United States of America v. Dawn Marie Bujak

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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0375P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 03a0375p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DAWN MARIE BUJAK,
Defendant-Appellant.
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No. 03-5545
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.
No. 00-00103—Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr., District Judge.
Submitted: July 15, 2003
Decided and Filed: October 23, 2003
Before: MERRITT, MARTIN, and COLE, Circuit Judges.
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COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Hershell D. Koger, Pulaski, Tennessee, for
Appellant. S. Carran Daughtrey, ASSISTANT UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Nashville, Tennessee.
2 United States v. Bujak No. 03-5545
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OPINION
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BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. Dawn Marie
Bujak, represented by counsel, appeals a district court
judgment revoking her probation and imposing a six month
term of imprisonment. The parties have expressly waived
oral argument and this panel unanimously agrees that oral
argument is not needed. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).
In October 2000, Bujak pleaded guilty to obtaining
possession of a controlled substance by misrepresentation in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(3). The court sentenced her
to three years of probation, ordering her to comply with the
standard conditions of probation and the following special
conditions: 1) that she participate in a program of drug
testing and substance abuse treatment; 2) that she submit to
random urine screens; and 3) that she pay two hundred dollars
per month toward the cost of supervision. In January 2002,
the district court extended Bujak’s supervision by one year as
a result of her violation of the conditions of her probation.
Thereafter, on February 14, 2003, the district court issued a
warrant for Bujak’s arrest based on her continued non-
compliance with the conditions of her probation.
The district court held a revocation hearing, during which
Bujak acknowledged that she had violated her probation by
failing to participate in substance abuse counseling, failing to
submit to urinalysis, failing to submit supervision reports, and
failing to pay two hundred dollars per month toward the cost
of supervision. The district court revoked Bujak’s probation
and sentenced her to six months of incarceration. Bujak has
filed a timely appeal, arguing that the district court
improperly revoked her probation and that the six month
sentence was unreasonable.

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No. 03-5545 United States v. Bujak 3
Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly
revoked Bujak’s probation. Probation revocation hearings
involve two analytically distinct stages: 1) a factual
determination of whether the probationer has violated a
condition of probation; and 2) a discretionary determination
of whether violation of a condition warrants revocation of
probation. See Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 611 (1985).
There do not appear to be any Sixth Circuit cases directly on
point with respect to the burden of proof necessary to
establish a probation violation. However, this Court has held
that, in order to revoke supervised release, the sentencing
court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that a
defendant has violated a condition of her supervised release.
See United States v. Cofield, 233 F.3d 405, 406 (6th Cir.
2000). We now hold that the preponderance of the evidence
standard also applies to determinations of whether a
probationer has violated a condition of probation. As stated
above, Bujak readily acknowledged that she had violated the
terms of her probation by failing to participate in substance
abuse counseling, failing to submit to urinalysis, failing to
submit supervision reports, and failing to pay two hundred
dollars per month toward the cost of supervision.
The district court properly determined that Bujak’s
violations warranted revocation of her probation. Appellate
courts review a district court’s decision to revoke probation
for an abuse of discretion. See Burns v. United States, 287
U.S. 216, 222 (1932); Cofield, 233 F.3d at 406. Where the
court determines that the defendant has violated probation, the
court can either continue probation or revoke probation in
favor of incarceration. See 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a); USSG
§ 7B1.3(a)(2). Revocation of probation is mandatory,
however, where a defendant refuses to comply with a
condition requiring drug testing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3565(b)(3);
United States v. Coatoam, 245 F.3d 553, 560 (6th Cir. 2001).
Here, Bujak admitted that she had failed to submit to
urinalysis testing as ordered by the conditions of her
probation. Hence, the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it revoked her probation.
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This Court has not had occasion to decide the appropriate
standard of review to apply when reviewing a sentence
imposed by the district court following revocation of
probation. We now hold, however, that such a sentence
should be reviewed for abuse of discretion--the same standard
that we have applied when reviewing sentences imposed
following revocation of supervised release. See United
States v. Washington, 147 F.3d 490, 491 (6th Cir. 1998). We
find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing Bujak to six months of imprisonment. Pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3565(a)(2), a judge who revokes a defendant’s
probation must resentence the defendant by considering the
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). These factors
include: “the nature of the offense; the need to deter criminal
conduct, to protect the public, and to provide [the] defendant
with appropriate treatment; any guideline range for
sentencing; guideline policy statements; and avoidance of
unwarranted disparities.” Id. The district court need not
make specific findings with respect to each of these factors.
See Washington, 147 F.3d at 491-93. Rather, the district
court need only articulate enough of its reasoning to permit an
informed appellate review. See United States v. McClellan,
164 F.3d 308, 310 (6th Cir. 1999).
Contrary to Bujak’s assertion, the district court provided
sufficient reasoning to permit this Court to review its
judgment. First, a review of the revocation hearing transcript
clearly reflects that the proof of Bujak’s probation violations
touched upon several of the relevant sentencing factors. For
instance, the nature and circumstances of Bujak’s violations
were clearly set forth during the hearing when Bujak was
afforded the opportunity to explain the violations to the court.
Second, immediately prior to sentencing Bujak, the court
stated that Bujak had been given “a lot of breaks,” and that
she had “not been able to respond to any of that so we are
going to try something else.” The court informed her that she
needed to learn that her actions have consequences. This
clearly addresses the need for the sentence to reflect the
seriousness of the offense and to promote respect for the law.

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No. 03-5545 United States v. Bujak 5
It also reflects the need to deter any future criminal conduct
by Bujak. Hence, the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it sentenced Bujak to six months of
incarceration.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. See
6 Cir. R. 34(j)(2)(C).

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