Ala Rahim Yonan v. TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 26a0358n.06

No. 25-3437

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

ALA RAHIM YONAN,
Petitioner,

v.

TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF
AN ORDER OF THE BOARD OF
IMMIGRATION APPEALS

OPINION

Before: MOORE, CLAY, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.
MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which CLAY, J., concurred.
NALBANDIAN, J. (pp. 14–16), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Ala Rahim Yonan is a native and citizen
of Iraq who was ordered removed in 2008. Fourteen years later, Yonan filed his third motion to
reopen his immigration proceedings and seek relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”), asserting that country conditions had materially deteriorated for Chaldean Catholic
Christians like himself. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) twice denied his third motion
to reopen. In doing so, however, the BIA applied the incorrect legal standard, determining that
Yonan’s changed-country-conditions evidence was immaterial by comparing it to country
conditions post-dating his merits hearing. We therefore GRANT the petition for review,
VACATE the Board’s decision, and REMAND to the Board for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

No. 25-3437, Yonan v. Blanche

2
I. BACKGROUND
Yonan is a native and citizen of Iraq, and a member of that country’s Chaldean Christian
minority. See Administrative Record (“A.R.”) at 2690 (Notice to Appear at 3); id. at 1524, 1528
(Application for Withholding of Removal at 1, 5); id. at 173 (7/25/2023 Ramadan Decl. at 2).
Fleeing religious persecution, Yonan’s parents brought him and his siblings to the United States
in 1979. Id. at 2690 (Notice to Appear at 3); id. at 1528 (Application for Withholding of Removal
at 5). Eight-year-old Yonan entered and obtained lawful-permanent-resident status because he
was the minor child of his lawful-permanent-resident parents. Id. at 245 (Third Mot. Reopen at
1); id. at 2104 (Application for Cancellation of Removal for Certain Permanent Residents at 1);
id. at 2690 (Notice to Appear at 3). Yonan has remained in the United States since he first entered
the country forty-seven years ago. As a result, Yonan considers himself a Westerner, does not
speak Arabic, and lacks Iraqi identification documents. See id. at 3 (6/2/2025 BIA Dec. at 1).
From the 1990s to the late 2000s Yonan committed multiple criminal offenses which
rendered him removable. In 1990, Yonan was convicted of unarmed robbery and fourth-degree
criminal sexual conduct in Michigan state court. Id. at 2690 (Notice to Appear at 3). Nine years
later, he pleaded guilty to possessing marijuana in Michigan state court. Id.; id. at 1531
(Application for Withholding of Removal at 8). And in 2007, Yonan pleaded guilty to conspiring
to possess with intent to distribute over one-hundred kilograms of marijuana. Id. at 2690 (Notice
to Appear at 3); id. at 1531 (Application for Withholding of Removal at 8). Because Yonan had
committed “two crimes involving moral turpitude,” see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006), a
controlled-substance offense, see id. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006), and an aggravated felony, see id.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006), the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings

No. 25-3437, Yonan v. Blanche

3
against him in May 2008, see A.R. at 2688–90 (Notice to Appear at 1–3). Later that month, an
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordered Yonan removed to Iraq after he conceded removability without
seeking CAT protections. See id.; id. at 2289 (5/27/2008 IJ Order). Yonan also waived his right
to appeal. Id. at 2289 (5/27/2008 IJ Order).
Yonan moved to reopen his removal proceedings for the first time in 2017. See id. at 1474
(First Mot. Reopen BIA Appeal at 3). In that motion, he argued that circumstances in Iraq had
materially changed since 2008 such that he faced a new, increased risk of torture and sought the
ability to apply for CAT relief. See id. The IJ denied Yonan’s motion to reopen, and the BIA
dismissed Yonan’s appeal. See id. at 1206–08 (7/12/2018 BIA Dec. at 1–3).
Yonan filed a second motion to reopen his removal proceedings in October 2019. Id. at
740–67 (Second Mot. Reopen at 1–28). Again, he argued that conditions in Iraq had materially
changed since 2008, increasing his risk of torture, and he sought to apply for CAT relief. Id. The
BIA denied Yonan’s second motion to reopen in July 2020. Id. at 524–27 (7/7/2020 BIA Dec. at
1–4). He then filed a petition for review, but we remanded to the BIA without addressing the
merits of his petition in order to give the BIA the opportunity to distinguish Yonan’s case from
others in which it had granted relief. Yonan v. Garland, No. 20-3781, 2021 LX 43405, at *1–2
(6th Cir. May 24, 2021) (order). The BIA, on remand, again denied Yonan’s motion to reopen.
AR at 336–38 (11/12/2021 BIA Dec. at 1–3). Yonan did not ask us to review this second denial
of his second motion to reopen.
In February 2022, Yonan filed a third motion to reopen. Id. at 245–65 (Third Mot. Reopen
at 1–21). He again argued that conditions in Iraq had changed. Id. at 250–59 (Third Mot. Reopen
at 6–15). Yonan largely focused on the resurgence of ISIS in 2022 and the ascendance of a network

No. 25-3437, Yonan v. Blanche

4
of Iranian-backed militia groups called the Popular Mobilization Forces (“PMF”), which were
formed in 2014 to combat ISIS. See, e.g., id. at 306 (PBS Article); id. at 436 (Smith Decl. at 11).
By 2021, Yohan claimed, the PMF had morphed from a group of private militias into a de facto
arm of the Iraqi state—one with a track record of torturing Christians, particularly those it had
stopped at checkpoints who were traveling without proper papers. Id. at 254–57 (Third Mot.
Reopen at 10–13); see also id. at 267–68, 272–73, 277 (1/26/2022 Ramadan Decl. at 2–3, 7–8,
12). In particular, Yonan highlighted the fact that one of the PMF’s leaders led the political party
that won a plurality of the seats in Iraq’s Parliament in October 2021. Id. at 256–57 (Third Mot.
Reopen at 12–13); see also id. at 274 (1/26/2022 Ramadan Decl. at 9).
While his third motion to reopen was pending before the BIA, Yonan moved to remand the
proceedings to an IJ in August 2023. Id. at 154–64 (Mot. to Remand 1–11). The remand motion
supplemented the facts presented in the third motion to reopen, with Yonan describing how the
Iraqi President had rescinded a longstanding decree acknowledging the religious authority of the
Patriarch of the Chaldean Catholic Church in July 2023 and identifying specific instances where
the PMF had tortured Christians in the mid-2010s and the early-2020s. Id. at 159–61 (Mot. to
Remand at 6–8); see also id. at 189–90, 212 (7/25/2023 Ramadan Decl. at 18–19).
The BIA denied Yonan’s third motion to reopen and motion to remand in December 2023.
Id. at 145–47 (12/20/2023 BIA Dec. at 1–3). The BIA determined that the PMF’s political
ascendancy and the Iraqi President’s decision to rescind the decree acknowledging the authority
of the Chaldean Patriarch were incremental, not material changes in country conditions. Id. at
146–47 (12/20/2023 BIA Dec. at 2–3).

No. 25-3437, Yonan v. Blanche

5
In January 2024, Yonan petitioned this court to review the BIA’s order. We, however,
granted the Government’s motion to remand the case to the BIA following our decision in
Abdulahad v. Garland, 99 F.4th 275 (6th Cir. 2024), so that the Board could address whether
Yonan’s multiple risk factors for torture, in the aggregate, warranted reopening. See Yonan v.
Garland, No. 24-3029 (6th Cir. June 4, 2024) (order). Yonan thereafter submitted a supplemental
brief to the BIA. A.R. at 24–25 (Suppl. Br. at 2–3).
The BIA again denied Yonan’s third motion to reopen in June 2025. Id. at 3–4 (6/2/2025
BIA Dec. at 1–2). The BIA’s decision adopted its 2023 decision and added “clarifying points” in
light of Abdulahad. Id. at 3 (6/2/2025 BIA Dec. at 1). Specifically, the BIA noted that Yonan
articulated five possible bases for torture in Iraq: (1) his status as a Chaldean Christian; (2) his
decades-long U.S. residency; (3) his lack of Iraqi identity documents; (4) his inability to speak
Arabic; (5) and his lack of family in Iraq. Id. The BIA then went on to explain that it had not
discussed these risks separately in its prior order because Yonan’s own expert stated that “having
‘Western’ sympathies and being Christian are often conflated in Iraq.” Id. at 4 (6/2/2025 BIA Dec.
at 2). And although it acknowledged that Yonan “has some risk of serious harm as a Westernized
Christian man returning from the United States without identity documents and family in Iraq,” it
relied on its prior determination to conclude that any risk Yonan faced resulted from incremental,
not material, changes in country conditions. Id. As an example, the BIA observed that Yonan
failed to demonstrate that PMF demonstrated “greater impunity” or tortured more Christians “as a
result of their political gains.” Id.
Yonan thereafter timely filed the instant petition for review, D. 1-2 (Pet. for Review at 1–
3), and simultaneously moved for an emergency stay of removal, D. 4 (Emergency Mot. for Stay

No. 25-3437, Yonan v. Blanche

6
at 1–8), on June 10, 2025. The Government opposed, D. 6 (Gov’t Opp’n to Pet’r’s Emergency
Mot. to Stay Removal at 1–8), and Yonan replied, D. 7 (Pet’r Stay Reply at 1–4). A little over six
months later, a motions panel denied Yonan’s stay motion. Yonan v. Bondi, No. 25-3437, 2025
LX 570372, at *9 (6th Cir. Dec. 12, 2025).
II. ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction
Yonan argues that the BIA applied the incorrect legal standard when it denied his motion
to reopen and that we have jurisdiction to review that question. See D. 15 (Pet’r Br. at 3, 15–23).
Title 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) precludes us from “review[ing] any final order of removal against
an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in section . . .
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B). . . .” Yonan was rendered removable by virtue of committing a controlled-
substance offense, see id. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006), and an aggravated felony, see id.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006). But “§ 1252(a)(2)(C) does not cover challenges to denials of [CAT]
relief.” Kilic v. Barr, 965 F.3d 469, 473 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573,
579–83 (2020)). We thus have jurisdiction to consider Yonan’s claim.
B. Standard of Review
When the BIA issues its own decision, we review that decision “as a final agency
determination.” Perez v. Bondi, 160 F.4th 710, 713 (6th Cir. 2025). The BIA did so here, and we
review its June 2025 and December 2023 decisions collectively because the former expressly
adopted the latter. A.R. at 3 (6/2/2025 BIA Dec. at 1). We review de novo questions of law, such
as whether the BIA applied the correct legal standard when resolving Yonan’s motion to reopen.
See Marqus v. Barr, 968 F.3d 583, 589 (6th Cir. 2020). “We review only ‘the basis articulated in

No. 25-3437, Yonan v. Blanche

7
the decision and [we] may not assume that the Board considered factors that it failed to mention
in its opinion.’” Abdulahad, 99 F.4th at 284 (quoting Preçetaj v. Sessions, 907 F.3d 453, 458 (6th
Cir. 2018)).
C. Motion to Reopen
Typically, a noncitizen applying for immigration relief is limited to a single motion to
reopen that must be filed within ninety days of the entry of the final order of removal. Id. (citing
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)). But the single-motion cap and the ninety-day deadline are subject to an
exception for noncitizens seeking CAT protections “based on changed circumstances arising in
the . . . country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not
available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” Id. (quoting
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)); Shabo v. Barr, 836 F. App’x 370, 372 (6th Cir. 2020). Yonan filed
the instant motion to reopen—his third—fourteen years after the ninety-day deadline, so he
invoked the changed-country-conditions exception. A.R. at 248 (Third Mot. to Reopen at 4); see
also id. at 24 (Suppl. Mot. at 2).
The exception is triggered when a noncitizen demonstrates that conditions in their country
of removal have materially changed since their merits hearing. Abdulahad, 99 F.4th at 285. This
means that we must compare country conditions at two moments in time, juxtaposing conditions
at the time of the original merits hearing with those at the time the noncitizen filed the motion to
reopen. See Bi Feng Liu v. Holder, 560 F.3d 485, 491 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Matter of S-Y-G, 24
I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (B.I.A. 2007)). If we conclude that hostility toward or persecution of the
noncitizen’s group has “‘escalated’ since the original immigration proceeding,” then the changed
country conditions are “material” and the exception applies. Dieng v. Barr, 947 F.3d 956, 962

No. 25-3437, Yonan v. Blanche

8
(6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Pablo Lorenzo v. Barr, 779 F. App’x 366, 373–75 (6th Cir. 2019)). If,
by contrast, conditions are static or undergo immaterial, “incremental or incidental” changes, then
the successive or untimely motion is barred. Abdulahad, 99 F.4th at 286 (quoting Matter of S-Y-
G, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 257).
The BIA identified the correct standard, citing Matter of S-Y-G and Abdulahad. See A.R.
at 146–47 (12/20/2023 BIA Dec. at 2–3); id. at 3–4 (6/2/2025 BIA Dec. at 1–2). But the BIA must
also apply the correct standard. See Abdulahad, 99 F.4th at 288; Pablo Lorenzo, 779 F. App’x at
373–75. Yonan asserts that the BIA did not apply the correct standard because it did not compare
the country-conditions evidence that he presented in his third motion to reopen with country
conditions in 2008 (when his merits hearing occurred). D. 15 (Pet’r Br. at 12–13).
We agree. It is error to compare country conditions as they existed at the time of a motion
to reopen with country conditions postdating the petitioner’s original merits hearing. See
Abdulahad, 99 F.4th at 285–86; accord Tulung v. Garland, 102 F.4th 551, 557 (1st Cir. 2024)
(explaining that country conditions at the time of the original merits hearing are the appropriate
comparator because the “time gap” between multiple motions to reopen may “significantly and
arbitrarily affect changed-conditions determinations” by making material “deterioration of
conditions” since the merits hearing appear as mere incremental change since the prior to motion
to reopen). But the BIA did just that. When evaluating the materiality of Iraq’s 2023 rescission
of its recognition of the Chaldean Patriarch, the BIA compared it to events that transpired long
after Yonan’s merits hearing. It observed, for one, that Iraq had taken other legal actions targeting
Christians, “including . . . legislative action to ban the sale of alcohol.” A.R. at 147 (12/20/2023
BIA Dec. at 3). The alcohol ban, however, was passed in March 2023, just months prior to the

No. 25-3437, Yonan v. Blanche

9
rescission. Id. at 183, 204 (7/25/2023 Ramadan Decl. at 12, 33). The BIA also noted that Yonan’s
“expert declaration . . . describe[d] several incidents where Iraqi Christian deportees were killed
or otherwise harmed,” which “predate[d] the rescission of the decree.” Id. at 147 (12/20/2023 BIA
Dec. at 3). Indeed, they did—but the incidents of torture recounted in Yonan’s expert’s declaration
also postdated Yonan’s merits hearing. See id. at 189–90 (7/25/2023 Ramadan Decl. at 18–19).
In short, the BIA determined that this county-conditions evidence was immaterial without ever
comparing it to country conditions “that existed at the time of the [2008] merits hearing.” Bi Feng
Liu, 560 F.3d at 491 (quoting Matter of S-Y-G, I. & N. Dec. at 253).
Making matters worse, in its June 2025 decision, the Board explained that Yonan’s
“evidence does not show greater impunity for PMF forces or an increase in their torture of
Christians as a result of their political gains.” A.R. at 4 (6/2/2025 BIA Dec. at 2). Yet the record
establishes that the PMF did not exist in 2008; it sprung into existence to combat ISIS in 2014.
See, e.g., id. at 306 (PBS Article); id. at 436 (Smith Decl. at 11) Thus, the BIA determined that a
change in country conditions that occurred in 2021—the PMF securing a plurality in Iraq’s
parliament—was an immaterial, incremental change by comparing it to country conditions in the
mid-2010s to early-2020s—when the PMF emerged and began torturing Christians. Instead, the
BIA should have considered whether PMF forces in 2022 were materially different than the
militias operating in Iraq in 2008—not whether the PMF in 2022 operated with greater impunity
than it did since it arose in the mid-2010s. See Abdulahad, 99 F.4th at 285–86; Tulung, 102 F.4th

No. 25-3437, Yonan v. Blanche

10
at 557. The BIA thus “applied the wrong legal standard[]” and “failed to properly consider
[Yonan’s] evidence.” See Pablo Lorenzo, 779 F. App’x at 375.
1

The Government’s counterarguments are unpersuasive. For starters, the Government
asserts that the BIA applied the proper standard because it considered country conditions in 2008.
D. 29 (Resp’t Br. at 16–17). To be sure, the BIA did observe that the “human rights situation” had
been dire for Iraqi Christians in 2008, as a 2010 report described “‘continued violence against
religious minorities in 2009 and 2010,” A.R. at 146 (12/20/2023 BIA Dec. at 2) (quoting id. at
2499 (U.S. Comm’n on Int’l Religious Freedom, Annual Rep. 68 (2010)), and Yonan’s country-
conditions expert broadly outlined the Christian exodus from Iraq that began in 2003, id. (citing

1
The dissent admits that the BIA “compar[ed] the PMF’s pre- and post-election character,” but insists that
the BIA proceeded to compare the PMF to “earlier militias” that targeted Christians in 2008. Dissent at 15. In reaching
this conclusion, the dissent clings to a single sentence in the BIA’s December 2023 opinion, which reads: “These
militias are not new and have been targeting Christians with impunity throughout the period since the respondent’s
removal hearing.” A.R. at 146 (12/20/2023 BIA Dec. at 2). In essence, the dissent argues that when the BIA wrote
“[t]hese militias,” it meant “earlier militias.”
We disagree with our dissenting colleague’s interpretation. To begin, the text of the BIA’s December 2023
opinion suggests the BIA never analyzed “earlier militias.” Read in context, “[t]hese militias” appears to have been a
reference to the PMF. The Board had just finished discussing “PMF forces” and “one of the PMF’s largest militias”—
a natural reading of the BIA’s opinion suggests that these militias and “[t]hese militias” were one and the same. See
id. Indeed, the remainder of the sentence suggests that the BIA was not analyzing militias in 2008, as the BIA then
described violence in “the period since” 2008. Id. (emphasis added). Bolstering this interpretation, in its June 2025
opinion, the BIA confirmed that it simply compared the PMF pre- and post-election. Id. at 4 (6/2/2025 BIA Dec. at
2).
The dissent’s counterargument, moreover, is self-defeating. At most, it proves that the BIA’s language is so
vague that a remand is in order. The dissent asserts that the BIA’s citation to the record clarifies that “[t]hese militias”
meant “non-PMF” groups. Dissent at 15 n.1. True, the BIA cited the U.S. Commission on Religious Freedom’s 2010
Annual Report. A.R. at 146 (citing id. at 2502 (U.S. Comm’n on Int’l Religious Freedom, Annual Rep. 71 (2010)).
But while the dissent claims that the BIA attempted to cite a sliver of text that “caps off” a larger section addressing
violence against religious minorities, including Christians, Dissent at 15 n.1., the Board, curiously, did not cite the
pages housing the bulk of that section. Assuming, as the dissent does, that the Board intended to reference pages it
did not cite, we are left to guess how the BIA attributed the violence described in that earlier section to militias in
2008. That violence was, by and large, carried out by unknown actors after Yonan’s merits hearing. See A.R. at
2499–2501 (U.S. Comm’n on Int’l Religious Freedom, supra at 68–70). Whether the Board summarily attributed all
of this post-2008 violence to militia groups operating in 2008 is unknown. In short, even under the dissent’s
interpretation, “we cannot be sure whether the [BIA] applied an improper standard,” leading us to the same result: a
remand. Diallo v. Gonzales, 241 F. App’x 312, 315 (6th Cir. 2007).

No. 25-3437, Yonan v. Blanche

11
id. at 271 (1/26/2022 Ramadan Decl. at 6)). The problem, however, is that the BIA dismissed
Yonan’s evidence concerning the rescission of the decree and the PMF’s newfound parliamentary
power without comparing it to this 2008 baseline. The BIA instead explicitly compared Yonan’s
changed-country-conditions evidence only to periods after 2008.
In a footnote, the Government offers up two additional arguments. It first attempts to pin
the Board’s error on Yonan because his third motion to reopen “explicitly stated that the ‘relevant
intervening period’ was 2020 to 2022 and discussed only changes since 2020.” D. 29 (Resp’t Br.
at 17 n.4) (quoting A.R. at 251 (Third Mot. Reopen at 7)). True, Yonan’s third motion to reopen
asked the BIA to compare country conditions in 2022 to those in 2020. A.R. at 251 (Third Mot.
Reopen at 7). But after we remanded Yonan’s case to the BIA in 2024, he filed a supplemental
brief in which he properly identified country conditions in 2008—not 2020—as the appropriate
comparator. A.R. at 24–25 (Suppl. Br. at 2–3). Rather than reframing its analysis, however, the
BIA adopted its December 2023 decision and continued to compare Yonan’s evidence of country
conditions in 2022 to those in the mid- to late-2010s. See id. at 3–4 (6/2/2025 BIA Dec. at 1–2).
The error, therefore, is the Board’s.
Next, the Government faults Yonan for failing to present evidence concerning conditions
in 2008, so as to allow the BIA to engage in the proper analysis. D. 29 (Resp’t Br. at 17 n.4).
Yonan very well may have failed to do so. Yet “the BIA did not address this alleged omission by
[Yonan] when it denied [Yonan’s] motion to reopen, and ‘the Board’s denial of relief may be

No. 25-3437, Yonan v. Blanche

12
affirmed only on the basis articulated in [its] decision.’” Lindor v. Holder, 317 F. App’x 492, 499
n.8 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Daneshvar v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 615, 626 (6th Cir. 2004)).
2

Finally, we consider harmless error. The Government does not make a harmless error
argument, and “[i]n this Circuit, we have we have endorsed a limited application of the harmless-
error doctrine in the immigration context.” Abdulahad, 99 F.4th at 295. “Instead, the ‘proper
course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the [BIA] for additional investigation or
explanation.’” Sebastian-Sebastian v. Garland, 87 F.4th 838, 850 (6th Cir. 2023) (alteration in
original) (quoting Bi Xia Qu v. Holder, 618 F.3d 602, 609 (6th Cir. 2010)); cf. Gonzales v. Thomas,
547 U.S. 183, 186 (2006) (per curiam) (“The law entrusts the agency to make the basic asylum
eligibility decision. . . . A court of appeals is not generally empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry
into the matter being reviewed and to reach its own conclusions . . . . Rather the proper course . . .
is to remand to the agency.” (citation modified)). We have, albeit rarely, “upheld the BIA’s
decision ‘on the basis of harmless error if the petitioner’s prospects are otherwise so weak that
there is no reason to believe . . . remand might lead to a different result.’” Mazariegos-Rodas v.
Garland, 122 F.4th 655, 676 (6th Cir. 2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Abdulahad, 99 F.4th
at 295).
“[T]his is not one of those rare instances.” Id. The evidence in the record—including the
sources cited by the BIA—suggests that the PMF may materially differ from the militia groups
operating in Iraq in 2008. Granted, the record indicates that there were militia groups with ties to

2
For much the same reason, we are unpersuaded by the dissent’s attempt to discount the significance of the
rescission of the decree recognizing the Chaldean Patriarch’s authority. Dissent at 16. Even if the BIA could have
deemed the rescission of the decree irrelevant to its analysis, it did not do so and “[w]e are not at liberty to search the
law and the record for reasoning to support the BIA’s decision because a court may not uphold an agency action on
grounds not relied on by the agency.” Preçetaj, 907 F.3d at 460 (quoting Mickeviciute v. I.N.S., 327 F.3d 1159, 1162–
63 (10th Cir. 2003)).

No. 25-3437, Yonan v. Blanche

13
the Iraqi government in 2008. See A.R. at 2502 (U.S. Comm’n on Int’l Religious Freedom, supra
at 71). That report, however, does not discuss how, if at all, those state-affiliated militia groups
targeted Christians like Yonan. See id. (discussing these militias in a section addressing Sunni-
Shi’a sectarian violence). Nor does it indicate that the militias targeted persons perceived as
American, as the PMF has done. See, e.g., id. at 434–36 (Smith Decl. at 9–11). In fact, the report
suggests that the Iraqi government had been attempting to curb the sectarian violence carried out
by those groups in 2008. See id. at 2502 (U.S. Comm’n on Int’l Religious Freedom, supra at 71)
(discussing a State Department report that “during 2008–09, the Iraqi government ‘became
increasingly successful in restoring security, in a generally non-sectarian manner, throughout the
country’”). Thus, Yonan may be able to demonstrate that the PMF—which controlled a plurality
of Iraq’s parliamentary seats, id. at 274 (1/26/2022 Ramadan Decl. at 9), and received billions
from the Iraqi fisc as of 2022, id. at 195 (7/25/2023 Ramadan Decl. at 24)—presents a far greater
risk of torture by state actors than did the militias operating in 2008. See Marqus, 968 F.3d at 587
(“An applicant seeking CAT relief must demonstrate that she faces a particularized and likely
threat of torture at the hands of a public official, or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official.”).
Accordingly, “[w]e therefore reverse and remand for the BIA to reconsider [Yonan’s]
motion to reopen based on changed country conditions using the correct evidentiary and legal
standards.” See Pablo Lorenzo, 779 F. App’x at 375.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we GRANT the petition for review, VACATE the Board’s
decision, and REMAND to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

No. 25-3437, Yonan v. Blanche

14
NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I agree with the majority that the BIA’s
opinions aren’t the picture of clarity. Even so, I don’t think that any imprecision rises to the level
of reversible error. See Orta Martinez v. Bondi, 2026 WL 208869, at *8 (6th Cir. Jan. 27, 2026)
(“No principle of administrative law or common sense requires us to remand a case in quest of a
perfect opinion unless there is reason to believe that the remand might lead to a different result.”
(citation modified)). Instead, because a natural reading of the BIA’s opinions shows that it
identified and applied the correct legal standard—and that any imperfections along the way don’t
overpower its otherwise sound conclusion—I respectfully dissent.
First, a brief recap of the legal standard governing motions to reopen removal proceedings.
Such motions are generally disfavored. See Preçetaj v. Sessions, 907 F.3d 453, 457 (6th Cir. 2018)
(“A party seeking reopening or reconsideration bears a heavy burden.” (citation modified)). And
because Yonan pursues CAT relief by reopening his proceedings past the normal rule limiting
petitioners to one such motion to be filed within ninety days of the removal order, he must show
that his claim is based on “material and previously unavailable evidence of changed country
conditions” showing a likelihood of torture. See Shabo v. Barr, 836 F. App’x 370, 372 (6th Cir.
2020) (per curiam). Most importantly to this appeal, the BIA must evaluate a changed-country-
conditions argument by “compar[ing] the evidence of country conditions submitted with the
motion [to reopen] to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below.” Abdulahad v.
Garland, 99 F.4th 275, 285 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Bi Feng Liu v. Holder, 560 F.3d 485, 491 (6th
Cir. 2009)).
The majority holds that the BIA didn’t properly apply the changed-conditions standard
despite correctly identifying it. To support that view, the majority cites two examples that, in its

No. 25-3437, Yonan v. Blanche

15
view, prove that the BIA compared country conditions significantly after 2008 to country
conditions as of Yonan’s motion for reopening. The first example doesn’t convince. And the
second shows, at most, a technically erroneous but ultimately harmless error on the BIA’s part.
To start with, the majority faults the BIA for its discussion of the PMF’s political gains in
Iraq’s 2021 parliamentary elections. The majority understands the BIA to have impermissibly
treated the mid-2010s, when the PMF sprung into existence to fight ISIS, as the starting point for
its analysis. But that’s not right. In its 2023 opinion, the BIA explained that it was comparing the
PMF’s pre- and post-election character to determine whether its political gains enabled it to
transgress against Christians materially more than earlier militias, which “[we]re not new and have
been targeting Christians with impunity throughout the period since the respondent’s removal
hearing.”
1
BIA 2023 Op., Admin. R., p.146. So the BIA didn’t use the 2021 elections’ effect to
gauge how much worse the PMF was than when it started. Rather, the BIA gauged whether the
elections made the PMF any worse than the militias transgressing against Christians back in 2008.

1
The majority faults me for “cling[ing] to [this] single sentence” and misreading its content. Maj. Op. p.10 n.1. On
the majority’s read, the “[t]hese militias” part of “[t]hese militias [we]re not new” refers to the PMF itself, not other
militias that existed in 2008. If that’s true, then the majority is right that the BIA’s discussion of the PMF had nothing
to do with Iraq’s country conditions as of 2008. But I disagree. In its quotation of the sentence in question, the
majority omitted the citation the BIA offered in support. That citation directs the reader to a report from Yonan’s
exhibits. And the relevant text on the cited page caps off an extended discussion of non-PMF violence against Iraqi
Christians in 2008, 2009, and 2010. Admin. R., pp.2500–02. So unless we have good reason to read the BIA’s citation
out of the BIA’s opinion, “[t]hese militias” refers to the ones operating at the same time Yonan was going through his
initial removal proceedings. Despite the majority’s quibbles with the BIA’s citation, the bottom line is this: the BIA
leaned on a report discussing bad actors harming Christians in 2008 to support its conclusion that the actors harming
Christians in 2022 weren’t materially worse. That’s enough for us to find that the BIA correctly applied the relevant
standard as to its consideration of the PMF.
Nor does the BIA’s 2025 opinion “[b]olster” the majority’s interpretation. Maj. Op. p.10 n.1. The single on-point
sentence in the BIA’s 2025 opinion reads: “For example, we noted [in 2023] that the respondent’s evidence does not
show greater impunity for PMF forces or an increase in their torture of Christians as a result of their political gains.”
Admin. R., p.4. That sentence doesn’t alter or walk back the BIA’s 2023 discussion, which, as I’ve explained, is best
read as assessing whether the 2021 elections emboldened the PMF to transgress against Christians more than the
militias operating circa 2008.

No. 25-3437, Yonan v. Blanche

16
Next, the majority objects to the BIA’s treatment of the Iraqi president’s decision to rescind
the decree officially recognizing the head of the Chaldean Catholic Church. Admittedly, the
rescission’s place in the analysis is a head-scratcher. Neither the original decree, nor its rescission,
bear on the two timeframes relevant to our analysis: 2008 or 2022. Iraq originally recognized the
head of the Chaldean Catholic Church by decree in 2013, five years after Yonan’s removal hearing.
And Iraq’s president rescinded the decree in mid-2023, more than a year after Yonan moved for
reopening. In other words, the decree didn’t exist at either of the two points in time that we must
treat as the endpoints of the temporal analysis. So Yonan can’t point to the decree’s issuance to
show favorable treatment of Christians as of 2008, and he can’t point to its rescission to show
heightened animus to Christians as of 2022. After all, the changed-conditions test calls for the BIA
to evaluate whether “persecution of [the petitioner’s] social group ha[s] escalated” between the
two relevant points in time. Dieng v. Barr, 947 F.3d 956, 962 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation modified).
Far from being an escalation, the Iraqi president’s rescission of the decree recognizing the head of
the Chaldean Catholic Church merely returned the country to the status quo as it existed when
Yonan’s final removal order issued. In any event, the BIA’s consideration of the decree, and its
rescission, was harmless. See Abdulahad, 99 F.4th at 295 (“If the agency’s reasoning was
inadequate, its decision may be upheld on the basis of harmless error” if “there is no reason to
believe remand might lead to a different result.” (citation modified)). Indeed, it benefitted Yonan
by giving him another potential—albeit improper—ground for showing changed country
conditions. So it’s no reason to vacate and remand.
So because I read the BIA’s opinions as applying the correct legal standard (and harmlessly
considering technically extraneous arguments), I respectfully dissent.