be afforded a strong
presumption of validity and must be upheld as long as
“there is a rational relationship between the disparity of
treatment and some legitimate government purpose.”
The government has no obligation to produce evidence

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No. 02-1488 Riley v. Kurtz 15
to support the rationality of its statutory classifications
and may rely entirely on rational speculation unsupported
by any evidence or empirical data. The legislature is not
even required to articulate any purpose or rationale in
support of its legislation. Consequently, plaintiffs bear
the heavy burden of “negativ[ing] every conceivable
basis which might support [the legislation], . . . whether
or not the basis has a foundation in the record.”
Id. (citations omitted).
One of Congress’ purposes in passing the PLRA was to
reduce the large number of frivolous prisoner lawsuits being
filed in federal courts. See id. at 844 (citing to 141 Cong.
Rec. S7498-01 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Dole)). The fee cap provisions are directly related to this
purpose. Mr. Manville argues, however, that once a prisoner
has prevailed at the trial level, the claims can no longer be
considered frivolous. Applying the fee caps to his appellate
work under these circumstances, he contends, would be an
equal protection violation. In response, the defendant argues
that our decisions in Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660 (6th Cir.
2001), and Hadix v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 840 (6th Cir. 2000),
are dispositive of this issue. We agree with the defendant.
We found in Walker and Hadix that it is rational to
speculate that narrowing the definition of a prevailing party
and building in a proportionality requirement (150% of the
monetary judgment) could reduce the incentive of prisoners
and their attorneys to file frivolous claims. As we discussed
in Hadix, the fee cap could “counter-balance” a prisoner’s
numerous incentives to litigate and place prisoners and non-
prisoners in a similar decision-making position. Hadix, 230
F.3d at 845. Just as a non-prisoner civil rights litigant should
consider all the costs of bringing the action, including
appellate costs, so should a prisoner litigant. Furthermore, as
we discussed in both Walker and Hadix, the fee cap
provisions are rationally related to protecting the federal and
16 Riley v. Kurtz No. 02-1488
state treasuries. Walker, 257 F.3d at 669; Hadix, 230 F.3d at
845.
As we noted in Walker, “the twin goals of decreasing
marginal lawsuits and protecting the public fisc are legitimate
government interests, and . . . decreasing an attorney fee
award in the context of prisoner civil rights litigation serves
both of these interests.” Walker, 257 F.3d at 669 (citing
Hadix, 230 F.3d at 845). These goals apply equally to trial
and appellate work. Thus, Mr. Manville has failed to negate
every conceivable basis which might support the legislation,
and his constitutional argument fails.
Finally, Mr. Manville argues that it would be unfair to deny
him his full attorney’s fees for his appellate work on behalf of
the prisoner. He asserts that if the fee limitation provision
applies to defending a judgment, a losing defendant prison
official would have little incentive to accept an unfavorable
judgment and considerable incentive to cause the attorney to
generate billable hours for which he or she might not be
compensated. Having to defend a successful judgment below
without additional compensation, however, is no different a
situation than is faced by every plaintiff’s lawyer working on
a fixed contingency fee. The possibility of having to defend
a favorable judgment on appeal is just another factor a
prisoner’s lawyer has to take into account in deciding whether
to take the prisoner’s case in the first place. While the court
appreciates the dilemma Mr. Manville found himself in when
he was denied permission to withdraw, we conclude that the
PLRA applies to all the attorney’s fees generated by a
prevailing prisoner – trial, post-trial, and on appeal.
Upon accepting his remittitur, the plaintiff’s monetary
judgment was $1,003. Applying the 150 percent cap to this
amount, the defendant is liable for attorney’s fees in the
amount of $1,504.50. However, under the unique facts of this
case, Mr. Manville will receive $32,097.80 in attorney’s fees
for his trial work on this case, an amount well in excess of the
150 percent allowed by the PLRA. We conclude that the

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No. 02-1488 Riley v. Kurtz 17
$1,504.50 allowed under the PLRA is included in the award
of trial fees, leaving no room for any further award for Mr.
Manville’s appellate work.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
court awarding Mr. Manville his trial fees and REVERSE the
judgment of the district court as to Mr. Manville’s appellate
fees.

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