Angelina Miguel v. Immigration and Naturalization Service

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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0062P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 04a0062p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
ANGELINA MIGUEL,
Petitioner,
v.
IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
Respondent.
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No. 02-3758
On Appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals.
No. A76 507 819.
Argued: February 4, 2004
Decided and Filed: February 26, 2004
Before: NORRIS, GILMAN, and ROGERS, Circuit
Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Richard R. Renner, TATE & RENNER, Dover,
Ohio, for Petitioner. Mary Jane Candaux, U. S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIVISION,
Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Richard R.
Renner, TATE & RENNER, Dover, Ohio, Raymond Vasvari,
2 Miguel v. INS No. 02-3758
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, Cleveland, Ohio,
for Petitioner. Allen W. Hausman, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, CIVIL DIVISION, Washington, D.C., for
Respondent.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
ROGERS, Circuit Judge. Angelina Miguel is a native and
citizen of Guatemala who was discovered by Immigration and
Naturalization Service agents after a warrantless entry into her
home. Miguel claims that the evidence obtained during the
search of her house should have been suppressed because the
search violated the Fourth Amendment. The Immigration
Judge, relying solely on the admissions of Miguel’s counsel
during a hearing, decided that Miguel should be removed
regardless of any potential Fourth Amendment violations.
The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the decision of
the Immigration Judge. Miguel appeals the denial of her
motion to suppress. Because Miguel’s counsel admitted the
relevant facts establishing her removability, and because the
Immigration Judge did not rely on any of the evidence that
Miguel has asked to be suppressed, this court does not need
to reach the potential application of the exclusionary rule to
the entry and seizure of evidence from her home in possible
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we deny
Miguel’s petition for review.
Angelina Miguel is a 25-year-old native and citizen of
Guatemala. Miguel apparently entered the United States
“without being admitted or paroled” in 1996 near San Ysidro,
California.
According to Miguel’s statement, on or about the morning
of July 7, 1999, Miguel was at her residence in New
Philadelphia, Ohio, with another woman and three children
whom they were babysitting. Miguel was allegedly upstairs

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No. 02-3758 Miguel v. INS 3
1It is unclear whether the wom en let the agents in or if they just
barged in. However, Miguel’s motion to suppress indicates that the
agents simply o pened the doo r without perm ission.
in a bathroom, when Immigration and Naturalization Service
(“INS”) agents knocked at the door. One of the children
apparently answered the door and let in the three agents, who
were soon joined by two more agents.
Miguel came downstairs, and the agents announced they
were looking for a person named Maria Garza. Miguel then
retreated upstairs to a bedroom, but the INS agents soon
knocked on the bedroom door. The agents came into the
bedroom and began to question Miguel about her immigration
status.1 Apparently believing she had an obligation to
answer, Miguel told the agents that she did not have any
“papers from the United States” but that she had a birth
certificate from Guatemala.
As Miguel retrieved her birth certificate from an envelope
in her backpack, an agent allegedly snatched the entire
envelope from her hands. The envelope also contained other
documents relating to her fiancé and daughter. Miguel was at
that time given a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) before the
Immigration Court.
On October 24, 2000, Miguel filed a motion to suppress all
evidence derived from the entry and search of her home. The
motion alleged that the INS agents entered her private
residence without a valid warrant and failed to advise her of
her constitutional rights. On November 8, 2000, the
Immigration Judge (the “IJ”) in the removal proceeding
indicated that an evidentiary hearing should be held on the
motion to suppress. On the date set for the evidentiary
hearing, Miguel was late. The IJ denied the motion to
suppress because Miguel had abandoned it by “her failure to
appear” and also because the affidavits did not support a
finding of egregious conduct. After Miguel arrived, the IJ did
4 Miguel v. INS No. 02-3758
not revisit the issue. The IJ then asked Miguel some standard
preliminary questions. In response, Miguel’s counsel
admitted the factual allegations contained in the NTA.
Specifically, Miguel’s counsel admitted that Miguel was not
a citizen of the United States, that she was a native and citizen
of Guatemala who entered the United States at an unknown
time and place, and that she was not admitted or paroled after
inspection by an Immigration Officer. The IJ thereupon
sustained the charge of removal and set a hearing date to
consider any relief from removal that Miguel sought to
pursue. On August 10, 2001, the day of the next hearing,
Miguel’s counsel stated that Miguel did not qualify for any
form of relief. At that hearing, the IJ also indicated that she
had denied the motion to suppress during the last hearing.
Later that day, the IJ issued a ruling ordering the removal of
Miguel to Guatemala.
On Miguel’s timely appeal, the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) issued a two-sentence decision affirming the
IJ’s decision. Miguel petitions this court for review, claiming
that the IJ acted arbitrarily and capriciously when she did not
hold an evidentiary hearing on Miguel’s motion to suppress
and that the INS agents acted so egregiously when they
entered her home without a warrant as to require the
suppression of the evidence gained during that entry.
The decision of the IJ was proper because Miguel admitted
that she was an alien, that she was not legally admitted into
the United States, and that she has no basis for any form of
relief. An evidentiary hearing as to the possible egregious
nature of the agents’ entry into Miguel’s home would
therefore have been irrelevant.
Miguel admitted before the IJ that she is a removable alien,
and, regardless of whether the evidence at her home should be
suppressed, these admissions establish her removability. See

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No. 02-3758 Miguel v. INS 5
28 C.F.R. § 240 has been subsequently renumbered as 8 C.F.R.
§ 1240.
8 C.F.R. § 240.10(c) (2000)2 (“The immigration judge shall
require the respondent to plead to the notice to appear by
stating whether he or she admits or denies the factual
allegations and his or her removability under the charges
contained therein. If the respondent admits the factual
allegations and admits his or her removability under the
charges and the immigration judge is satisfied that no issues
of law or fact remain, the immigration judge may determine
that removability as charged has been established by the
admissions of the respondent.” (emphasis added)); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1361 (“In any removal proceeding . . . the burden of proof
shall be upon [the alien] to show the time, place, and manner
of his entry into the United States . . . . If such burden of
proof is not sustained, such person shall be presumed to be in
the United States in violation of law.”); see also INS v. Lopez-
Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1984) (“In many deportation
cases the INS must show only identity and alienage; the
burden then shifts to the respondent to prove the time, place,
and manner of his entry.”).
During a hearing, the IJ specifically asked Miguel, through
an interpreter, how she answered the factual allegations
contained in the NTA. The NTA indicated that she is not a
citizen or national of the United States; that she is a native
and citizen of Guatemala; and that she was not admitted or
paroled into the United States. Miguel then admitted these
factual allegations through counsel. The admissions have not
been challenged on appeal.
After Miguel’s alienage was established by her admission
and was not contradicted by any additional evidence in the
record, Miguel needed to demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that she is “lawfully in the United States
pursuant to a prior admission, [or that] she is clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted to the United States
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3The Supreme Court in Lopez-Me ndoza held tha t the Fourth
Amendm ent exclusio nary rule does not ap ply in deportation proceedings,
but appeared to leave open the possibility that the exclusionary rule might
app ly in cases involving “egregious vio lations” of the Fourth Amendment.
Lopez-Me ndoza, 468 U.S. at 105 0-51 (plurality opinion). M iguel asse rts
that an “egregio us violation” o ccurred in her case.
and is not inadmissible as charged.” 8 C.F.R. § 240.8(c)
(2000). To avoid removal, Miguel could also show that she
is eligible for some type of relief from removal, but she bears
the burden of proof in making such a showing. 8 C.F.R.
§ 240.8(d) (2000). Miguel admitted later, however, that she
does not qualify for any form of relief.
Miguel does not contest the jurisdiction of the Immigration
Court over her person. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S
1032, 1039 (1984) (“The ‘body’ or identity of a defendant or
respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never itself
suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if it is
conceded that an unlawful arrest, search, or interrogation
occurred.”). Instead, Miguel argues that the IJ improperly
denied her motion to suppress without an evidentiary hearing.
However, even a favorable ruling for Miguel on her motion
to suppress would not change her established removablity
because she has not asserted any applicable basis for relief
from removal.3 In Matter of Burgos, 15 I. & N. Dec. 278,
279-80 (BIA 1975), the BIA concluded that the IJ properly
found the aliens deportable because of their admissions. The
aliens in Burgos had submitted a motion to suppress before
the IJ, but the IJ denied this motion. Id. at 270. In Burgos, as
in the present case, the administrative record did not contain
any evidence that was obtained in the search, and the aliens
essentially argued that “their physical presence is the
evidence to be suppressed as that presence was obtained
illegally.” Id. at 280. However, the BIA held that after the
Burgos aliens admitted their alienage, the burden shifted to
them to prove their time, place, and manner of entry into this
country. Id. The Burgos opinion continued:

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No. 02-3758 Miguel v. INS 7
Since they failed to sustain that burden, they are
presumed to be in the United States in violation of law.
The [INS] did not rely upon any statement taken or any
evidence seized at the time of the [the aliens’] arrest to
establish deportability. Thus, even if the arrest was
illegal, this would not invalidate the subsequent
deportation proceedings . . . .
Id.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Lopez Mendoza did not
change the analysis of Burgos. See, e.g., Yadidi v. INS, No.
92-70042, 1993 WL 306238, at **1 (9th Cir. Aug. 12, 1993)
(“Yadidi’s admissions at the deportation hearing formed the
basis of the IJ’s deportation order. Thus, the IJ did not err by
denying Yadidi’s motion to continue or by refusing to
consider further his motion to suppress.”). Likewise, the
evidence of Miguel’s removability did not come from an
allegedly illegal entry, search, arrest, or interrogation, but
instead the evidence of her alienage and removability came
from her own admissions at a subsequent removal hearing.
As the IJ did not rely on any of the evidence that Miguel
asked to be suppressed, this court does not need to reach the
potential application of the exclusionary rule to the entry and
seizure of evidence from her home in possible violation of the
Fourth Amendment.
For the foregoing reasons, we deny Miguel’s petition for
review.

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