RANDY LAWSON and SHARON LAWSON v. Shelby County , Tennessee

12 Lawson, et al. v. Shelby
County, Tennessee, et al.
No. 98-6065
II.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s
opinion because I would affirm the district court’s opinion by
finding that the statute of limitations barred this action.
1
RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0155P (6th Cir.)
File Name: 00a0155p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
_________________
R ANDY LAWSON and S HARON
LAWSON ,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
S HELBY C OUNTY ,
TENNESSEE , and its division
the S HELBY C OUNTY
ELECTION C OMMISSION , O.C.
P LEASANT , J R., DAVID H.
LILLARD , J R.,YVONNE B.
ACEY , R ICHARD L. HOLDEN ,
and MYRA S TILES, in their
official capacity as members
of the Shelby County
Election Commission, and
THE S TATE OF TENNESSEE
and DON S UNDQUIST , in his
official capacity as Governor
of the State of Tennessee,
Defendants-Appellees.
;>

1
No. 98-6065
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Tennessee at Memphis.
No. 97-03034—Bernice B. Donald, District Judge.

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2 Lawson, et al. v. Shelby
County, Tennessee, et al.
No. 98-6065
Submitted: October 26, 1999
Decided and Filed: May 3, 2000
Before: MARTIN, Chief Judge; SUHRHEINRICH and
SILER, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Mark L. Pittman, PITTMAN & KELLY,
Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellants. William J. Marett, Jr.,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Nashville,
Tennessee, for Appellees.
MARTIN, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court, in
which SILER, J., joined. SUHRHEINRICH, J. (pp. 10-12),
delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Chief Judge. Randy and Sharon
Lawson appeal an order dismissing their amended complaint
for failure to state a claim. The Lawsons claim that they were
denied the right to vote when they refused to disclose their
social security numbers as a condition to exercising their right
to vote to the Shelby County Election Commission.
On September 26, 1996, Randy and Sharon Lawson
attempted to register to vote in Shelby County by mail.
Instead of writing their social security number as required on
the voter registration form, Randy and Sharon each wrote
“See Public Law 93-579.” Public Law 93-579 is an
amendment to the Freedom of Information/Privacy Act,
which states that neither the federal, state, nor local
governments may deny benefits because of an individual’s
No. 98-6065 Lawson, et al. v. Shelby
County, Tennessee, et al.
11
In Delaware State College v. Ricks, a junior faculty
member was notified that he had been denied tenure, but was
given a “terminal” contract that extended his employment for
one-year beyond the date his tenure was denied. The
Supreme Court found that the cause of action for his denial of
tenure accrued on the date that he was given notice of the
denial, rather than on the date of his termination at the
conclusion of his “terminal” contract. The Court noted that
the “termination of employment at Delaware State is a
delayed, but inevitable consequence of the denial of tenure.”
Id. at 257-58 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has also
held that for the purposes of computing the statute of
limitations period, the “proper focus is on the time of the . . .
act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become
painful.” Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. at 8 (42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 employment termination case)(original emphasis).
This notice-based test to determine when a cause of action
has accrued has also been applied in a variety of other civil
rights actions. See, e.g., Watts v. Graves, 720 F.2d 1416 (5th
Cir. 1983) (per curiam) ( 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action
against local police alleging violation of Fourth Amendment
rights based on warrantless search); Eagleston v. Guido, 41
F.3d 865 (2d Cir. 1994) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action
against police alleging equal protection violation in police
arrest policies relating to domestic violence complaints).
Likewise, in this case, the Lawsons’ inability to vote on
November 5, 1996, was a delayed, but inevitable consequence
of the denial of their registration application in October, 1996.
The alleged deprivation of their rights occurred, and the filing
limitations period began to run, at the time their registration
application was denied, even though the effect of that denial
did not occur until election day. Since the Lawsons were
notified of that denial in October, 1996, more than one year
prior to filing their complaint, their suit is time-barred.

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10 Lawson, et al. v. Shelby
County, Tennessee, et al.
No. 98-6065
_________________
DISSENT
_________________
SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I write
separately to respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion
because I would find that this suit is barred by the one-year
statute of limitations.
I.
I agree with the majority that a one-year statute of
limitations applies to this case under Tennessee law. I also
agree that federal law determines when a cause of action is
deemed to have accrued. However, I disagree with the
majority’s finding that the cause of action in this case accrued
on election day, November 5, 1996. Instead, I agree with the
district court and would find that the cause of action accrued
in October, 1996, when the plaintiffs were given official
notice that they were being denied the right to vote because of
their failure to provide their social security numbers.
Generally, a civil rights cause of action accrues when the
plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury. For
example, the Supreme Court held that a cause of action
accrues at the time the plaintiff has notice of the
discriminatory act for civil rights cases in the employment
context. See Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250
(1980) (denial of tenure case filed under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 accrued on date
tenure was denied, not when employment terminated a year
later as a result of that denial); see also Janikowski v. Bendix
Corp., 823 F.2d 945, 947-48 (6th Cir. 1987) (Age
Discrimination in Employment Act action accrued on date
employee was notified of pending termination, not on the
actual date of termination) (citing Chardon v. Fernandez, 454
U.S. 6 (1981) (per curiam), and Delaware State College v.
Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980)).
No. 98-6065 Lawson, et al. v. Shelby
County, Tennessee, et al.
3
refusal to disclose his social security number. The Shelby
County Election Commission notified the Lawsons before the
October 5 registration deadline that their registration was
denied because they omitted their social security numbers.
The Lawsons attempted to vote in the November 5 general
election, but were denied because they were not registered.
Randy and Sharon each presented to the election official at
the poll, a letter, for signature, stating that he/she was being
denied the right to vote because his/her registration was
rejected for failure to disclose his/her social security number.
On November 5, 1997, exactly one year after the election,
the Lawsons filed suit in federal court against Shelby County,
the Shelby County Election Commission and the Chair of the
Commission, Mr. O.C. Pleasant, Jr., “individually and in his
official capacity.” The Lawsons, seeking injunctive and
declaratory relief, damages and attorney’s fees, claim that
they were denied the right to vote on November 5, 1996,
because they refused to disclose their social security numbers
on their voter registration form. This, they allege, constituted
a deprivation of their rights, privileges and immunities
secured by the Constitution of the United States under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, Article IV § 1 of the
Tennessee Constitution, and the Privacy Act of 1974. The
Lawsons then filed an Amended Complaint on February 27,
1998, naming all the remaining members of the election
commission in their official, but not in their individual,
capacities, the State of Tennessee, and Governor Sundquist in
his official capacity. In their second amended complaint, the
Lawsons assert a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
After granting the Lawson’s permission to amend their
complaint, the district court dismissed the Lawsons’ claims
finding that they were barred by the Eleventh Amendment,
and assuming that the complaint was not barred by the
Eleventh Amendment, the claims were barred by the one year
statute of limitations. The Lawsons filed a timely notice of
appeal to this Court on July 31, 1998.

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4 Lawson, et al. v. Shelby
County, Tennessee, et al.
No. 98-6065
This Court reviews de novo the district court’s dismissal for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Cline v. Rogers, 87 F.3d 176, 179 (6th Cir. 1996).
The Lawsons contend that the district court erred in
dismissing their suit for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted because Eleventh Amendment immunity
does not apply to suits brought by a private citizen seeking
injunctive or declaratory relief against a state official. The
full text of the Eleventh Amendment provides: “The judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” As originally
drafted, the suits to which the Amendment referred were only
those suits brought against a state by out-of-state or foreign
citizens. But, in 1890, the Supreme Court held that in-state as
well as out-of-state citizens were barred by the Eleventh
Amendment from suing a state. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.
1 (1890). Under current law, the Amendment is a bar to
federal court jurisdiction whenever any private citizen
attempts to sue a state.
There are, however, three qualified exceptions to Eleventh
Amendment immunity, only two of which are addressed by
the district court in this case. First, a state may waive the
protection of the Amendment by consenting to the suit.
Consent may occur in a number of ways. A state may
expressly waive immunity from suit for money damages in
court. Thiokol Corp. V. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 987 F.2d
376 (6th Cir. 1993). Consent may also take the form of a
voluntary appearance and defense on the merits in federal
court. Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883). Furthermore,
consent may result when the state agrees to administer a
federal-state program that imposes certain federal standards
No. 98-6065 Lawson, et al. v. Shelby
County, Tennessee, et al.
9
the cause of action accrued, thus satisfying the statute of
limitations.
Thus, we remand the case to the district court to order such
relief as will allow the Lawsons to vote and such other relief
as appropriate.

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8 Lawson, et al. v. Shelby
County, Tennessee, et al.
No. 98-6065
election day for failing to be registered. The denial of the
right to vote, they contend, occurred at the moment they were
denied the opportunity to vote on election day. Defendants,
however, dispute this contention, arguing instead that the
Lawsons were denied the right to vote when they received
notice that their registration application was not successful on
October 1, 1996, which is more than a year before the
complaint was filed. The district court agreed with
Defendants on this issue and therefore dismissed the case.
We reverse the district courts decision on this issue for two
reasons. First, the issue at hand in this case is the
fundamental right to vote not the right to register to vote. The
U.S. Constitution protects an individual’s right to vote during
an election, not the right to register to vote prior to an
election.
Second, the district court cites a number of wrongful
employment termination cases in its opinion to show that
employees brought actions against their respective employers
outside of the limitations periods as measured from the dates
on which they were notified that they had been terminated.
Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6 (1981); In re Rin, 782 F.2d
603 (6th Cir. 1986). The court concludes that the “act” is
what is important, not the point at which the consequences of
the act become painful. These cases, however, do not apply
to the Lawson’s situation. The Lawsons were not denied the
right to vote when they were notified that their registrations
had been rejected, they were denied the right to vote when
they presented themselves at the appropriate polling place and
were denied access to the voting booth. The rejection letters
merely served as notice to the Lawsons that they were not
registered, and in order to become registered, they needed to
provide their social security numbers. This could have been
done up until the time they presented themselves at the polls
on election day. Therefore, the harm to the Lawsons occurred
on November 5, 1996 (election day) when they presented
themselves at their polling station and were refused the right
to vote. The complaint was then filed within one year after
No. 98-6065 Lawson, et al. v. Shelby
County, Tennessee, et al.
5
1Thus far, consent to suit on this basis has never been found. See
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
2The Supreme Court has found no clear statement of intent to
abrogate under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Quern v. Jordan,
440 U.S. 332 (1979).
3Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). The
Supreme Court has suggested that Congress may also abrogate state
sovereign immunity under the Fifteenth Amendment. City of Rome v.
United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
upon the state.1 In this case, the district court correctly
asserted that no consent had been given by the defendant to
satisfy this first exception to the Eleventh Amendment bar.
Thus, the exception does not apply here.
The second exception to the Eleventh Amendment bar is
that Congress, under certain provisions of the Constitution,
may abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states through
statute. For a Congressional abrogation of state sovereign
immunity to be valid, two conditions must be satisfied. First,
Congress must state clearly that it intends a statute to abrogate
state sovereign immunity. Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996).2 Second, a determination
must be made as to whether Congress has acted “pursuant to
a valid exercise of power.”3 Id. Thus, the mere fact that a
statute was passed is not enough to show that Congress
intended to nullify state sovereign immunity. Defendants
correctly assert in their brief that Congress never expressly
abrogated state sovereign immunity under the Privacy Act.
Thus, the Lawsons cannot escape the Eleventh Amendment
bar against their Privacy Act claim under the second
exception. But Defendants also note that the Lawsons may be
able to circumvent a state sovereign immunity defense under
a third exception to the Eleventh Amendment bar.

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6 Lawson, et al. v. Shelby
County, Tennessee, et al.
No. 98-6065
Under the third exception, a federal court may enjoin a
“state official” from violating federal law. Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123 (1908). The idea behind this exception is that
a suit against a state officer is not a suit against the state when
the remedy sought is an injunction against an illegal action,
for an officer is not acting on behalf of the state when he acts
illegally. In effect, the illegal act strips the state officer of his
character as an agent of the state for the purposes of the
Eleventh Amendment. Injunctive relief is available under the
Young exception only against state officers — not the state
itself — who violate federal law. Pennhurst State School &
Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). Relief ancillary
to injunctive relief, such as attorneys’ fees is also permitted.
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). However, retroactive
relief, such as money damages, is not permitted because such
relief would require the “payment of funds from the state
treasury.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
In this case, because the Young exception is limited to the
award of prospective nonmonetary relief, any claim for
retroactive relief or damages is barred under the Eleventh
Amendment. Id. In addition, the Lawsons’ claims against the
State of Tennessee are barred by the Eleventh Amendment,
because the Amendment prohibits suits against a “state” in
federal court whether for injunctive, declaratory or monetary
relief.
However, the Lawsons’ claims for prospective injunctive
and declaratory relief against the individual state and county
officials should not be dismissed. Under the fiction of Ex
parte Young, these officials may be stripped of their character
as agents of the state when they violate federal law. The
Lawsons allege that Governor Sundquist, the Chairman of the
Shelby County Election Commission and the remaining
members of the Commission engaged in conduct that violated
federal law when they denied the Lawsons the right to vote
for failing to disclose their social security numbers. Thus,
their request for prospective injunctive relief against these
officials is permitted under the Young exception. Moreover,
No. 98-6065 Lawson, et al. v. Shelby
County, Tennessee, et al.
7
4Suits may be brought by private citizens against counties and
municipalities under section 1983. Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
because the Lawsons’ requests for declaratory relief and
attorneys’ fees are ancillary to their request for prospective
injunctive relief, such relief would also fall under the Young
exception.
Finally, subdivisions of the state, such as counties and
municipalities, are not protected by the Eleventh Amendment.
Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890). The
Eleventh Amendment limits the jurisdiction only as to suits
against a state.4 Id., at 530. Even though a county is
territorially a part of the state, it is also a corporation created
by it, and is therefore only a part of the state “in that remote
sense in which any city, town or other municipal corporation
may be said to be a part of the state.” Id. In this case, the
Lawsons filed suit against Shelby County and the Shelby
County Election Commission. These entities are not
protected by the Eleventh Amendment under Luning.
Therefore, the Lawsons’ claims against these entities should
not have been dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds.
In regard to the district court’s dismissal of the Lawson’s
case based on an expired statute of limitations, the Lawsons
argue that the court’s decision should be reversed because the
complaint was filed within the required time period. The
statute of limitations for federal civil rights claims is the
appropriate state statute of limitations. Wilson v. Garcia, 471
U.S. 261 (1985). Tennessee law requires that actions brought
under the federal civil rights statutes shall be commenced
within one year after the cause of action accrues. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(3). Federal law ordinarily determines
when a cause of action is deemed to have accrued. Sevier v.
Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984).
The Lawsons filed their complaint on November 5, 1997,
exactly one year after they were turned away from the polls on

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