Virginia Sagan, as Personal Representative of the Estate of RICHARD SAGAN, deceased v. United States of America

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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0302P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 03a0302p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
VIRGINIA SAGAN, as Personal
Representative of the Estate
of RICHARD SAGAN,
deceased; VIRGINIA SAGAN,
in her individual capacity,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;
ALGONAC FIRE DEPARTMENT;
JOHN STIER; RUSS SEDER;
JERRY DOAN; JOE DOAN,
Defendants-Appellees.
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No. 01-2568
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Flint.
No. 99-40130—Paul V. Gadola, District Judge.
Argued: June 13, 2003
Decided and Filed: August 25, 2003
Before: KEITH, MOORE, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.
2 Sagan, et al. v. United States, et al. No. 01-2568
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Andrew W. Mayoras, BARRON, ROSENBERG,
MAYORAS & MAYORAS, Troy, Michigan, for Appellants.
Michelle T. Delemarre, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., Daniel P. Dalton,
TOMKIW DALTON, Royal Oak, Michigan, for Appellees.
ON BRIEF: Andrew W. Mayoras, Ronald M. Barron,
BARRON, ROSENBERG, MAYORAS & MAYORAS,
Troy, Michigan, Gary E. Levitt, LAW OFFICES OF GARY
E. LEVITT, Troy, Michigan, for Appellants. Michelle T.
Delemarre, Debra J. Kossow, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., Daniel P.
Dalton, TOMKIW DALTON, Royal Oak, Michigan, for
Appellees.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
DAMON J. KEITH, Circuit Judge. In this personal injury
action, the Plaintiffs appeal a September 10, 2001 order
granting Defendant United States’ motion for summary
judgment and dismissing without prejudice the Plaintiffs’
claims against Defendants Algonac Fire Department, John
Stier, Russ Seder, Jerry Doan, and Joe Doan. For the reasons
set forth below, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of
summary judgment for the United States and REMAND the
case for further proceedings, with the Plaintiffs’ claims
against the other Defendants reinstated.
I. BACKGROUND
On the night of August 30, 1997, Richard and Virginia
Sagan took their boat to Little Muscamoot Bay near Algonac,
Michigan. They intended to spend the night in the bay with

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No. 01-2568 Sagan, et al. v. United States, et al. 3
their friends Greg Grizdowski and Karen Drobot. The Sagans
tied their boat to Grizdowski’s boat in shallow water. At
around 11:30 p.m., after he had been drinking for several
hours, Richard Sagan took off his clothes and dove head-first
into the bay. His head struck the bottom of the bay, which
was less than three feet deep at the point of Mr. Sagan’s entry.
His spinal column between the C4 and C5 levels was severed
on impact.
Realizing that her husband was in trouble, Mrs. Sagan
jumped into the water, lifted Mr. Sagan’s head, and screamed
that he was not breathing. Mrs. Sagan dragged Mr. Sagan
toward the boat, yelling at her husband to wake up. Mrs.
Sagan and Grizdowski tried unsuccessfully to lift Mr. Sagan
onto Grizdowski’s boat and then onto the Sagans’ boat.
Grizdowski performed mouth-to-mouth resuscitation on Mr.
Sagan, who began to breathe and moan. Mr. Sagan’s
breathing was impeded by water in his lungs. He told
Grizdowski that he had no sensation in his hands.
At 11:35 p.m., Mrs. Sagan used the radio on her boat to
contact the Macomb County Sherriff’s Department. At 12:15
a.m., the Algonac Fire Department arrived on the scene in a
boat. Three minutes later, the United States Coast Guard
arrived by boat and informed those present that a rescue
helicopter was on its way and would take Mr. Sagan to the
hospital. Mr. Sagan was secured to a backboard on the deck
of the Algonac Fire and Rescue boat. According to Mrs.
Sagan, Captain Joe Doan of the Algonac Fire Department
insisted that Mr. Sagan immediately be taken to a hospital via
an ambulance that was waiting a mile away from the boats.
The Plaintiffs contend that the Coast Guard seized control
of the situation and prevented the Algonac Boat from leaving,
demanding instead that they wait for a Coast Guard
helicopter. Sometime after 1:00 a.m., the Coast Guard
4 Sagan, et al. v. United States, et al. No. 01-2568
1The Coast Guard helicopter had initially gone to Fisher Bay,
approximately three miles away from Little M uscam oot B ay. The C oast
Guard lowered a rescue swimm er near some boats in Fishe r Bay, only to
learn that they were in the wrong place.
helicopter arrived on the scene.1 Shortly after the helicopter
arrived, it was determined that the backboard to which Mr.
Sagan had been secured was incompatible with the device
needed to lift him to the helicopter. The rescuers agreed that
transferring Mr. Sagan to a compatible backboard would risk
further injury, and that instead the Algonac Fire Department
boat should transport Mr. Sagan to the waiting ambulance.
Mr. Sagan was transferred to the ambulance at approximately
1:46 a.m.
Mr. Sagan became a quadriplegic as a result of his dive into
shallow water. Within a month of his injury, he began to
suffer from pneumonia, which his doctors attributed to the
spinal injury’s effects on his breathing, to his having inhaled
water, and/or to his having suffered from hypothermia. He
required complicated pulmonary care, including frequent
suctioning, the use of albuterol, Atrovent and Serevent
breathing treatments, and percussion and postural drainage
therapy. He required assistance to perform most daily
activities, including eating, bathing, and going to the
bathroom. Mr. Sagan also had numerous respiratory
problems, including impaired swallowing and ineffective
airway clearance and tracheostomy. He was unable to breathe
effectively without ventilator assistance.
On February 1, 1999, the Sagans sued the United States
pursuant to the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 740 et
seq. Their complaint alleged that the United States Coast
Guard failed to exercise due care while attempting to rescue
Richard Sagan after he dove into shallow water, and that the
Coast Guard’s failure to exercise due care caused and/or
exacerbated injuries to Mr. Sagan.

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No. 01-2568 Sagan, et al. v. United States, et al. 5
Richard Sagan died on August 9, 1999. According to the
death certificate, the “immediate cause” of death was the
quadriplegia from which Mr. Sagan had suffered for
approximately two years, and the “underlying cause” was
pneumonia.
On August 11, 2000, Plaintiff Virginia Sagan filed a
Second Amended Complaint in which she alleged that
Defendants Algonac Fire Department, John Stier, Russ Seder,
Jerry Doan, and Joe Doan acted negligently toward Richard
Sagan, and that their negligence proximately caused and/or
exacerbated his injuries. These Defendants were all part of
the effort to rescue Mr. Sagan but were not associated with
the Coast Guard; hereinafter they will be called “the Algonac
Defendants.”
The parties conducted discovery. On September 15, 2000,
the Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. A
hearing was held on November 28, 2000, and the parties
presented arguments in support of and in opposition to the
motions.
In a Memorandum Opinion and Order dated September 10,
2001, the district court granted Defendant United States’
motion for summary judgment and dismissed without
prejudice the claims against the Algonac Defendants for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. See Sagan v. United States,
157 F. Supp. 2d 824 (E.D. Mich. 2001). The district court
found that the Plaintiffs had failed to present enough evidence
that the United States proximately caused Mr. Sagan’s
injuries to survive summary judgment. The district court then
held that because the claim against the United States was
dismissed, the claims against the Algonac Defendants must
also be dismissed, because those claims were before the
district court based on supplemental jurisdiction.
6 Sagan, et al. v. United States, et al. No. 01-2568
2The Appellants here are Virginia Sagan, as personal representative
of the estate of Richard Sagan, and Virginia Sagan, in her individual
capacity. We refer to them as “the Plaintiffs” throughout this opinion.
The Plaintiffs filed this timely appeal.2 In it, they allege
that the district court erred in concluding that there was no
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the United States’
negligence proximately caused Richard Sagan’s injuries. The
Plaintiffs ask that their claims against all parties be reinstated
and that the matter be remanded to the district court. They
further request that on remand, the case be assigned to a
different district court judge to preserve the appearance of
justice.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
A district court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed
de novo. See Holloway v. Brush, 220 F.3d 767, 772 (6th Cir.
2000). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In
deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that
party’s favor. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The judge is not to
“weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but
to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
A genuine issue for trial exists only where there is sufficient
“evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
plaintiff.” Id. at 252. The central issue is “whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52.

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No. 01-2568 Sagan, et al. v. United States, et al. 7
B. Analysis
1. The Plaintiffs’ Claim Against the United States
The Suits in Admiralty Act (SIAA) “is the exclusive
remedy against the United States for maritime torts . . . . In
contrast to the Federal Tort Claims Act . . ., the SIAA does
not incorporate state tort law, inasmuch as maritime tort law
is federal law.” Good v. Ohio Edison Co., 149 F.3d 413, 420
n.13 (6th Cir. 1998). The SIAA does not itself create a cause
of action against the United States. See Good, 149 F.3d at
419. Rather, a plaintiff must show that the United States
would be liable under maritime tort law for the same conduct.
The United States Coast Guard does not have an
affirmative duty to rescue persons in distress. Federal law
merely provides that the Coast Guard “shall” establish and
operate rescue facilities and that it “may” render aid to protect
persons and property at any time such facilities are available.
See 14 U.S.C. § 88. However, once the Coast Guard
undertakes a rescue operation, it must act with reasonable
care. See Patentas v. United States, 687 F.2d 707 (3d Cir.
1982). Its actions are judged according to the so-called
“Good Samaritan” doctrine. See id. at 713-14. Under this
doctrine, a defendant is liable for breach of a duty voluntarily
assumed by affirmative conduct, even when that assumption
of duty was gratuitous. See id. (citing Indian Towing Co. v.
United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955)). The Restatement
(Second) of Torts has described the doctrine as follows:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to
render services to another which he should recognize as
necessary for the protection of the other’s person or
things, is subject to liability to the other for physical
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable
care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to
exercise such care increases the risk of harm, or (b) the
harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the
undertaking.
8 Sagan, et al. v. United States, et al. No. 01-2568
3The proximate cause element was the focus of the United States’
motion for summary judgment and the basis for the district court’s grant
of summ ary judgment. The United States does not appear to dispute that
it was negligent, and no one disputes that Mr. Sagan sustained injuries on
the night in question. Therefore, our focus will be on the issue of
proximate cause as well. See American & Foreign Insurance Co. v.
Genera l Electric, 45 F.3d 135, 140 (6th Cir. 199 5) (“O f all the elem ents
necessary to support recovery in a to rt action, causation is the most
susceptible to summary determination.”)
4The Coast Guard delayed the rescue of Mr. Sagan by insisting that
the rescuers wait for a helicopter rather than transport him by boat to a
waiting ambulance . The district co urt concluded that the Coast Guard’s
actions delayed the rescue by 55 m inutes. T he Plaintiffs continue to assert
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323b (1965).
To prevail in this case, the Plaintiffs must prove that the
Coast Guard was negligent in carrying out its rescue of Mr.
Sagan, and that the Coast Guard’s negligence proximately
caused some of his injuries. Thus, in order to survive
summary judgment, the Plaintiffs must produce evidence
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the risk of physical harm to Mr. Sagan was increased
by the Coast Guard’s negligence. “The test is not whether the
risk was increased over what it would have been if the
defendant had not been negligent,” but rather whether “the
risk was increased over what it would have been had the
defendant not engaged in the undertaking at all.” Myers v.
United States, 17 F.3d 890, 903 (6th Cir. 1994).
With these standards in mind, we now proceed to evaluate
the evidence in this case to determine whether it gives rise to
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Coast
Guard’s negligence proximately caused injury to Richard
Sagan.3 The Plaintiffs do not contend that the Coast Guard is
in any way responsible for Richard Sagan becoming a
quadriplegic. Mr. Sagan became a quadriplegic when he dove
head-first into shallow water. Instead, the Plaintiffs contend
that the Coast Guard’s negligence in delaying the rescue4

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No. 01-2568 Sagan, et al. v. United States, et al. 9
that the time of the d elay was in fact one hour and 20 m inutes. T he
evidence is ambiguous regarding exactly how much delay the Coast
Guard caused, but the evidence is uncontradicted that the Coast Guard
caused a delay.
contributed to Mr. Sagan’s development of hypothermia,
pulmonary and respiratory problems, and pneumonia.
In support of this contention, the Plaintiffs point to the
affidavit of Dr. Ralph E. Dilisio, one of Richard Sagan’s
treating physicians at St. John’s Hospital. Dr. Dilisio stated
that “the significant hypothermia caused by the delay did
contribute to Mr. Sagan’s respiratory complications.
Specifically, the detrimental systematic effects, including the
pulmonary dysfunction, resulted in Mr. Sagan being
significantly more ventilator dependent than he would have
been without the delay, among other complications.” J.A. at
844 (Affidavit of Ralph E. Dilisio, M.D.). Dr. Dilisio also
stated that the delay “resulted in Mr. Sagan being far more
susceptible to pneumonia,” and that the pulmonary problems
that Mr. Sagan suffered were “far more severe than I would
expect from an individual with his level of spinal injury.” Id.
Finally, Dr. Dilisio recited the “well-recognized medical
principle that not appropriately securing a victim’s head and
neck, resulting in movement of the head and neck, after a
severe C4-C5 spinal cord injury is an aggravating factor to the
spinal cord injury.” Id.
The Plaintiffs also rely on the affidavit of Dr. Jennifer
Doble, who treated Mr. Sagan at Lakeland Center. According
to Dr. Doble, “Mr. Sagan had severe and substantial
respiratory problems which caused him to be much more
ventilator dependent than a typical C4-C5 quadriplegic. In
addition, the respiratory problems caused Mr. Sagan to be far
more susceptible to pneumonia.” J.A. at 851 (Affidavit of
Jennifer Doble, M.D.). Dr. Doble stated that in her medical
opinion, Mr. Sagan died from pneumonia. See id.
10 Sagan, et al. v. United States, et al. No. 01-2568
As the Plaintiffs are quick to point out, the report of an
expert witness for the defense also lends support to the
Plaintiffs’ argument that the delay caused injury to Mr.
Sagan. According to Dr. Alberto Martinez-Arizala,
In one area, specifically hypothermia, the delay in rescue
probably had an untoward effect. Hypothermia has
detrimental systemic effects that include pulmonary
dysfunction and it could have contributed to his
respiratory compromise. . . . Upon arrival at St. John’s
hospital his temperature was recorded at 86.7° F, which
is significantly low. So he was significantly hypothermic
and this could have contributed to his complications.
J.A. at 598 (Report of Defendant’s Expert Witness Alberto
Martinez-Arizala, M.D.). Dr. Martinez-Arizala also stated
that “[a]nother complication of his injury that may be related
to the delay in transportation was the development of
aspiration pneumonia”, although “it is likely that it would
have occurred even if he had been transported sooner.” Id.
The Plaintiffs note that one of the Algonac Defendants, Joe
Doan, also testified as to the importance of transporting Mr.
Sagan to a hospital as soon as possible to prevent
hypothermia and pneumonia. In his deposition, Captain
Doan, a state-licensed paramedic, stated that he believed Mr.
Sagan needed intravenous fluids to warm his body.
The district court found that the Plaintiffs had not produced
evidence that the Coast Guard’s actions caused Mr. Sagan’s
injuries to be worse or more numerous than they would have
been had the Coast Guard not attempted the rescue at all. The
district court characterized the Plaintiffs’ evidence as “no
more than conjecture or speculation” and “insufficient to raise
an issue of fact to defeat a summary judgment motion.”
Sagan v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 2d 824, 829 (E.D. Mich.
2001). We respectfully disagree. We think the Plaintiffs
have produced evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the Coast Guard’s negligence in

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No. 01-2568 Sagan, et al. v. United States, et al. 11
delaying the rescue proximately caused injury to Richard
Sagan. The evidence presented to the district court was
expert medical opinion from physicians who had treated Mr.
Sagan; it was not merely “conjecture or speculation.” We
think a reasonable trier of fact could find for the Plaintiffs on
the issue of causation based on the testimony of Drs. Dilisio,
Doble, and Martinez-Arizala. All three experts agreed that,
at the very least, the delay “probably” contributed to Mr.
Sagan’s injuries.
Furthermore, it is telling that the defense’s own expert
witness, Dr. Martinez-Arizala, stated in his report that “the
majority of Mr. Sagan’s injuries resulted from his original
trauma at the time of his accident, and not from actions or
lack of actions of his rescuers.” J.A. at 597 (Martinez-Arizala
Report) (emphasis added). The United States cites this
statement in its brief, as though it supports the United States’
position. On the contrary, it supports the Plaintiffs’ argument
for causation inasmuch as Dr. Martinez-Arizala acknowledges
that some – “a minority” – of Mr. Sagan’s injuries resulted
from the actions or lack of actions of his rescuers. Of course,
the law does not require a plaintiff to prove that the majority
of his injuries were proximately caused by the defendants.
Indeed, in this case, it seems fairly clear that the majority of
Mr. Sagan’s injuries were caused by his head-first dive into
shallow water. The important question is whether the Coast
Guard’s negligence in rescuing Mr. Sagan caused additional
injury, not whether those additional injuries amount to a
majority or a minority of all the injuries sustained by Mr.
Sagan on the night in question.
We are also puzzled by the district court’s statement that
the Plaintiffs “have not produced evidence that Defendant’s
actions increased Plaintiff Richard Sagan’s injuries over what
those injuries would have been had Defendant not attempted
the rescue at all.” 157 F. Supp. 2d at 829. It is clear from the
record that from the moment they arrived on the scene, the
Algonac Defendants wanted to transport Mr. Sagan by boat
to a waiting ambulance. The Coast Guard prevented them
12 Sagan, et al. v. United States, et al. No. 01-2568
from carrying out this plan, and the approximately one hour
delay ensued. Thus, the delay would not have occurred had
Defendant United States not attempted the rescue at all.
For these reasons, we find that the Plaintiffs have presented
sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether the Coast Guard’s negligence in delaying the
rescue of Richard Sagan proximately caused him injury.
2. The Plaintiffs’ Claims Against the Algonac Defendants
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) provides that “in any civil action of
which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district
courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other
claims that are so related to claims in the action within such
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy.” We review a determination of whether a
district court has jurisdiction de novo. Blakely v. United
States, 276 F.3d 853, 860 (6th Cir. 2002).
After the district court granted the United States’ motion
for summary judgment, the court dismissed without prejudice
the Plaintiffs’ purely state law claims against the Algonac
Defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In their
complaint, the Plaintiffs assert only state law claims against
the Algonac Defendants and explicitly state that they are not
invoking admiralty jurisdiction as to the Algonac Defendants.
We leave for the district court the issue of whether the state
law claims are preempted by federal maritime law. The
district court noted that the Algonac Defendants were in
federal court based on supplemental jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court has held that “if the federal claims are
dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims should be
dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of America v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
The district court’s dismissal of the claims against the
Algonac Defendants was proper in light of its grant of
summary judgment for the United States. However, because

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No. 01-2568 Sagan, et al. v. United States, et al. 13
we now reverse the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for the United States and remand this case for
further proceedings, the claims against the Algonac
Defendants must also be remanded based on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a). See Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737,
757 (6th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by
Swierkiewics v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002)
(remanding a state defamation claim to the district court after
reversing the district court’s dismissal of a federal claim).
3. The Necessity of Reassignment
The Plaintiffs argue that on remand, this case should be
assigned to a different district court judge. We have the
authority to do this under 28 U.S.C. § 2106. However, as we
have frequently emphasized, reassignment is an
“extraordinary power and should be rarely invoked . . . .
[R]eassignments should be made infrequently and with the
greatest reluctance.” Armco, Inc. v. United Steel Workers of
America, AFL-CIO, Local 169, 280 F.3d 669, 683 (6th Cir.
2002); see also Hamad v. Woodcrest Condominium Ass’n,
328 F.3d 224, 238 (6th Cir. 2003). In determining whether
reassignment is necessary, courts consider (1) whether the
original judge would reasonably be expected to have
substantial difficulty in putting out of his mind previously
expressed views or findings; (2) whether reassignment is
advisable to preserve the appearance of justice; and
(3) whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication
out of proportion to any gain in preserving the appearance of
fairness. See Bercheny v. Johnson, 633 F.2d 473, 476-77 (6th
Cir. 1980).
The Plaintiffs argue that the district judge in this case failed
to consider and/or mischaracterized the Plaintiffs’ evidence
regarding Richard Sagan’s pulmonary and respiratory
injuries, that he determined the issue of proximate cause
based upon his own predetermined beliefs on quadriplegia,
and that he was so partial to defendant United States that he
initially decided that the Coast Guard had not been negligent
14 Sagan, et al. v. United States, et al. No. 01-2568
in its rescue operation. We agree that the district judge
mischaracterized the Plaintiffs’ evidence when he stated that
the expert medical testimony in this case was “no more than
conjecture or speculation.” Sagan v. United States, 157 F.
Supp. 2d at 829. Accordingly, we have reversed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant United
States and remanded the case for further proceedings. On
remand, the district court will reconsider all of the expert
testimony in the record. We do not think that the district
court’s mischaracterization of the evidence is grounds for
reassignment. If we reassigned the case every time a district
court judge misconstrued some evidence, reassignment would
surely cease to be “an extraordinary power . . . rarely
invoked.” Armco, 280 F.3d at 683. At oral argument in this
case, counsel for the Plaintiffs was asked to provide the court
with some limiting principle that would justify reassignment
here but not in most other cases in which we reverse a district
court’s grant of summary judgment. Plaintiffs’ counsel was
unable to suggest any appropriate limiting principle, and we
cannot think of one.
Turning to the Plaintiffs’ other arguments, we do not agree
that the district court determined the issue of proximate cause
based upon its own predetermined beliefs on quadriplegia.
The Plaintiffs base this argument on an exchange between
Plaintiffs’ counsel and the district court, during which the
district judge stated that quadriplegia is an “irreversible
condition” and that “[w]e still haven’t found a way to cure
somebody from being a quadriplegic.” Appellants’ Br. at 46;
J.A. at 1039-40 (Transcript of Summary Judgment Motion
Hearing). Based on this exchange, the Plaintiffs argue that
the district judge in this case “allowed his own
preconceptions of quadriplegia to interfere with his judgment
of the injuries suffered by Mr. Sagan.” Appellants’ Br. at 48.
We note initially that the Plaintiffs provide no evidence that
the district judge’s statements about quadriplegia were
incorrect. More importantly, we find no evidence that the
district judge here allowed these “predetermined beliefs” to

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No. 01-2568 Sagan, et al. v. United States, et al. 15
influence his decision granting summary judgment for the
United States. The district court’s grant of summary
judgment was not based on the irreversible nature of
quadriplegia. Rather, the district court granted summary
judgment for the United States because it found that the
Plaintiffs had not introduced evidence sufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact with respect to proximate cause.
We also reject the Plaintiffs’ argument that the district
judge decided that the Coast Guard had not been negligent,
and that this determination represents bias. The Plaintiffs
base this argument on a different exchange between
Plaintiffs’ counsel and the district court, during which the
district judge stated: “I think there are real problems here. I
would like to know . . . what evidence there is here that . . .
these defendants did not act with reasonable care in light of
the extremely unique circumstances of this rescue that was
performed.” Appellants’ Br. at 49; J.A. at 1020 (Transcript
of Summary Judgment Motion Hearing).
This statement hardly amounts to a determination that the
Coast Guard was not negligent. We do not think it is
improper for a district judge, in a summary judgment motion
hearing, to ask Plaintiffs’ counsel what evidence he has that
the Defendants did not act with reasonable care. We find in
this statement by the district court nothing inappropriate or
suggestive of bias. See Hamad, 328 F.3d at 239 (finding that
remarks by the district judge, when considered in context, did
not demonstrate that he was partial or that he could not put
aside his personal views); Brown v. Crowley, 312 F.3d 782,
791-92 (6th Cir. 2003) (rejecting a request for reassignment
despite plaintiff’s claim that “[t]he district court seemed to
[analyze] everything in favor of the defendants”). On
remand, the district court will consider fully the issue of the
Coast Guard’s negligence.
For these reasons, we hold that reassignment of this case to
another district court judge is not necessary.
16 Sagan, et al. v. United States, et al. No. 01-2568
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s grant
of summary judgment for the United States and REMAND
the case for further proceedings, with the Plaintiffs’ claims
against the other Defendants reinstated.

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