Theodore G. Williams v. William Meyer

*The Honorable Louis F. Oberdorfer, United States District Judge for
the District of Columbia, sitting by designation.
1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0344P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 03a0344p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
THEODORE G. WILLIAMS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
WILLIAM MEYER,
Respondent-Appellee.
X
-
-
-
->
,
-
-
N
No. 01-1951
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 93-75495—Paul D. Borman, District Judge.
Argued: May 8, 2003
Decided and Filed: September 25, 2003
Before: BOGGS and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges;
OBERDORFER, District Judge.*
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: John A. Shea, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for
Appellant. Brad H. Beaver, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
2 Williams v. Meyer No. 01-1951
GENERAL, CORRECTIONS DIVISION, Lansing,
Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: John A. Shea, Ann
Arbor, Michigan, for Appellant. Brad H. Beaver, OFFICE
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, CORRECTIONS
DIVISION, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellee.
OBERDORFER, D. J., delivered the opinion of the court,
in which DAUGHTREY, J., joined. BOGGS, J. (p. 18),
delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
OBERDORFER, District Judge. Theodore G. Williams,
the petitioner, appeals the district court’s order denying his
motion for relief from judgment. The district court entered
judgment, denying Williams’ petition for habeas relief, after
Williams failed to timely file objections to the magistrate’s
report and recommendation. Williams has demonstrated that
his failure to timely file his objections was the result of
“excusable neglect,” entitling him to relief. Accordingly, we
reverse and remand.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Statutory Provisions
1. Michigan’s Criminal Sexual Psychopath Act
Until its repeal, effective August 1, 1968, Michigan’s
Criminal Sexual Psychopath Act (the “Sexual Psychopath
Act”), Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 780.501-.509 (West
1968), repealed by 1968 Mich. Pub. Acts 143 (Aug. 1, 1968),
provided that a criminal defendant in Michigan who was
designated a “criminal sexual psychopathic person” would be
committed to the custody of the state hospital commission to
be confined in an appropriate state institution. Id. § 780.505.
A criminal sexual psychopathic person was defined as “[a]ny

-- 1 of 9 --

No. 01-1951 Williams v. Meyer 3
1Under the Sexual Psychopath Act, either the state or the defendant
could seek this designation.
person who is suffering from a mental disorder and is not
feeble-minded, which mental disorder is coupled with
criminal propensities to the commission of sexual offenses.”1
Id. § 780.501. After the Sexual Psychopath Act was repealed,
the Michigan Supreme Court ordered that the discharge of
persons in custody pursuant to the Act would continue to be
governed by the Act’s discharge provisions until further
legislative clarification. Admin. Order 1969-4, 382 Mich.
xxix (1969). As no such clarification ever occurred, the Act’s
discharge provisions have continued to apply to such persons.
Under those provisions (section 7 of the Act as enacted), a
person in custody “shall be discharged only after there are
reasonable grounds to believe that such person has recovered
from such psychopathy to a degree that he will not be a
menace to others.” Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. § 780.507 (West
1968).
2. Michigan’s Mental Health Code
With the exception of persons committed pursuant to the
Sexual Psychopath Act, Michigan’s Mental Health Code
governs the commitment and discharge of persons in the
custody of the Michigan Department of Mental Health. Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 330.2050(5) (West 2003). Under the
Mental Health Code, a person must be discharged when “the
patient’s mental condition is such that he or she no longer
meets the criteria of a person requiring treatment.” Id.
§ 330.1476(2). A “person requiring treatment” is defined as
an individual “who has mental illness” and (1) who as a result
of that illness can reasonably be expected within the near
future to intentionally or unintentionally seriously injure
himself or herself or another individual; (2) who as a result of
that illness is unable to attend to his or her basic physical
needs necessary to avoid serious harm in the near future; or
(3) whose judgment is so impaired that he or she is unable to
4 Williams v. Meyer No. 01-1951
2A convoluted series of events transpired between W illiams’ release
in 1973 and his return to custody in 1979. W hen W illiams pleaded guilty
in 1967, he had been charged with the rape and murder of a seven-year-
old girl in Allegan County, Michigan. After his release, Allegan County,
for reasons not apparent from the record, filed new charges based on that
same rape and murder. W illiams again pleaded guilty, this time to second
degree murder, and he was sentenced to life in prison. Williams appealed,
citing section 8 o f the Sexual Psychopath A ct. Section 8 provided that a
defendant was immune from prosecution for the “the offense with which
he originally stood charged, or convicted” prior to commitment. Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 780.508 (West 1968). The Michigan Court of
Appeals held that section 8 applied and reversed W illiams’ conviction.
The Michigan Supreme C ourt affirmed, but ordered Williams returned to
the custody of the Department of Mental Health on the ground that he had
been “imprope rly released” in 1973. People v. Williams, 406 Mich. 990
(1979). The case was rem anded to the state circuit court to permit
W illiams to file a new petition for discharge. People v. Williams, 407
Mich. 91 2 (1979 ).
Shortly after his release in 1973 , W illiams was also arrested and
understand the need for treatment and whose continued
behavior can reasonably be expected, on the basis of
competent clinical opinion, to result in significant physical
harm to himself or herself or others. Id. § 330.1401. Mental
illness is defined as “a substantial disorder or thought or
mood that significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity
to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary
demands of life.” Id. § 330.1400(g).
B. Facts
In October 1967, Theodore Williams, the petitioner, entered
a plea of guilty in Michigan state court to a charge of first
degree murder. Prior to sentencing, Williams was designated
a “criminal sexual psychopath,” under the then-applicable
Sexual Psychopath Act, and committed to the custody of a
state mental hospital. He was initially discharged in
September 1973, but he was returned to custody in 1979,
following a determination by the Michigan Supreme Court
that he had been improperly released.2 See People v.

-- 2 of 9 --

No. 01-1951 Williams v. Meyer 5
charged with the rap e and murd er of a thirteen-year-old girl in Newaygo
County, Michigan, a crime he had committed in 1966 and confessed to
when he was arrested in 1967. Williams was unsuccessful in his attempt
to get those charges dismissed under section 8 , as they were not the basis
for his conviction. Nonetheless, for reasons not apparent from the record,
those charges were dismissed after Williams entered his second plea of
guilty in Allegan County.
Williams, 406 Mich. 909 (1979). From then until the present,
he has remained in the custody of the Michigan Department
of Mental Health. He has filed a number of petitions for
discharge pursuant to section 7 of the repealed Sexual
Psychopath Act, all of which have been denied. Today, he is
the only person remaining in the custody of the Michigan
Department of Mental Health who was committed under, and
whose discharge is governed by, the Sexual Psychopath Act.
C. Procedural History
1. State Proceedings
The present action began with the petition for discharge
Williams filed on September 19, 1991. In addition to seeking
discharge under section 7 of the Sexual Psychopath Act,
Williams contended that the application of section 7 violated
his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection.
On July 29, 1993, the state circuit court rejected Williams’
constitutional challenges. JA 77-100 (People v. Williams, No.
67-4411 FY (Allegan County, Mich. Cir. Ct. July 29, 1993)).
On June 13, 1994, at the conclusion of a series of evidentiary
hearings, it orally denied Williams’ petition. A subsequent
written order stated that “it was established by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant has not recovered
from his criminal sexual psychopathy to a degree that he will
not be a menace to others.” JA 103.
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. It ruled that the
constitutional challenges were without merit and that the
circuit court had not clearly erred in denying discharge. See
6 Williams v. Meyer No. 01-1951
JA 105-111 (People v. Williams, 580 N.W.2d 438, 441-44
(Mich. Ct. App. 1998)). On November 24, 1998, the
Michigan Supreme Court denied Williams’ application for
leave to appeal. See People v. Williams, 589 N.W.2d 287
(Mich. 1998).
2. Federal Collateral Proceedings
After the state circuit court rejected his constitutional
claims in 1993, Williams filed a petition in federal district
court seeking habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On
January 5, 1995, the district court dismissed the petition,
pending final resolution of the state court proceedings. The
case was reopened on January 14, 1999, after the Michigan
Supreme Court denied Williams’ application for leave to
appeal. The district court appointed counsel to review, and
amend as necessary, Williams’ petition. Williams filed an
amended petition on October 13, 2000, claiming that
requiring him to seek discharge under section 7 deprived him
of his constitutional rights to due process and equal
protection. His due process claim had two components.
First, he claimed that section 7 failed to satisfy the
requirements of constitutional due process because it only
required the state to prove a predisposition toward, not a
“likelihood” of, future dangerousness, in conflict with the due
process principles established by the Supreme Court in
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), a decision
upholding the standard for commitment in Kansas’ Sexually
Violent Predator Act. Next, he claimed that even if section 7
did not on its face violate due process, his continued detention
did because even under section 7 there was insufficient
evidence to support the state circuit court’s conclusion that he
was not entitled to release. His equal protection claim rested
on a comparison between the standard for discharge under
section 7 and the standard for discharge under the Mental
Health Code. The latter, he claimed, was easier to satisfy,
resulting in his being treated differently than other similarly
situated persons held under the Mental Health Code. The

-- 3 of 9 --

No. 01-1951 Williams v. Meyer 7
3The issue presented in Crane was what, if any, showing of volitional
impairment a state must make before civilly committing a sexual
offender. Ultimately, the Court held that a state does not need to prove
the offender’s total or complete lack of control over his dangerous
behavior, but does need to make some determination of a lack of contro l.
534 U.S. 407 (2002).
district court referred the case to a magistrate judge on
January 16, 2001.
On March 7, 2001, the magistrate judge issued his report
and recommendation, concluding that the habeas petition
should be denied. JA 145-173. Williams had ten days to file
objections to that report. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). On
March 16, 2001, Williams filed a consent motion for an
enlargement of time, asking the district court for an additional
thirty days to file objections because “the issues are novel and
complex, the record voluminous, and other matters already
scheduled [for counsel] when the Report and
Recommendation was received will occupy a significant
amount of [counsel’s] time in the next couple of weeks.” JA
189-90. The district court granted the motion, giving
Williams until April 25, 2001, to file objections. JA 191.
On April 24, 2001, Williams filed a second motion for
enlargement of time, asking for an additional twenty-one
days, until May 17, 2001, to file objections. JA 192-93. The
motion stated that counsel needed the extra time “[o]n
account of recent illnesses and his trial schedule” and to
review the implications of the Supreme Court’s April 2, 2001
grant of certiorari in Kansas v. Crane, 532 U.S. 937 (2001),
a case counsel thought had the potential to alter the guiding
constitutional principles of involuntary hospitalization.3 JA
193. Williams’ counsel was unable to speak with Williams
prior to making this request, but he informed the district court
that he was “confident” Williams would not object. JA 193.
On April 27, 2001, the district court denied the motion,
stating: “Petitioner’s counsel has already had one extension
of time, and the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in
8 Williams v. Meyer No. 01-1951
Kansas v. Crane . . . is unlikely to affect the merits of this
case.” JA 194. That same day, the district court accepted the
magistrate’s report and recommendation and denied
Williams’ petition for habeas relief. JA 195-96.
On May 11, 2001, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b), Williams filed a motion for relief from
judgment, for reconsideration of the order denying his second
motion for an enlargement of time, and for leave to file
objections, which he attached. JA 197-211. As grounds for
relief, Williams argued that his failure to timely file
objections was “excusable neglect” under Rule 60(b).
Williams’ motion described in greater detail the reasons why
counsel had failed to file objections within the time allotted:
undersigned counsel informs the Court that he fell ill on
two separate occasions in the time between his first and
second motions for enlargement. As a result, he lost
several days of work. Moreover, also during this time a
close friend came into the final stage of a terminal
illness, which required the undersigned’s attention in
both a personal and representative capacity, resulting in
a additional time being diverted from the office. Those
unexpected events, combined with an already heavy
hearings schedule (including a trial) during this time, and
combined further with the unexpected Crane
development, made it impossible for the undersigned to
file [William’s] objections within the enlargement of
time initially given.
JA 198. With respect to the potential relevance of Crane,
Williams argued that if the Supreme Court were to decide in
Crane that the Constitution requires a showing of volitional
impairment to prove future dangerousness, that would support
Williams’ claim that the quantum of proof of dangerousness
required under the Sexual Psychopath Act did not satisfy
constitutional due process. JA 199. Finally, Williams
pointed out that if the district court denied the motion for

-- 4 of 9 --

No. 01-1951 Williams v. Meyer 9
4Although these principles com e from cases involving defa ult
judgments, the parties assume, and we agree, that the same approach
should govern the present case.
relief from judgment, he would be barred from any appeal on
the merits. JA 204.
On June 6, 2001, the district court denied Williams’ motion
for relief from judgment, for reconsideration of the order
denying the second motion for enlargement of time, and for
leave to file his objections instanter. JA 174-75. The court
ruled that Williams’ counsel’s “recent illnesses, his trial
schedule and the potential need to review a case before the
Supreme Court” did not amount to “excusable neglect to
justify granting relief under Rule 60(b).” JA 175.
Williams filed a timely Notice of Appeal on July 3, 2001.
On January 11, 2002, the Sixth Circuit issued a Certificate of
Appealability, limited to “the sole issue of whether the district
court properly denied Williams’ motion for relief from
judgment and for leave to file objections to the magistrate’s
report and recommendation.”
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Principles
In relevant part, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1)
provides that “on motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment . . . for . . .
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b)(1). Where a party seeks relief from a default
judgment,4 Rule 60(b)(1) should be applied “equitably and
liberally . . . to achieve substantial justice.” United Coin
Meter v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 705 F.2d 839, 844-45 (6th
Cir. 1983) (internal quotations omitted). In deciding whether
relief is warranted, three factors are relevant: (1) whether the
party seeking relief is culpable; (2) whether the party
opposing relief will be prejudiced; and (3) whether the party
10 Williams v. Meyer No. 01-1951
seeking relief has a meritorious claim or defense. Id. at 845.
Culpability is “framed” by the specific language of the rule;
i.e., a party demonstrates a lack of culpability by
demonstrating “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect.” Waifersong, Ltd. v. Classic Music Vending, 976
F.2d 290, 292 (6th Cir. 1992). And because Rule 60(b)(1)
“mandates” such a demonstration, “[i]t is only when the
[party seeking relief] can carry this burden that he will be
permitted to demonstrate that he also can satisfy the other two
factors: the existence of a meritorious defense and the absence
of substantial prejudice to the [other party].” Id.; see also
Weiss v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 283 F.3d 790, 794
(6th Cir. 2002) (a party seeking relief “must demonstrate first
and foremost that the default did not result from his culpable
conduct”). A district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b)(1) motion
is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United Coin, 705 F.2d at
843.
B. Application
1. Culpability of Party Seeking Relief
We start, as we must, by considering Williams’ culpability.
Williams contends that the failure to timely file objections
was not the result of culpable conduct but of “excusable
neglect.” A party’s conduct is culpable if it “display[s] either
an intent to thwart judicial proceedings or a reckless disregard
for the effect of its conduct on those proceedings.”
Amerinational Indus. v. Action-Tungsram, Inc., 925 F.2d 970,
978 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting INVST Financial Group, Inc. v.
Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc., 815 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1992).
Moreover, although clients are held liable for the acts and
omissions of their counsel, see, e.g., United States v. Reyes,
307 F.3d 451 (6th Cir. 2002), “this court, like many others,
has been extremely reluctant to uphold the dismissal of a case
or the entering of a default judgment merely to discipline an
errant attorney because such a sanction deprives the client of
his day in court,” see Buck v. United States Dep’t of
Agriculture, 960 F.2d 603, 608 (6th Cir. 1992).

-- 5 of 9 --

No. 01-1951 Williams v. Meyer 11
The record establishes that in failing to timely file neither
Williams nor his counsel engaged in any culpable conduct.
First, Williams’ failure to timely file objections does not
appear to have been “willful” or the result of “carelessness”
or “negligence.” See Weiss, 283 F.3d at 795. He timely
asked for enlargements of time, and the time requested was
not extraordinary. His first motion for an enlargement of
time, which was granted, was timely filed and sought merely
an additional thirty days. The second motion was also timely
filed and asked for only an additional twenty-one days.
Moreover, the length of time that lapsed between the
appointment of Williams’ counsel and the filing of the
amended petition, while not irrelevant, does not obviate the
need for sufficient time after receiving the magistrate’s report
and recommendation to review the actual report and prepare
responsive objections.
Nor did Williams fail to give reasons for needing additional
time. See, e.g., Wilson v. Cassidy (In re Cassidy), 273 B.R.
531 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002). In both the second motion for
an enlargement of time and the motion for relief from
judgment, Williams cited a number of reasons for needing
additional time, including illness, preexisting professional
obligations, the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in
Kansas v. Crane, the complexity of the issues, the magnitude
of the record, and the magistrate’s reliance on caselaw from
other jurisdictions. All of these events were mostly or
entirely beyond counsel’s control, and there is no evidence
that the any of the claimed reasons were false or frivolous.
The respondent asks us to penalize Williams for failing to
provide the district court with the specific details of his
counsel’s illness or trial schedule, but we do not believe that
fact supports a finding of culpability where, as here, he was
never asked for such information and the veracity of the
information has not been challenged. The respondent also
contends, as the district court ruled, that Crane had no
relevance to Williams’ case. We disagree. The grant of
certiorari in Crane, presenting (and ultimately resolving) the
issue of what the federal Constitution requires a state to
12 Williams v. Meyer No. 01-1951
demonstrate with respect to a sexual offender’s lack of
control, clearly had the potential to be relevant to Williams’
claims.
Finally, Williams did not delay seeking relief or filing his
objections. He filed his motion for relief, with objections
attached, almost immediately after the district court denied
the second motion for enlargement of time and entered
judgment. And the objections Williams seeks to file are not
mere repetitions of his original petition. Given these
circumstances, Williams’ failure to timely file objections was
the result of “excusable neglect,” not culpable conduct.
2. Prejudice to Prevailing Party
The respondent concedes that granting the requested relief
will cause it no prejudice.
3. Meritoriousness of Claim or Defense
The final factor to consider is the meritoriousness of the
claim of the party seeking relief – in this case, the
meritoriousness of Williams’ objections to the magistrate’s
report and recommendation. A claim or defense is
“meritorious,” if “there is some possibility that the outcome
of the suit after a full trial will be contrary to the result
achieved by the default.” INVST Financial v. Chem-Nuclear
Systems, 815 F.2d 391, 398-99 (6th Cir. 1987) (internal
quotations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Amerinational
Indus. v. Action-Tungsram, Inc., 925 F.2d 970, 977 (6th Cir.
1991). The test of meritoriousness is not “likelihood of
success,” but merely whether the claim or defense is “good at
law.” United Coin, 705 F.2d at 845. Ambiguous or disputed
facts must be construed “in the light most favorable to the
[defaulted party].” Amerinational, 925 F.2d at 977.
Accordingly, we must decide whether permitting the filing of
Williams’ objections, which opens up the possibility of an
appeal on the merits, creates “some possibility” of a different

-- 6 of 9 --

No. 01-1951 Williams v. Meyer 13
5Kansas’ Sexually Vio lent Predator Act is an act similar, but not
identical, to M ichgan’s Sexual Psychopath Act. The Kansas Act provides
for the civil co mmitment of a “sexually violent predator,” defined as a
person (1) convicted of, or charged with, a sexually violent offense,
(2) who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder, and
(3) which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual
violence. A person held under this statute must be discharged if, at any
time, the state can no longer sa tisfy its burden of p roving these facts
beyo nd a reasonable doubt.
outcome. Applying this standard, as explained below, we
believe that several of his objections are meritorious.
a. Meritorious Objection to Analysis of First Due
Process Claim
Williams’ first due process claim is that section 7 is
unconstitutional because it does not require sufficient proof
of future dangerousness. Specifically, he claims that under
section 7, as interpreted and applied by Michigan courts, the
State can prevent discharge by proving merely a
predisposition toward future dangerousness, whereas the
Supreme Court’s decision in Kansas v. Hendricks, upholding
Kansas’ Sexually Violent Predator Act, established that
continued confinement requires proof of a likelihood of future
dangerousness.
In Hendricks, in the course of resolving the specific issues
before it, the Supreme Court observed that civil commitment
statutes generally satisfy due process when “they have
coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some
additional factor, such as a mental illness or mental
abnormality.” It then concluded that Kansas’ Sexually
Violent Predator Act satisfied this standard because it
required “evidence of past sexually violent behavior and a
present mental condition that creates a likelihood of such
conduct in the future if the person is not incapacitated.”5 521
U.S. at 357-58 (emphasis added).
14 Williams v. Meyer No. 01-1951
The magistrate judge agreed that Hendricks established that
due process requires proof of a likelihood of future
dangerousness, but rejected Williams’ claim that section 7
does not require such proof. He acknowledged that the
language of section 7 differs from the language of Kansas’s
Sexually Violent Predator Act, but found those differences
immaterial as the Michigan courts, in his view, had applied
section 7 in a manner that “mirrors the Kansas statute.” JA
162. He justified his conclusion by pointing out that the
Michigan Court of Appeals stated in its opinion that
Williams’ claim failed “because the state proved, as required
by the [Sexual Psychopath Act], that [Williams] would pose
an actual threat of danger to others if he were release[d] from
his detention.” JA 162-63 (quoting Williams, 228 Mich. App.
at 555 (JA 109)). Relying on this language, he concluded that
the “menace to others” language of section 7 serves the same
purpose as the “likelihood of such conduct” language in the
Kansas statute, namely, to insure that continued commitment
is based on a finding of a likelihood of future dangerousness.
Williams objects to the magistrate’s reliance on the
Michigan Court of Appeals’ opinion as the basis for his
conclusion that section 7 requires finding a likelihood of
future dangerousness. JA 207. He contends that the opinion
does not clearly impose such a requirement, as it also
describes the required finding in terms of a predisposition or
propensity toward future dangerousness. Id. (citing Williams,
228 Mich. App. at 554-555 (JA 109)).
We agree. In its opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals
states that Williams poses an “actual threat of danger,” but it
also describes section 7 as requiring the state to prove
“criminal propensities to commit future sex offenses,” or a
“mental disorder that predisposes him to commit future sex
offenses.” JA 109 (Williams, 228 Mich. App. at 554-555).
This conflicting language calls into question the magistrate’s
conclusion that it has been clearly established by the
Michigan courts that section 7 requires proof of a likelihood

-- 7 of 9 --

No. 01-1951 Williams v. Meyer 15
of future dangerousness and persuades us that Williams’
objection is meritorious.
b. Meritorious Objections to Equal Protection
Analysis
Williams’ equal protection claim is that section 7 is
unconstitutional because it subjects him to a different, and
more difficult to satisfy, standard for release than that applied
to other involuntary detainees, including sexual offenders
committed after being found guilty but mentally ill or not
guilty by reason of insanity, who are covered by the Mental
Health Code.
The magistrate rejected Williams’ equal protection claim
on several grounds. First, again relying on the Michigan
Court of Appeals’ opinion, he concluded that standards for
discharge in the Mental Health Code and in section 7 “largely
mirror” each other and, therefore, that Williams could not
show any constitutionally significant difference between his
treatment and the treatment of other involuntary detainees
under the Mental Health Code. JA 166. Moreover, he ruled,
even if the standards are different, the equal protection claim
fails because “[i]mprovement in the criminal justice,
sentencing, and mental health schemes of a state are
substantial governmental interests, and a state does not violate
equal protection by applying different schemes to persons
who committed their crimes at different times.” JA 169.
Williams first objects to the magistrate’s conclusion that
section 7 imposes the same burden as the Mental Health
Code. He argues that the definition of future dangerousness
in the Mental Health Code is “specific and narrow,” while the
definition in section 7 is “broad and general,” making it easier
to obtain release under the Mental Health Code. JA 210. As
the magistrate recognized, the Michigan Court of Appeals’
finding that the Mental Health Code and section 7 “largely
mirror” each other is a construction of state law that is
binding on a federal court. However, that finding does not
16 Williams v. Meyer No. 01-1951
preclude the possibility that a federal court might nonetheless
conclude that there are differences between the two schemes
and that those differences are constitutionally significant. The
magistrate’s analysis does not address this possibility.
Moreover, Williams’ claim that the burdens are not identical,
and that it is more difficult to obtain release under section 7,
is supported by the testimony of at least one expert. See JA
41 (describing testimony of Dr. Mark Fettman). Accordingly,
we are persuaded that this objection is meritorious.
Williams also objects to the magistrate’s conclusion that
any difference between his treatment under section 7 and the
treatment of other sexual offenders under the Mental Health
Code is constitutionally insignificant because it results from
the state’s “substantial” interest in improving its criminal
justice, sentencing and mental health schemes. He contends
that the magistrate erred because he failed to apply strict
scrutiny, which requires that the government’s interests be
compelling. We agree. Any difference in treatment of
involuntary detainees is subject to strict scrutiny. See Foucha
v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 85-86 (1992). As the magistrate’s
analysis fails to apply this standard, Williams’ second
objection to the magistrate’s equal protection analysis is also
meritorious.
III. CONCLUSION
As all three Coin factors weigh in Williams’ favor, the
district court should have granted Williams’ motion for relief
from judgment and permitted him to file his objections.
Accordingly, and for the above stated reasons, the district
court’s order denying Williams’ motion for relief from
judgment, for reconsideration of the order denying a second
enlargement of time to file objections and for leave to file
objections is REVERSED. The district court’s April 27,
2001 order denying the second motion for enlargement of
time is REVERSED; its April 27, 2001 order accepting the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and denying
Williams’ application for the writ of habeas corpus is

-- 8 of 9 --

No. 01-1951 Williams v. Meyer 17
6A de termination o n remand that W illiams has been dep rived of his
constitutional right to due pro cess or equal protection d oes not entitle him
to release, but to have a state court reconsider his petition for discharge
guided by the federal court’s final ruling on the merits.
VACATED; and its April 27, 2001 judgment in favor of the
respondent and against the petitioner is VACATED. The
case is REMANDED with instructions for the district court
to accept Williams’ objections for filing, and to issue a
decision on Williams’ petition after consideration of all of his
objections.6
18 Williams v. Meyer No. 01-1951
______________
DISSENT
______________
BOGGS, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent
from my colleagues’ holding that counsel committed
“excusable neglect” in failing to file objections to the
magistrate judge’s report in this case. Counsel had asked for
an extension of time for thirty days beyond the ten-day period
prescribed for such objections. The court actually granted an
additional thirty-nine days, to April 25.
Counsel, now having had forty-nine days since the filing of
the magistrate judge’s report, waited until the forty-eighth day
to ask for an additional twenty-one day extension.
Under these circumstances, waiting until the next to the last
day to file the extension was virtually defying the judge’s
right to rule on the motion. The circumstances at issue here,
while certainly trying, are in no way out of the ordinary for
legal practice. Other professional and personal commitments,
which did not arise at the last moment, are part and parcel of
doing business as a lawyer. The reasons relied on by my
colleagues for finding this neglect excusable would be present
in very many cases before our court. By waiting until the end
of the extended period to file a request for yet another
extension, counsel insured that the judge would have no
choice between dismissing the case, with the harsh
consequences that are noted in the opinion, and acceeding to
counsel’s request, whatever its merits. Under these
circumstances, I would hold that the test of United Coin
Meter and of Weiss has been met and that counsel’s actions
show carelessness and/or negligence in dealing with the time
given him by the court’s initial extension of time.
I therefore respectfully dissent.

-- 9 of 9 --